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Abstract
This thesis deals with the security and privacy of Implantable Medical Devices
(IMDs). Specifically, we analyse the security of widely used IMDs, and propose
practical and effective countermeasures to address the security issues we have
identified.
We first propose a protocol that allows an IMD to establish an end-to-end secure
channel with a hospital while preserving the patient’s privacy. This enables
remote monitoring and reprogramming of the patient’s IMD through a base
station installed in the patient’s home. Our solution prevents unauthorised
entities and adversaries from learning to whom the data belongs and to which
hospital the medical data is sent, among others. We also present a key
establishment protocol through which the base station and the IMD can agree
on a symmetric session key without needing to share any prior secrets. These
goals are achieved by using a physiological signal extracted from the patient’s
body in combination with fuzzy extractors.
Next, we perform a security analysis of an insulin pump system and we present
various attacks. Furthermore, we study the feasibility of using cryptography to
protect the wireless communication between the insulin pump and the remote
control. To this end, we present a cryptographic AES-based solution with an
updated message format that is optimised for energy consumption. We propose
multiple alternatives of our solution and implement them in an openMSP430, a
16-bit micro-controller similar to the one used in the insulin pump. For each of
these alternatives, we measure the extra computation and communication energy
cost due to the use of cryptography both in the remote control and the insulin
pump. Finally, we identify possible ways of decreasing the communication cost.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document the reverse engineering
and security analysis of the proprietary protocol between a device programmer
and some of the latest generation of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators
(ICDs) from one of the leading manufacturers over a long-range wireless channel.
v
vi ABSTRACT
Our goal is to evaluate the feasibility of reverse-engineering the proprietary
protocol by adversaries with limited resources who do not have physical access
to the devices but can only eavesdrop on the wireless communications. Our work
reveals the first attempt – known by the scientific community – to obfuscate
the data that is transmitted over the air. In addition, we demonstrate attacks
that can compromise the ICD’s availability and the patient’s privacy, and give
evidence that replay and spoofing attacks are also possible. All our findings
apply to at least 10 types of ICDs that are currently on the market. We also
discuss several ways of how adversaries can bypass the activation procedure
– which requires to be in close proximity to the patient – to send maliciously
crafted commands to the ICD from several meters away. Finally, several short-
term and long-term countermeasures are proposed, including a novel semi-oﬄine
key agreement protocol that we formally verify using ProVerif.
Furthermore, we describe the process of how to reverse engineer the proprietary
protocol between a device programmer and a neurostimulator to communicate
over a short-range channel. Subsequently, we assess the feasibility and conduct
several types of attacks on neurostimulators. To preclude these attacks, we
present a complete security architecture that includes the generation and
transportation of keys from the neurostimulator to the device programmer
and the necessary cryptographic protocols to secure the communication flow.
For generating the key on the neurostimulator, we investigate the potential of
using a signal extracted from the patient’s brain as a source of randomness. We
also propose a novel technique for securely and reliably transporting the key
from the neurostimulator to the device programmer. Our technique leverages the
fact that both the patient’s skin and the neurostimulator’s case are conductive.
To conclude, we provide a critical evaluation of countermeasures that rely on
patient’s physiological signals for establishing a cryptographic key between
two devices. Our work reveals serious security weaknesses in two pairing
protocols proposed in the literature. Furthermore, we show that most of the
existing countermeasures rely on unrealistic assumptions that underestimate
the adversaries’ capabilities. This work concludes by providing a set of
recommendations on how to securely use physiological signals in cryptographic
protocols.
Beknopte samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt de beveiliging en privacy van Implantable Medical
Devices (IMDs). Concreet analyseren we de beveiliging van veelgebruikte
IMD’s en stellen we praktische en effectieve tegenmaatregelen voor om de
beveiligingsproblemen aan te pakken die we hebben vastgesteld.
We stellen eerst een protocol voor waarmee een IMD een end-to-end beveiligd
kanaal met een ziekenhuis kan opzetten met behoud van de privacy van
de patiënt. Dit maakt monitoring op afstand en herprogrammering van de
IMD van de patiënt mogelijk via een basisstation dat bij de patiënt thuis is
geïnstalleerd. Onze oplossing voorkomt onder andere dat ongeautoriseerde
entiteiten en tegenstanders leren van wie de gegevens zijn en naar welk
ziekenhuis de medische gegevens worden verzonden. We presenteren ook
een nieuw sleuteluitwisselingsprotocol waarmee het basisstation en de IMD
overeenstemming kunnen bereiken over een symmetrische sessiesleutel zonder
voorafgaand geheimen te hoeven delen. Deze doelen worden bereikt door een
fysiologisch signaal te gebruiken dat geëxtraheerd wordt uit het lichaam van de
patiënt, in combinatie met fuzzy extractors.
Vervolgens voeren we een beveiligingsanalyse uit van een insulinepompsysteem en
presenteren we verschillende aanvallen. Verder bestuderen we de haalbaarheid
van het gebruik van cryptografie om de draadloze communicatie tussen de
insulinepomp en een bijbehorende afstandsbediening te beschermen. Hiertoe
presenteren we een op AES gebaseerde cryptografische oplossing met een
geüpdatete berichtindeling die is geoptimaliseerd voor energieverbruik. We
stellen meerdere alternatieven van onze oplossing voor en implementeren deze
in een openMSP430, een 16-bits microcontroller die gelijkaardig is aan die van
de insulinepomp. Voor elk van deze alternatieven meten we hoeveel energie er
extra verbruikt wordt in zowel de afstandsbediening als de insulinepomp voor
berekeningen en communicatie. Ten slotte identificeren we mogelijke manieren
om de energieconsumptie van de communicatie te verlagen.
vii
viii BEKNOPTE SAMENVATTING
Vervolgens voeren we de eerste beveiligingsanalyse en reverse engineering uit
van het gepatenteerde protocol tussen een apparaatprogrammeur en enkele van
de nieuwste generatie Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) via een
langeafstands draadloos kanaal. Ons doel is om de haalbaarheid te evalueren
van het reverse-engineer van het gepatenteerde protocol door tegenstanders met
beperkte middelen die geen fysieke toegang tot de apparaten hebben maar alleen
de berichten kunnen onderscheppen die draadloos worden verzonden. Daarnaast
demonstreren we aanvallen die de beschikbaarheid van de ICD en de privacy van
de patiënt in gevaar kunnen brengen, en kunnen we aantonen dat herhaling en
spoofing-aanvallen ook mogelijk zijn. Al onze bevindingen zijn van toepassing op
ten minste 10 soorten ICD’s die momenteel op de markt zijn. We bespreken ook
verschillende manieren waarop tegenstanders de activeringsprocedure kunnen
omzeilen - waarvoor men zich normaal dicht bij de patiënt moet bevinden - om
vanaf enkele meters schadelijke berichten naar de ICD te sturen. Ten slotte
worden verschillende kortetermijn en langetermijn tegenmaatregelen voorgesteld
om de bestaande kwetsbaarheden te reduceren of op te lossen, waaronder een
nieuw semi-oﬄine sleutelovereenkomstprotocol dat we formeel verifiëren met
behulp van ProVerif.
Verder beschrijven we het proces van het reverse engineer van het gepatenteerde
protocol tussen een apparaatprogrammeur en een neurostimulator om te commu-
niceren over een korteafstandskanaal. Vervolgens beoordelen we de haalbaarheid
en voeren we verschillende soorten aanvallen uit op neurostimulatoren. Om deze
aanvallen te verhinderen, presenteren we een complete beveiligingsarchitectuur
die het genereren en transporteren van sleutels van de neurostimulator naar
de apparaatprogrammeur mogelijk maakt en de noodzakelijke cryptografische
protocollen omvat om de communicatiestroom te beveiligen. Voor het genereren
van de sleutel op de neurostimulator, onderzoeken we het potentieel van het
gebruik van een signaal uit de hersenen van de patiënt als een bron van willekeur.
We stellen ook een nieuwe techniek voor om de sleutel veilig en betrouwbaar
van de neurostimulator naar de apparaatprogrammeur te transporteren, waarbij
gebruik wordt gemaakt van het feit dat zowel de huid van de patiënt als de
behuizing van de neurostimulator geleidend zijn.
Om af te sluiten, bieden we een kritische evaluatie van tegenmaatregelen die
berusten op de fysiologische signalen van de patiënt voor het genereren van
cryptografische sleutels tussen twee apparaten. Ons werk onthult ernstige
beveiligingszwakheden in twee pairing protocollen die in de literatuur worden
voorgesteld. Bovendien laten we zien dat de meeste van de bestaande
tegenmaatregelen steunen op onrealistische veronderstellingen die de capaciteiten
van de aanvaller onderschatten. Dit werk wordt afgesloten met een reeks
aanbevelingen voor het veilig gebruik van fysiologische signalen in cryptografische
protocollen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) allow to monitor and control a broad range
of diseases, such as cardiac arrhythmia, diabetes or Parkinson’s disease. The
most common IMDs include pacemakers, Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators
(ICDs), insulin pumps and neurostimulators. Already in 2001, the number of
patients in the United States with an IMD exceeded 25 million [31]. Currently,
seven to ten million people worldwide are living with Parkinson’s disease [14],
whereas diabetes affects more than 422 million people [23]. The number of
people with chronic diseases that require an IMD will continue to rise because
of people living an unhealthy lifestyle and the ageing of the population. For
example, it is estimated that more than a million pacemakers will be implanted
only in 2023, resulting in a revenue of more than 10 billion dollars [33].
Recent advancements in low-power wireless technologies and energy-efficient
hardware platforms made it possible to develop IMDs with wireless capabilities
which can deliver sophisticated treatments to patients. Once implanted in
a patient, an IMD can only interact with the outside world through its
analogue interface (i.e. internal sensors) and its wireless interface (i.e
wireless bidirectional communication link), as shown in Figure. 1.1.
The internal sensors are used to constantly measure physiological signals in the
patient’s body, enabling the IMD to detect abnormal situations and actuate
accordingly. For example, this allows an ICD to deliver an electrical shock to
the patient’s heart when this is not beating correctly1.
1Some IMDs also have a built-in speaker that emits a sound when the IMD is not
functioning correctly or before its battery is fully depleted.
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Figure 1.1: System architecture. The dashed lines denote links that do not
always exist.
The wireless interface enables the IMD to communicate with several external
devices such as device programmers, base stations and external sensors. Next,
we focus on the wireless communication channel between the IMD and each of
these peripherals.
By means of a device programmer, doctors cannot only gather telemetry data
and patient’s information stored in the IMD, but also modify the IMD’s settings
via the wireless interface. In some cases, device programmers have an Internet
connection that allows IMD manufacturers to remotely update their software.
IMDs can often interact with base stations to monitor the patient’s condition
when he is at home. Base stations are placed in close proximity to the patient’s
bed in order to collect telemetry data from the IMD while the patient is sleeping.
This telemetry data is then transmitted over phone or the Internet to a server
that is often managed by the IMD’s manufacturer. Doctors – and in some cases
also patients – can log in to a website portal in order to review the telemetry
data. Currently, there are several remote monitoring systems available in the
market. In the near future, these remote monitoring systems could be extended
to enable a bidirectional communication link between the base station and the
IMD, allowing doctors in the hospital to remotely reprogram the patient’s IMD
when the patient is at home.
In addition to being able to interact with device programmers and base stations,
IMDs can often also communicate with external sensors – either worn by the
patient or implanted in his body – via the wireless interface. The data collected
by the sensors is sent to the IMD so that the latter can dynamically adjust its
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settings without requiring the doctor’s intervention. An example of IMD-sensor
communication would be an insulin pump system where the patient attaches
a continuous glucose monitoring sensor to his abdomen that periodically and
automatically measures and sends their glucose level to the insulin pump.
All these developments make IMDs more prone to failures and broaden their
attack surface. As IMDs are devices that perform critical functions, they can
jeopardise the patient’s life if they stop working correctly due to unintentional
or intentional reasons. According to Zian Tseng, a physician who investigated
cardiac devices at the University of California, uninentional failures due to IMD
malfunctions occur more often than expected [34]. Surprisingly, half of the
cardiac devices he analysed had serious defects ranging from drained batteries
to mechanical failures. Similarly, intentional failures in IMDs due to attacks by
adversaries pose an important threat. Adversaries could control the patient’s
IMD by sending maliciously crafted commands to alter its settings or turn
off the therapies. Furthermore, adversaries could compromise the patient’s
privacy by intercepting the messages exchanged over the air between the device
programmer and the IMD. These messages contain highly sensitive information
including personal patient data, such as their address and social security number,
and medical data such as information about the treatment and telemetry.
There are several reasons why someone may want to launch attacks against
patients with an IMD.
• Cause physical harm. Criminal organizations could threaten and
blackmail patients, or even worse, hurt or kill them. Although there
are no known real attacks against patients with an IMD, in 2007, the
former Vice-President of the United States, Dick Cheney, asked his doctor
to disable the wireless interface of his pacemaker to thwart possible
assassination attempts [20].
• Economical. Individuals, companies or potential competitors of IMD
manufacturers could influence stock markets to make profit. For example,
in 2016, a team of security researchers called MedSec allegedly investigated
the security of several St. Jude Medical implanted heart devices, and
concluded that these devices had serious security vulnerabilities [28–30].
Rather than notifying their findings to St. Jude Medical, MedSec released
a report jointly with the investment firm Muddy Waters, causing St. Jude
shares to fall 10 percent. Muddy Waters and MedSec admitted that they
had a financial agreement to profit from a fall in St. Jude’s stock price.
• Privacy breaches. IMDs collect highly privacy-sensitive data from
the patient’s body. For example, by analysing the data gathered by a
pacemaker, one can learn the patient’s physical activity pattern, making
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it even possible to infer when the patient had sex. In this thesis, we
focus on how adversaries could get access to this data in an illegitimate
way. However, even if unauthorised access to this data is prevented, some
privacy risks remain. For example, there is a risk that this data is used
for other purposes than the initially intended one. The latter case is out
of the scope of this thesis.
• Tracking. The messages exchanged over the air between the device
programmer and the IMD typically include information that can uniquely
identify patients such as the unique IMD’s serial number. Thus, adversaries
could track, locate or identify patients simply by intercepting the messages
sent by IMDs. If adversaries install beacons in strategic places throughout
a city, they could even learn the patients’ movement patterns.
1.1 Contributions of the Thesis
The main contribution of this thesis is to advance the understanding of security
and privacy in IMDs. We mainly contributed to this field in two ways: (i) by
analysing the security and discovering vulnerabilities in several widely used
IMDs and (ii) by proposing practical and effective countermeasures to address
the security weaknesses we have identified. The mapping of the contributions
to our papers is shown in Table 1.1.
Our work on identifying vulnerabilities in IMDs had considerable real-world
impact and received significant media coverage in newspapers, radio and TV
shows. We followed the principles of responsible disclosure and notified the
affected manufacturers six months before publishing our results. In all the
papers, we deliberately omitted some information so that our work does not
help someone with malicious intentions to perform attacks on real patients.
We had discussions with the affected manufacturers to evaluate the risks of
these attacks and suggested possible mitigation strategies. All manufacturers
acknowledged our findings and some of them are currently considering adding
security mechanisms in their devices as a result of our work. In addition, recent
research from our team and other researchers has led the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to release several documents with recomendations for
mitigating and managing cyber-security threats in IMDs [22]. Currently, the
FDA is responsible only for ensuring that IMDs are sufficiently safe and effective
to be implanted within the patient’s body. However, in the near future the FDA
will additionally check if IMDs comply with their security guidelines before
giving its approval.
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In detail, our contributions can be summarised as follows:
C1) Security analysis of IMDs. We analysed the security of the
wireless protocol between a device programmer and widely used IMDs. This
includes Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs), insulin pumps and
neurostimulators from the leading IMD manufacturers. As IMDs typically
utilise proprietary protocols for which no information is available, we fully
reverse engineered the protocols using a non-invasive black-box approach and
inexpensive hardware devices. The reverse engineering led us to document the
protocols in use and to find the protocol state-machine. Our main goal was to
demonstrate that proprietary protocols can be reverse engineered by adversaries
with limited resources who do not have physical access to the devices but can
only eavesdrop on the wireless communications. Our work has resulted in the
identification of important security weaknesses in IMDs used by millions of
patients worldwide.
C2) Wireless attacks on IMDs. We demonstrated passive and active
wireless attacks against various types of IMDs which could jeopardise the
patient’s life or compromise the patient’s privacy. To mount these attacks, we
used commercial antennas along with inexpensive hardware equipment such
as Software Defined Radios (SDRs) and Data Acquisition Systems (DAQs).
Moreover, we investigated the feasibility of these attacks, and showed how to
overcome some of the challenges that adversaries would face to carry out these
attacks in practice.
C3) Study the feasibility of using cryptography in IMDs. We
conducted the first study on whether cryptography can be used in IMDs
without significantly reducing their battery lifetimes. Our work targeted a
wearable insulin pump that wirelessly communicates with a remote control. We
presented an AES-based solution that is optimised for energy consumption, and
implemented it in a micro-controller similar to the one used in the insulin pump.
The choice of AES was based on the hypothesis that the computation cost
would be negligible compared to the communication cost. We proposed several
variants of our solution and measured for each of them the extra computation
and communication energy cost due to the use of cryptography in both the
remote control and the insulin pump. Finally, we elaborated on possible ways
to optimise the message format in order to decrease the total energy cost.
C4) Novel key establishment solutions for IMDs. We proposed novel
cryptographic solutions for a device programmer and an IMD to securely
establish a session key. We consider the case in which the devices share a
long-term key beforehand, as well as the case in which the devices do not share
any prior secrets. For the former case, we designed a novel semi-oﬄine key
agreement protocol where the master key is updated periodically. This limits the
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impact of attacks that aim at compromising the master key stored in all device
programmers. Each time a new master key is generated, the IMD can update
its device-specific key using bilinear pairings. For the latter case, we proposed a
low-cost source of randomness for IMD as well as a novel technique for securely
and reliably transporting a key from the IMD to the device programmer.
C5) Security evaluation and framework of countermeasures based on
physiological signals. We conducted a critical evaluation of countermeasures
that allow a device programmer and an IMD to generate and establish a
key through the use of a patient’s physiological signal. To this end, we first
challenged several assumptions made by manufacturers and demonstrated that
some of them do not hold in practical scenarios. Our work revealed serious
security weaknesses in two pairing protocols proposed in the literature, namely
the H2H and Biosec protocols. This shows that it is a non-trivial task to design
secure and lightweight pairing protocols for IMDs based on the use of a patient’s
physiological signal. Motivated by our findings, we provided a set of security
design guidelines in which we specified the requirements physiological signals
should satisfy to be used in cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, we described
how to use patient’s physiological signals in combination with fuzzy extractors
securely while keeping the energy cost in the IMD as low as possible.
C6) Design of a privacy preserving system for remote healthcare
monitoring and reprogramming. We presented a protocol by which an
IMD can establish an end-to-end secure channel with a hospital. This allows
remote monitoring and reprogramming of an IMD when the patient is at
home. However, even if cryptography is used, the context information of these
communications, also known as metadata, could leak sensitive information
about patients. For example, unauthorised entities or adversaries could infer
the patients’ health condition or discover which disease they have. Our protocol
has been designed to conceal this information and hence it provides privacy to
patients. As a result, unauthorised entities are unable to learn to whom the
medical data belongs or to which hospital the data is sent. To achieve this, we
utilised cryptography and an anonymous communication channel.
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Table 1.1: Mapping of contributions to our papers.
Paper/Contribution C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
A Privacy-preserving Remote Healthcare
System Offering End-to-End Security
On the Feasibility of Cryptography for
a Wireless Insulin Pump System
On the (in)security of the Latest Generation
Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators
and How to Secure Them
Securing Wireless Neurostimulators
A Critical Evaluation of Security Solutions
based on Physiological Signals
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis mainly comprises of two parts. In Part I, we define the objectives,
contributions and motivation behind this thesis. In Chapter 2 we give an
overview of the proposed attacks against IMDs to place our work into context.
Chapter 3 describes several methodologies and techniques for reverse engineering
proprietary protocols. In Chapter 4 we group and summarise the existing
countermeasures including those that we have proposed. Finally, Part I gives
concluding remarks and presents potential research directions for future work.
Part II consists of five publications:
1. We present a privacy-preserving protocol for establishing an end-to-end
secure channel between an IMD and a hospital. This protocol can be used
for remote monitoring and reprogramming of the patient’s IMD when the
patient is at home [90].
2. We analyse the security of an insulin pump system, and study the feasibility
of using cryptography to create a secure wireless channel between the
insulin pump and the remote control [92].
3. We evaluate the security of some of the latest generation ICDs, and
propose several short and long-term countermeasures [91].
4. We analyse the security of a neurostimulator, and present a security
architecture for securing the wireless channel between the neurostimulator
and the device programmer [93].
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5. We provide a critical evaluation of security solutions based on the
use of patient’s physiological signals for generating cryptographic keys.
Furthermore, we provide a set of recommendations on how to securely use
patient’s physiological signals in cryptographic protocols.
Chapter 2
Attacks on Medical Devices
Prior work has investigated possible ways of conducting attacks against IMDs.
We group the proposed attacks into two main categories depending on the
type of interface that adversaries need to exploit them (see Figure. 1.1). This
includes (i) wireless attacks where adversaries leverage the wireless nature of the
communication to perform passive and active attacks and (ii) analogue attacks
whereby adversaries tamper with the readings taken by the sensors embedded
on IMDs to cause the latter to actuate incorrectly.
While analogue attacks on IMDs have received little research attention until
now, there has been a significant amount of research on studying wireless attacks
on IMDs over the last decade. The main challenge that this research had to
face is the lack of publicly available information about the specifications of the
wireless protocols being used. This is because IMD’s manufacturers typically
use proprietary (i.e. non-standard) protocols whose specifications are kept secret
as a means to provide security, also known as security-through-obscurity.
2.1 Wireless Attacks
This section first reviews several assumptions that are widely adopted by IMD’s
manufacturers which do not hold in practice. Subsequently, we subdivide the
proposed wireless attacks according to device type. This includes (i) attacks on
implantable cardiac devices, (ii) attacks on insulin pump and infusion systems
and (iii) attacks on neurostimulators. Note that there exist other IMDs with
wireless capabilities but their security has not yet been analysed.
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2.1.1 Are Wireless Attacks Realistic?
Manufacturers often underestimate the adversaries’ capabilities. Therefore, they
make unrealistic security assumptions which can significantly affect the security
of IMDs.
• Need for sophisticated hardware equipment: Before developing
a security solution, an adversarial model should be defined that is as
realistic as possible. This is important because the security mechanisms
are designed to protect only against the type of adversaries specified in
the adversarial model. Researchers typically consider adversaries who
can eavesdrop the wireless channel, modify and inject messages or have
physical access to the devices. Despite this type of adversary is widely
accepted within the security community, manufacturers often consider
weaker adversaries with limited resources and capabilities.
It is important to stress that, as technology advances, the price of
the necessary hardware equipment decreases. This enables adversaries
to execute complex attacks using only commercial and inexpensive
devices. For example, there is a 32 dollar device available in the market
for conducting eavesdropping-and-jamming attacks to compromise the
security of rolling-code-based systems [25]. These systems are currently
used in most cars and garage doors. Other examples include SDR-based
devices such as the HackRF One [61], bladeRF [99], YARD Stick One [62]
and USRP [12]. All these devices can be purchased online for a few
hundred dollars.
Another assumption that does not hold in practice is that adversaries
cannot conduct their attacks without getting noticed, due to the size
of their hardware devices and their antennas. There are already
examples that show how hardware devices can be miniaturised to fit
in a backpack [78]. Furthermore, there is a substantial number of research
papers that focus on designing inexpensive and small antennas with
reasonable gain and directivity. These antennas could even be attached
to the adversaries’ clothes, enabling adversaries to hide these antennas in
the pockets of a jacket or under a sweater.
• Physical range constraints: Most IMDs with wireless capabilities
can communicate with device programmers over a few meters. A
common assumption is that adversaries need to be a few meters away
from the targeted device to be able to capture or transmit messages.
Nevertheless, adversaries can use sophisticated hardware equipment along
with directional antennas to extend the distance from which they can
intercept these messages. Furthermore, adversaries do not need to follow
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the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations and can
transmit their messages using a higher power. This could enable them to
extend the communication range even up to a few orders of magnitude.
For example, BlueSniper enables to mount attacks on Bluetooth devices
from more than 1.5 km [50]. Similarly, a long range Radio-Frequency
IDentification (RFID) reader can be modified to clone a RFID tag from
up to 1 m away [60]. Extending such short-range communication channels
even further is however unrealistic due to the significant increase in antenna
size.
2.1.2 Attacks on Implantable Cardiac Devices
The first security analysis of an ICD with wireless capabilities was conducted
by Halperin et al. in 2008 [70]. They partially reverse-engineered the
proprietary protocol between a device programmer and an ICD over short-
range communication (less than 10 cm). For the reverse engineering, they
followed a black-box methodology (see Section 3 for more details about this
approach). Their study revealed that the transmissions sent over the air between
the device programmer and the ICD are neither encrypted nor authenticated.
This led them to perform several types of attacks on ICDs simply by replaying
messages previously transmitted by legitimate device programmers. Although
these attacks could compromise the safety and the privacy of patients, their
impact is quite limited. Firstly, adversaries would need to be in close proximity
(few centimetres) with the patient, not only to intercept the messages sent
by these devices while there is an ongoing communication, but also to replay
the captured messages to the ICD at a later stage. Furthermore, adversaries
would be able to replay only those messages that were previously sent by device
programmers.
Hei et al. introduced various Denial-of-Service (DoS) wireless attacks that can
be performed against any type of IMD without needing to reverse engineer the
proprietary protocol [73]. Their goal is to reduce the IMD’s battery lifetime from
several years to only a few weeks. These attacks leverage the fact that IMDs need
to perform several computations when receiving a new message in order to check
if it is valid. By repeatedly sending messages, adversaries can force the IMD
to verify if their messages are valid, which could lead to a significant overhead
in terms of energy consumption. Unfortunately, these attacks are difficult to
defeat and cannot be prevented with traditional cryptographic solutions.
A few years later, Barnaby Jack demonstrated several attacks on pacemakers
at the BreakPoint security conference in Melbourne. However, the exact details
of his work are not known [19].
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Our contribution. In [91], we analysed the security of the latest generation
of ICDs from one of the leading IMD manufacturers. In contrast to the work by
Halperin et al. [70], our work focused on the protocol used between the device
programmer and the ICD over a long-range communication (few meters). As
the protocol was proprietary, the first step of our analysis was to fully reverse
engineer it. By using a black-box methodology, we studied the feasibility of
reverse engineering the proprietary protocol by a weak adversary who does
not have physical access to the devices but can only eavesdrop on wireless
communications. We demonstrated that the proprietary protocol has serious
design and implementation weaknesses. Our work revealed the first known
attempt by a IMD manufacturer to obfuscate the data that is transmitted over
the air. The data is obfuscated by XORing it with a bit sequence generated
from a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). This LFSR sequence is constant
throughout sessions, and is reused in all ICDs we analysed. We validated that
our findings apply at least to 10 different types of ICDs that are currently on
the market.
After learning the inner-workings of the protocol, we were able to carry out
attacks that could compromise the ICD’s availability and violate the patient’s
privacy. Moreover, we demonstrated that replay and spoofing attacks are also
possible. As the ICDs we studied are activated by the device programmer over
short-range communication (few centimetres), these attacks could suffer from
the same limitations as the attacks proposed by Halperin et al. [70]. However,
we found that ICDs remain in a semi-active mode for 5 min every time a
communication session with a device programmer is terminated. While being
in this mode, ICDs accept messages sent over the long-range communication
channel. Adversaries could thus exploit this 5 minute time window to mount
attacks from several meters away. The only limitation for adversaries is that
they need to be present at the specific time that the patient has his ICD in
semi-active mode.
Follow-up work. As previously explained, MedSec investigated the security
of several implantable cardiac devices from St. Jude Medical. Subsequently,
MedSec released a report where they claimed to have found serious security
vulnerabilities in these devices [29]. St. Jude Medical denied the veracity of
this report and claimed that MedSec analysed an old software version that was
no longer used on their device programmers. However, the FDA has recently
issued a (voluntary) recall to patch security weaknesses in 465,000 St. Jude
pacemakers [32]. Unfortunately, updating the firmware of these devices comes
with risks associated to possible device failures. For example, St. Jude stated
that the devices can stop working after the update in 0.003% of cases.
Recently, Rios and Butts have identified serious security weaknesses in
implantable cardiac devices from the four leading manufacturers [112]. Instead
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of using a black-box methodology similar to ours, they studied the feasibility
of obtaining the firmware from a device programmer or a base station and
analysing it. Thus, they implicitly considered an adversary who possesses or has
temporary access to one of these devices. Their findings revealed that the Joint
Test Action Group (JTAG) and Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
(UART) debugging interfaces are not disabled, making it possible for adversaries
to obtain the firmware of these devices. Since no firmware packing, obfuscation
or encryption techniques are used, the firmware could be reverse engineered
easily (see Section 3 for more details about this approach). This task is
made even easier due to the use of ASCII text in function names, source code
comments and software debugging symbols. Moreover, they found sensitive
information, such as hard-coded credentials and patient’s data, stored in the
clear in device programmers and base stations. The patient’s data included
physicians’ names, phone numbers, social security numbers or treatment data.
Additionally, they reported that both device programmers and base stations
lack security mechanisms to validate the source of the entity that distributes
the firmware for these devices. Adversaries can thus exploit this weakness to
upload malicious firmware in these devices. Finally, they discovered that the
device programmer’s firmware include third-party libraries that contain many
vulnerabilities. For example, one vendor has more than 3500 vulnerabilities in
its third-party components.
2.1.3 Attacks on Insulin Pumps Systems and Infusion Systems
In 2011, Jay Radcliffe, a diabetic patient, analysed the security of his insulin
pump and continuous glucose monitoring system [106]. He captured several
messages sent by these devices using an Arduino board, and then reverse-
engineered parts of the proprietary protocol. For this purpose, he did not only
analyse the captured messages but also inspected the Java library file (i.e. JAR
file) included in the insulin pump. The latter was possible because these files
were not obfuscated, thus facilitating the analysis.
In the same year, Li et al. reverse engineered the proprietary wireless
communication protocol between an insulin pump and a remote control [86].
To show what adversaries could do after learning how the protocol works, they
conducted several passive and active attacks against an insulin pump from
20 meters away. The authors stated that it would be possible to extend this
range even further by using an antenna with more directivity or a SDR that
allows to transmit messages with higher power.
In 2015, Billy Rios found important security weaknesses in the Hospira’s symbiq,
an infusion system that can be used to deliver medications by pumping them
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directly into the patient’s bloodstream [26]. This system has a wired or wireless
connection to communicate with the hospital’s information system (HIS). His
findings indicated that adversaries could fully control the infusion pump to
change the dosage that is delivered to the patient. This could lead to over-
or under-infusion of critical patient therapies. The FDA acknowledged these
findings and recommended hospitals to stop using this infusion system [27].
Hospira stated that they will develop a software update to patch these problems.
This patch is intended to close some ports of the infusion system that were
initially open and to provide extra security protection.
In 2016, Jay Radcliffe analysed the security of the Animas OneTouch Ping
insulin pump system [107]. This work reported that this system does not have
any security mechanisms to protect the wireless data exchange between the
devices.
Our contribution. In [92], we evaluated the security and privacy properties
of the wireless communication between a widely used insulin pump and all
its peripherals. This includes a remote control, a glucose meter, a continuous
glucose monitor system and a USB stick. To achieve our goal, we first fully
reverse engineered the proprietary protocol between the insulin pump and its
peripherals using a black-box methodology. Prior to reverse engineering the
protocol, we had to discover several wireless communication parameters used
by these devices, such as the transmission frequency, modulation scheme and
symbol rate. Subsequently, we created our own receiver and configured it
with these wireless communication parameters to capture the messages sent
by these devices. Our reverse engineering of the protocol resulted in the
identification of the message format and the protocol state-machine in use. Our
work demonstrated that all messages transmitted between these devices are sent
both unencrypted and unauthenticated. We then went one step further and
showed that this knowledge can be used to mount several passive and active
attacks on the insulin pump.
Follow-up work. Reverberi and Oswald investigated the security of a
continuous glucose monitor system with wireless capabilities called Dexcom
G4 [111]. This system consists of a sensor (implanted) that is connected to a
transmitter, and a hand-held receiver device that collects the messages sent
by the transmitter and displays the patient’s glucose level. They started their
analysis by removing the plastic packaging covering the transmitter to find
the exact micro-controller and transceiver being used. Subsequently, they
identified the debug pins of the micro-controller and connected a suitable
programmer to them for extracting the device’s firmware. Yet, they were unable
to recover the device’s firmware because the read-out protection bit of the
micro-controller was set. At this stage, they opted for capturing messages sent
by the transmitter using a SDR. After analysing these messages, they came to
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similar findings compared to ours; the Dexcom G4 protocol does not employ
any security mechanisms and the transmitted messages are neither encrypted
nor authenticated. Finally, they devised a series of attacks against this system.
This ranged from spoofing attacks that aim at maliciously changing the sensor’s
readings to privacy attacks whose goal is to track patients based on the messages
sent by their transmitters.
Skorobogatov detailed the main challenges for extracting the firmware from an
IMD, and discussed how to overcome them [125]. His work targeted a wireless
tubeless insulin pump manufactured by Insulet called OmniPod. By using a
combination of hardware techniques, he was able to find the circuit diagram of
the device and identify the locations of the reset and debug pins in the chip.
Furthermore, he described possible ways of disassembling the firmware once it
has been extracted. The analysis of the disassembled code to find the inner
workings of the wireless protocol was left as a future work.
2.1.4 Attacks on Neurostimulators
Our contribution. In [93], we performed the first security analysis of the
wireless protocol between a device programmer and a neurostimulator over
short-range communication (less than 10 cm). We focused on a commercial
neurostimulator from one of the leading manufacturers. Due to the lack of
publicly available information on how the protocol works, we first had to fully
reverse engineer the protocol to determine the message format and the protocol
state-machine. This was achieved following a black-box reverse engineering
methodology and using inexpensive hardware devices. Our evaluation revealed
that the wireless protocol does not use any cryptographic mechanisms. While
these security weaknesses could be exploited to execute attacks against
neurostimulators, these attacks suffer from several limitations in practice. Firstly,
adversaries would need to know the serial number (SN) of the neurostimulator.
Intuitively, one possible way for adversaries to get the neurostimulator’s SN
would be to eavesdrop the wireless channel to capture the messages exchanged
between these devices while there is an ongoing session. However, we found
that neurostimulators have an important implementation flaw that makes them
accept messages with an empty neurostimulator SN field. This means that
adversaries could create a valid message, without a SN, and reuse it for all
neurostimulators. Secondly, another limitation is that adversaries would need
to be in close proximity to the patient to be able to communicate with his
neurostimulator. We argue that there are definitely several scenarios, such as
a crowded subway, where this would be possible, but this clearly reduces the
impact of our attacks.
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2.2 Analogue Attacks
All electronic circuits have components that can behave as an antenna under
certain circumstances. When this occurs, these components can capture
ElectroMagnetic Interference (EMI) radiation produced by other devices such
as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment. The FDA has acknowledged
that EMI could lead IMDs to malfunction and has taken measures to reduce
the risks. Making IMDs resistant to unintentional, high-power EMI has been
the focus of a substantial amount of research over the last years. Yet, several
incidents have been reported allegedly related to EMI in IMDs [8].
Recently, Foo Kune et al. investigated the feasibility of injecting intentional EMI
signals on the sensors embedded on ICDs to maliciously alter their readings [84].
The goal of these attacks is to convince the ICD that the patient’s heart is not
beating correctly when it actually does so. To execute these attacks, one could
inject high-power EMI signals. However, high-power EMI signals are difficult
to generate and could disable the electronic components of the equipment used
by adversaries. Instead, the authors proposed to inject intentional, low-power
EMI signals since this can cause fluctuations on the order of millivolts which
are sufficient to influence the sensor’s readings.
They proposed two attacks: (i) baseband EMI attacks and (ii) amplitude-
modulated EMI attacks. The former relies on injecting signals within the
sensor’s frequency band (i.e. baseband) whereas the latter is based on injecting
signals on a frequency outside the baseband but still within the frequency band
where the sensor responds. As amplitude-modulated EMI attacks target devices
that lack filters and IMDs have filters to remove undesired signals outside
the baseband, these attacks do not pose a real threat for IMDs. To conduct
baseband EMI attacks, the first step is to find the resonant frequency of the
sensor. They performed a series of experiments where they swept through
all possible IMD’s frequencies (between 0.1-1 KHz), and observed at which
frequency band the signals had the strongest amplitude. These attacks could
cause pacing inhibition or induce defibrillation from 1-2 meters. However, the
authors stated that, when testing these attacks in a more realistic setup, the
range from which these attacks can be conducted decreases to 5 cm. It is unclear
whether these attacks could be executed from further away if a more powerful
EMI source is used.
Chapter 3
Reverse-Engineering
Methodologies
Most IMDs use proprietary (i.e. non-standard) protocols to wirelessly
communicate with device programmers. IMD manufacturers rely on maintaining
the protocol specifications secret as a means to provide “security”, i.e. security-
through-obscurity. They assume that adversaries who do not have access to
the protocol specifications, will not be capable of learning its inner-workings.
However, several papers have already shown that proprietary protocols can be
reverse engineered without prior knowledge.
Severe weaknesses were found in proprietary protocols used in other application
domains. For example, Rouf et al. analysed the security and privacy of
Automatic Meter Readings (AMR) systems. These systems allow a receiver
device when being in close vicinity to a house to wirelessly gather electricity, gas
and water consumption data [115]. By reverse engineering the protocol being
used, they determined that these systems lack security mechanisms to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the consumption data. Similarly, Smith
et al. reverse engineered the wireless proprietary protocol between airplanes
and ground stations, which is also known as the Aircraft Communications
Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) [126]. Their work revealed that
99% of the traffic is unencrypted and that it is possible to recover the key used
in the substitution cipher in order to decrypt the 1% of encrypted traffic.
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3.1 Overview
Intuitively, the easiest way for someone to learn how a protocol works would
be to steal its specifications through information leaks, social engineering
attacks or intrusion into computer systems. However, these attacks are not
always possible. Protocol reverse engineering implies finding both the message
format and how messages are exchanged between two devices (i.e. protocol
state-machine) without knowing its specifications. There are several techniques
for reverse engineering a protocol, each of which has its own advantages and
disadvantages. This includes (i) black-box reverse engineering and (ii) firmware
reverse engineering. The former is non-invasive and does not require to have
physical access to the device, whereas the latter is often invasive and requires
either to have physical access to the device itself or to get a copy of it. In
practice, the choice of which methodology to use will mainly depend on the
information available about the device and if it can be broken. Next, we describe
each of these reverse engineering techniques more in detail.
3.2 Black-box Reverse Engineering
Black-box reverse engineering is a technique that allows to infer the inner-
workings of a protocol simply by providing inputs to a device and observing
its outputs. In this case, one can use a device programmer to perform an
operation on an IMD and then inspect the format of the messages transmitted
as a result of this operation. We acknowledge that having access to a device
programmer to choose which operations are performed can speed up the process
of reverse engineering. Even if the process of reverse engineering may take
longer, adversaries can still learn the protocol inner-workings when they do not
know which actions are performed on the device programmer.
Through a device programmer one could, for example, modify the patient’s
name, stored on the IMD, and intercept the messages exchanged between
the device programmer and the IMD. By slightly changing the input each
time and performing differential analysis, it is possible to learn where the bits
corresponding to the patient’s name are placed within the message and how
this data is encoded. By following this methodology and conducting a thorough
analysis of the captured messages, one can infer all the message fields.
To reverse engineer a protocol using a black-box methodology, several messages
sent by the devices need to be first captured while performing different operations
on the IMD, e.g. changing the patient’s name. To this end, one can either
fabricate a receiver device, manipulate an existing receiver device or use an
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SDR and then connect an antenna to it. As antennas operate in a special range
of frequency, it is important to design or buy an antenna that can intercept
the signals sent by the device programmer and the IMD. The antenna’s gain
will be one of the factors that will determine from which distance the messages
can be captured. However, the larger the antenna gain, the more expensive the
antenna will be.
The process of reverse engineering a protocol using a black-box methodology
can be divided into three main steps. Next, we describe each of these steps
more in detail.
1) Get public information from the Internet: All wireless devices sold in
the U.S. have a FCC ID that contains all the information about their internal
functioning such as circuit diagrams, block diagrams or internal photographs [5].
However, IMD manufacturers typically argue that this information should
remain confidential. According to a confidentiality request by Medtronic, one of
the world’s leading IMD manufacturers, “disclosure would, in effect, give away
the fruits of the labours of Medtronic’s engineering personnel, who have designed
the equipment and the manufacturing processes. Disclosure would also offer
competitors additional unwarranted insight into the state of product development
thereby allowing such competitors an advantage that would not be available to
Medtronic” [18].
2) Find the wireless communication parameters: As most information
about these devices is kept secret, an important step is to identify the wireless
communication parameters used by the devices.
• Transmission frequency: The transmission frequency of these devices
is typically one of the few data that can be obtained through its FCC ID.
Both device programmers and IMDs have their own FCC ID, which is
typically printed on the back of the device.
• Modulation scheme: The modulation scheme can be found by
intercepting messages and analysing the waveform of the signals both in
the time and frequency domain [105]. Due to the asymmetry between
device programmers and IMDs, it is not uncommon to find two distinct
modulation schemes depending on the direction of the communication.
Examples of modulation schemes used in device programmer - IMD
communications are Frequency Shift Keying (FSK), Differential Phase
Shift Keying (DPSK) or On-Off Keying (OOK).
• Symbol rate: Discovering the duration of the modulated bits, also known
as symbols, just by examining the signal’s waveform is often a very difficult
task. This mainly depends on the type of modulation being used. For
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example, when using OOK, the ‘1s’ and ‘0s’ can be easily distinguished
allowing to measure the symbol rate. In some other cases, it is possible
to look at the raw bits (i.e. bits before modulation) to be transmitted
by opening the device and tapping one pin of its micro-controller [70, 92].
This could be seen as a semi black-box approach. However, sometimes
neither of the previous two approaches can be used to find the symbol
rate. For those cases, we developed a technique for estimating the symbol
rate based on the Hilbert transform [91].
Our technique requires (at least) one message or parts of it whose bits are
known. For this purpose, one can leverage the synchronization sequence
at the beginning of each message, which typically contains a series of
alternating ‘1s’ and ‘0s’ sent consecutively. Our technique can be applied
to any modulation scheme in which the information is embedded in the
frequency or the phase of the signal (e.g. FSK).
However, this technique does not provide the exact symbol rate value,
but gives a small range of possible symbol rate values. To find the exact
symbol rate, we created a program that performs a sweep over all possible
symbol rate values within this range, increasing the symbol rate by one
symbol each time. For each iteration, our program demodulates several
messages, and checks whether the demodulated bits are equal for all the
messages. This allows to find the symbol rate being used by the devices,
as the correct symbol rate is the one for which no bit errors are produced.
3) Capture and analyse messages sent by the devices: Subsequently,
one can create a receiver program for capturing and demodulating the messages
sent by the devices. We observed that if the receiver program uses slightly
different wireless communication parameters compared to those used by the
devices, this leads to an incorrect demodulation of the messages, i.e. messages
with erroneous bits. After demodulating the messages, one can distinguish
the bits containing the information from the noise by looking at specific bit
sequences that indicate the beginning and the end of the packet. Next, the
packets can be thoroughly analysed to identify common patterns and to find
dependencies among message fields. As protocols often use the same or similar
message fields, knowledge about other wireless protocols can help to determine
which message fields are used.
3.3 Firmware Reverse Engineering
In addition to reverse engineering a proprietary protocol through a black-box
approach, the protocol can be reverse engineered by retrieving and analysing
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the firmware of a device programmer, a base station or an IMD. Ideally, these
devices should implement security mechanisms to prevent anyone from retrieving
and analysing their firmware. For example, the device’s debugging interfaces
could be disabled to make it more difficult to retrieve the device’s firmware.
Both obfuscation and encryption could also be used to ensure that the device’s
firmware is unreadable to anyone who manages to retrieve the firmware and
decompile or disassemble it. In practice, though, most device programmers,
base stations and IMDs do not employ any of these security mechanisms.
Next, we describe the process of how to extract the firmware from one of these
devices and analyse it to learn how the proprietary protocol works.
• Component identification and analysis: The first step is to open the
device in order to explore the Integrated Circuit (IC) on its Printed Circuit
Board (PCB). In some cases, it is possible to identify the chip and obtain
its data sheet on the Internet. This makes it easier to find the debugging
and programming pins. However, many devices use chips for which no
public information is available, which significantly increases the difficulty of
retrieving the firmware. In such case, X-Ray imaging can help to discover
the internal layers of the PCB and its connections. The main limitation of
this technique is that it requires specialised hardware equipment. A more
inexpensive approach to find the interconnections between components on
the PCB is to de-solder all its electronic components, clean the PCB with
a solvent and dry it. This process results in a PCB where all wires are
easily traceable. Yet, this approach is only suitable for PCBs with one or
two layers.
To discover the functions of the micro-controller’s pins, one can either
use a logic analyser or measure the voltage on the micro-controller’s pins
during the device operations. Both approaches allow to reduce the number
of pins that are suitable for the debugging and programming interfaces.
• Firmware extraction: The easiest way to retrieve the device’s firmware
is to use any of the programming or debugging interfaces of the chip such as
JTAG and UART. These interfaces can be used not only to get the device’s
firmware but also to trace instructions or to read memory sections. Thus,
manufacturers should disable these interfaces in all production devices.
However, Rios and Butts found that the JTAG and UART debugging
interfaces of device programmers and base stations are not disabled [112].
In this case, any universal programmer can be used to get the firmware
from these devices.
If the read-out protection bit is set, one can attempt to reverse this
operation in several ways. For example, one could perform voltage glitching
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attacks to introduce a fault during power up of the device in order to
circumvent the read-out protection bit [97]. Another way to bypass the
micro-controller’s read-out protection mechanism would be to use the
technique proposed by Garcia et al. [63]. This technique can be applied
to micro-controllers whose memory is divided into a number of blocks,
where each block has its own access control bits that determine if the
block is readable and/or writeable. The core idea behind this technique
is to carefully erase part of the chip’s memory in order to reset the access
control bits.
This technique requires to have two copies of the chip, and works as
follows. The first step is to erase block 0 on one of the chips in order
to reset its access control bits to the default settings, i.e. readable and
writeable. Subsequently, a small program can be written on block 0 that
reads blocks 1,...,n and then outputs the data obtained in each of the
blocks via one of the micro-controller’s output pins. This procedure allows
to recover blocks 1,...,n. For recovering block 0, one can proceed in a
similar way and first erase blocks 1, ..., n in the other chip and then write
a small program in block n to read block 0.
• Code analysis: As previously explained, most chips contain debugging
or programming interfaces, such as JTAG or UART. The use of these
interfaces makes it possible to observe the current state of the internal
memory and registers, and set breakpoints either on a specific value of
the program counter or on a certain memory or register condition. To
disassemble the firmware and debug its code, one can use well-known tools
such as IDA Pro [58], Binary Ninja [2] and MPLAB [9]. In addition to
performing dynamic analysis, static analysis can help to reverse engineer
parts of the protocol.
Chapter 4
Security Solutions
This section focuses on giving an overview of the countermeasures that have
been proposed for addressing the wireless attacks and analogue attacks on IMDs.
Prior to this, we describe what makes security of IMDs unique and why it is
not straightforward to implement security mechanisms in these devices.
4.1 Problem Statement
While security and privacy are two important requirements that should be
considered already during the design phase, adding security mechanisms to
IMDs is a non-trivial task.
IMDs are small resource-constrained devices with a limited computation
power and memory storage. They typically contain a custom ultra-low power
microprocessor with 128 Kbytes of RAM. Most IMDs are operated by a single
non-rechargeable and non-replaceable battery with a capacity between 0.5 A·h
to 2 A·h [116]1. This means that IMDs are required to have a low peak power
and a low duty cycle. The IMD’s battery typically lasts between five and seven
years depending on the type of device and treatment. For example, the pacing
pulses delivered by ICDs require about 25 µJ whereas a single electric shock
can consume up to 40 J [69]. Once the battery is drained, the IMD is replaced
through a surgical intervention which introduces a small, but non negligible risk
of infections, sometimes even with lethal consequences. Furthermore, IMDs lack
1Some IMDs contain a rechargeable battery. However, this is not very common due to
practical, economic and safety reasons.
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input and output interfaces and cannot be physically accessed once implanted.
Finally, several inherent tensions exist between some of the IMD’s functional
requirements and the required security and privacy goals. Below, we describe
each of these tensions more in detail.
1) Security vs. safety: Implementing security mechanisms in IMDs inevitably
increases the number of code lines and consequently the IMD’s complexity. This
makes IMDs more prone to software bugs. There are several well-known formal
techniques and tools to detect bugs but experience has shown that it is difficult
to have a bug-free implementation. For example, a software bug was found in
a radiation therapy machine called the Therac-25 which caused serious injury
and the death of several patients [85]. Because of this software bug, patients
received radiation doses that were hundreds of times greater than the intended
therapy. In this domain, it is paramount for IMDs to have a means to revert to
a safe default mode if a bug is found during normal operation. In addition to
the possibility of introducing software bugs, adding security could also reduce
the IMD’s reliability. For example, suppose that the device programmer and the
IMD produce a different cryptographic key after executing a key establishment
protocol. In such a situation, it is impossible for IMDs to distinguish between
an error in the key establishment protocol and an adversary who attempts to
send malicious messages.
2) Security vs. permissive access control policies: IMDs should
implement security mechanisms to prevent security attacks but at the same
time they should also develop permissive access control policies to grant medical
staff access to the patient’s IMD in emergencies. In non-emergency situations,
patients typically go to a small set of doctors and there are no strict time
requirements. Doctors can easily authenticate themselves to a server that
contains all the cryptographic keys in order to retrieve the key for accessing
the patient’s IMD. However, this situation becomes more complicated in an
emergency situation. Suppose an scenario where a patient with an IMD has an
accident while he is abroad. Medical staff should be able to detect the IMD’s
presence and know what type of IMD the patient has, gather data stored in
the IMD or reprogram it2. To further complicate matters, medical staff do not
know the patient and could be unable to identify him; he may be unconscious
or may not carry his ID card. In emergencies, a small delay when contacting
the IMD’s manufacturer or the patient’s doctor to obtain the key could prevent
the patient from receiving care on time.
This problem could be mitigated by defining various security levels depending
on the type of action that doctors want to conduct. It is clear that having access
2Detecting the presence of an IMD is very important since some IMDs need to be
deactivated before a surgery.
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to the data stored in the IMD does not pose the same risks as having the ability
to reprogram the IMD. Nevertheless, this may not be a viable solution since
doctors should be able to perform all actions on the patient’s IMD. This shows
that there is need for a balance between security in non-emergency situations
and permissive access control in emergency situations.
3) Security vs. communication range: Not long ago, IMDs did not support
any means of wireless communication with external devices. Back then, IMDs
were isolated and it was impossible for adversaries to conduct wireless attacks.
However, this also prevented doctors from being able to collect telemetry
data stored in the IMD or reprogram it once implanted. When the wireless
communication was first introduced, the communication range between the
device programmer and the IMD was only a few centimetres. This required the
device programmer to be in close proximity to the patient’s IMD for the entire
duration of the communication, but it also limited the range of possible attacks.
Since a few years, the device programmer and the IMD can communicate over
a long-range channel. Even if this provides more flexibility to doctors and
patients, extending the communication range also significantly increases the
attack surface for IMDs.
4) Security vs. energy cost: While strong security mechanisms should
be implemented in IMDs, they should also be lightweight to affect as little
as possible the IMD’s battery lifetime. The problem is that the level of
protection provided by the security mechanisms is typically proportional to
the energy required to execute them. For example, public-key cryptography
could be suitable for IMDs because it offers strong protection and facilitates
key management. However, even the most lightweight public-key primitive,
elliptic curve Cryptography (ECC), is much more expensive than symmetric-key
cryptography, specially in terms of communication cost. This does not mean
that public-key cryptography cannot be used, but rather that its use should be
limited.
It is important to note that the computation cost is typically negligible compared
to the communication cost [92,123]. Thus, one needs to primarily reduce the
communication cost in order to decrease the total extra energy cost due to the use
of cryptography. This means that, although a 128-bit Message Authentication
Code (MAC) tag would be ideal for security reasons, this could be too costly
for IMDs. Instead, a 64-bit tag could be used that does not have a significant
impact on the IMD’s battery at the cost of offering slightly less security.
All the aspects discussed above should be considered when designing
countermeasures to preclude wireless attacks, while only some of them are
relevant in the design of countermeasures that thwart analogue attacks.
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4.2 Countermeasures for Wireless Attacks
We summarise the most prominent countermeasures for creating a secure wireless
data exchange between a device programmer and an IMD. The main research
challenge is how to perform key establishment. These solutions can be divided
into five categories: (i) using an auxiliary or Out-Of-Band (OOB) channel,
(ii) using pre-installed keys, (iii) using distance bounding protocols, (iv) using
external devices and (v) using anomaly detection techniques.
Once a key is established between the device programmer and the IMD,
it can be used to encrypt and authenticate the data transmitted over the
wireless communication channel. However, even when wireless transmissions are
encrypted, there are still some privacy risks remaining. For example, context
information of the communication (e.g. the number of exchanged messages)
could reveal sensitive information about patients. Countermeasures to defend
against traffic analysis attacks are out of the scope of this thesis.
4.2.1 Auxiliary or Out-of-Band Channels
Various types of auxiliary or OOB channels have been proposed that allow
to bootstrap a key establishment protocol between a device programmer and
an IMD. We distinguish between the following three types of OOB channels:
(i) using tattoos and bracelets, (ii) using audio or vibrational signals and (iii)
using patient’s physiological signals. Distance bounding protocols can also be
considered an OOB channel but they will be discussed later in this section.
Tattoos and bracelets
One possible solution for establishing a key between a device programmer and
an IMD – both in normal and emergency situations – would be to print a
password in a bracelet worn by the patient or in his skin. However, bracelets
can be lost, stolen or damaged and can implicitly reveal the patient’s condition,
which could lead to discrimination. Similarly, tattoos may become unreadable
after an accident and could be refused by patients because of cultural, social or
personal reasons, as shown by Denning et al. [55].
Audio and vibrational signals
Halperin et al. proposed a zero-power key distribution technique through which
an IMD can generate a session key and transport it to a device programmer
over an audio channel. Rather than using the IMD itself for generating and
transporting the key, they proposed to use a passive RFID device, also known
as Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP), which can be attached
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to or built into an IMD. As the authentication process takes place between the
device programmer and the WISP, this solution prevents DoS attacks as those
proposed by Hei et al. [73]. The authors stated that the audio signals can only
be received and demodulated by a device programmer in close proximity to
the patient’s IMD. However, Halevi et al. demonstrated that this solution is
vulnerable to acoustic eavesdropping attacks where adversaries can recover the
key by eavesdropping the acoustic emanations from several meters away [68].
Saxena et al. presented a pairing protocol by which a transmiter device can
send a short PIN to a receiver device over a vibrational channel [119]. Their
solution is simple and elegant but it would require to add a vibration motor
or an accelerometer in the IMD. Furthermore, as vibration always results in
unintentional acoustic emanations whose waveform is similar to the one of the
vibration signal, this solution is also vulnerable to the acoustic eavesdropping
attacks proposed by Halevi et al. [68].
Kim et al. [80] and Abhishek Anand et al. [38] introduced two similar vibration-
based pairing techniques to defeat acoustic eavesdropping attacks. In both
solutions, the transmitter device simultaneously sends a vibration signal and
an audio signal. The former is used to transport the key, whereas the latter
is generated using white noise and is used to hide the acoustic emanations
from adversaries. Both solutions were shown to be effective at concealing the
acoustic emanations to adversaries who eavesdrop the audio channel from far
away. However, Abhishek Anand et al. showed that collocated adversaries who
reside close to the transmitter device, can compromise the security of these
solutions using standard signal processing and noise filtering techniques [39].
This is because white-noise-based audio signals cannot conceal the low-frequency
(between 50-250 Hz) audio components, exposing the key to adversaries in close
proximity to the source of the sound. Abhishek Anand et al. also proposed a
novel technique for creating a masking signal that effectively masks both the
low- and high-frequency audio components.
Collocated adversaries could be a real threat for IMDs since they could launch
acoustic eavesdropping attacks through malicious wearable devices that are
placed close to the implantation site. It is unclear if IMDs could produce the
required low-frequency masking sounds and if sophisticated filtering techniques
could be applied to separate the masking signal from the unintentional acoustic
emanations produced by the vibration motor. As future work, it would also be
interesting to investigate whether the vibration channel can be eavesdropped
by collocated adversaries to recover the key.
Recently, Trippel et al. showed that the integrity of the readings taken by
audio and vibration sensors can be compromised by injecting malicious analog
accoustic signals [129]. As a result, both audio- and vibration-based key
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transport techniques could be vulnerable to attacks where adversaries modify
the key to a chosen value. This attack forces the IMD to establish the key with
the adversary’s device.
Physiological signals
Poon et al. were the first to propose the use of physiological signals extracted from
the patient’s body for establishing a cryptographic key between two devices [104].
In contrast to biometrics, which are person-specific and to some extent time-
invariant, physiological signals are random signals that vary not only over
time but also among individuals. Examples of physiological signals include the
ElectroCardioGram (ECG), InterPulse Interval (IPI), PhotoPlethysmoGram
(PPG), blood glucose, blood pressure, temperature, hemoglobin and blood
flow [135]. However, only physiological signals that satisfy certain properties
can be used to establish a key between a device programmer and an IMD. Below,
we give an overview of all the properties that physiological signals should meet.
• Readiness: The process of acquiring the physiological signal should be
as fast as possible.
• Exclusivity: Only the device programmer and the IMD should be able
to accurately measure the physiological signal.
• Availability: The physiological signal should depend neither on the
patient nor on his health condition.
• Entropy: The physiological signal should provide high entropy so that it is
possible to generate random keys in short periods of time. More specifically,
the physiological signal should offer high inter-subject variability and high
intra-subject variability.
• Precision: The differences between the physiological signal measured
by the device programmer and IMD should be as small as possible to
maximise the Effective Key Length (EKL) and reduce the acquisition
time.
In recent years, a significant number of papers have proposed to use the patient’s
IPI for generating random cryptographic keys. This is because the Least
Significant Bits (LFBs) of the IPI seem to exhibit a high degree of entropy [114,
121]. Recently, Ortiz-Martin et al. conducted a large scale study to determine
the suitability of the IPI as a source of entropy [101]. Their results pointed
out that the patient’s IPI may not provide sufficient randomness under some
circumstances. Furthermore, there are several articles that have shown that it
is possible to gather accurate information about the patient’s IPI remotely [24,
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47,103,122]. This renders all solutions that rely on the secrecy of the patient’s
IPI insecure3.
A common approach for the device programmer and the IMD to agree on a
key is that both devices take a measurement of the chosen physiological signal
independently and synchronously. These measurements are typically not equal
but at best only rather similar due to the noise. Furthermore, when using these
measurements as a randomness source, the resulting key bits do not necessarily
need to be uniformly distributed. The problem of how to generate cryptographic
keys from noisy measurements has been widely studied in the literature (e.g.
Dodis et al. [57] and Linnartz et al. [87])
Prior work in the domain of medical device security has proposed to use
physiological signals in combination not only with fuzzy cryptographic primitives,
as suggested by Dodis et al., but also with cryptographic commitment schemes.
For a detailed overview of countermeasures proposed in the literature based
on the use of the patient’s physiological signal, we refer the reader to the fifth
paper shown in Part II of this thesis.
Our contributions: (1) In the fifth paper of this thesis, we performed a critical
evaluation of countermeasures by which an IMD can establish a key with a
device programmer through the use of a patient’s physiological signal. After
a meticulous analysis of the existing countermeasures, we demonstrated that
many of them rely on assumptions which do not hold in practical scenarios. In
addition, we found serious security weaknesses in two pairing protocols proposed
in the literature, namely the H2H [114] and the Biosec [49] protocols. The H2H
protocol is shown to be vulnerable to a reflection and a Man-in-The-Middle
(MiTM) attack. In the former, adversaries can successfully authenticate to
the IMD simply by replaying the messages sent by the IMD, whereas in the
latter the goal of the adversary is to trick the device programmer into believing
that it is communicating with a legitimate IMD while it actually does it with
the adversary. In the Biosec protocol, the authors did not account for the
loss of entropy in the key due to the use of an Error Correction Code (ECC).
Finally, we concluded our work by providing a set of recommendations on how
to securely use physiological signals in cryptographic protocols.
(2) In [93], we explored the option of using a signal extracted from the patient’s
brain called Local Field Potential (LFP) as a source of randomness for generating
cryptographic keys in neurostimulators. The choice of LFP is based on the fact
that current neurostimulators can measure this signal and the hypothesis that
3The solution we introduced in [90] was proposed before knowing that the IPI does not
provide enough entropy and that it can be measured remotely. Therefore, our solution can still
be used if the IPI would be replaced by any physiological signal that satisfies the requirements
previously mentioned.
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it is impossible for adversaries to gather information about this signal remotely.
Our preliminary results indicate that the bits extracted from the LFP signal
are uniformly distributed. In addition to the proposal of a low-cost source of
randomness, we introduced a novel technique for transporting the key from the
neurostimulator to the device programmer. Our technique relies on applying an
electrical signal with the key bits embedded in it to the neurostimulator’s case.
As both the neurostimulator’s case and the patient’s skin are conductive, any
device programmer that can touch the patient’s skin for several seconds, can
measure this signal to recover the key. We validated our solution with some
practical experiments.
4.2.2 Pre-installed Keys
Symmetric-key cryptography
Intuitively, a device-specific symmetric key could be pre-installed in each IMD
during manufacturing and stored in a protected server. This would be a simple
yet effective solution for non-emergency situations. In emergency situations,
though, medical staff would need to contact the patient’s doctor or the IMD’s
manufacturer on the fly for requesting the IMD’s key. To overcome this
limitation, Halperin et al. proposed to use a key diversification protocol where
the IMD’s key is generated through the IMD’s serial number (SN) and a master
key [70]. By storing the master key in all device programmers, medical staff
could interrogate the IMD in situ to obtain its SN and generate the IMD’s
key. Nevertheless, this approach would bring substantial security risks since
adversaries can easily obtain a device programmer either by stealing it from
a hospital or by purchasing it in an auction site such as eBay. One possible
way to slightly reduce the impact of compromising the master key would be
to use several master keys instead of a single one. Another possibility would
be to use a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) or to store the master key in
an encrypted form in tamper-resistant hardware. While this is a difficult and
costly task, specially if tamper-resistant hardware is used, adversaries could
attempt to recover the master key through a combination of side-channel and
physical attacks. The incentives for adversaries to recover the master key are
huge since compromising the key would put the security of millions of IMDs at
risk.
Rather than storing the master key in the device programmer, one could opt
for storing the master key in the cloud. As device programmers have an
Internet connection, they could connect and authenticate to the cloud in order
to derive the IMD’s key. Once the communication with the IMD is finished,
device programmers could delete the IMD’s key from their memory not to leave
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any trace to adversaries. The main limitation of this solution is that device
programmers need to be able to operate at all times, including during Internet
and cloud provider outages. Furthermore, this approach would still require to
store a long-term key in all device programmers to authenticate to the cloud.
Public-key cryptography
Another possible solution would be to pre-install a public-private key pair in
each IMD during manufacturing, and then use a secure key transport or key
agreement protocol [36]. This would allow the device programmer and the IMD
to establish a symmetric session key without having the key management issues
previously mentioned. One could even argue that it is not necessary for IMDs
to have a public-private key pair if the solution is solely based on public-key
cryptography. IMDs only need to have the public keys of device programmers
that may communicate with them, so that they can verify the authenticity
of the messages sent by the device programmers. The main limitation of
these approaches is that they would require to have a robust worldwide Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) that maintains an up-to-date list of trustworthy
device programmers. In addition, IMDs should have a mechanism for updating
and revoking keys such that device programmers can no longer communicate
with them if they are compromised. Unfortunately, such a robust worldwide
infrastructure is difficult to set up and maintain, and IMDs do not have an
Internet connection to periodically get a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or
sufficient memory to store all the necessary certificates. Rather than using a
PKI to authenticate public keys, one could use an authentication tree. The
advantage of this approach is that it requires each device to store only its public
key and the associated hash values from its public key to the root. However,
every time a new public key is included in the tree, the root of the tree needs
to be recomputed and new data needs to be stored in all devices.
Our contribution: In [91], we presented a novel key agreement protocol that
relies on a master key stored in the device programmer, similarly to the solution
proposed by Halperin et al. [70]. Our solution differs from theirs in that we
propose a semi-oﬄine (instead of oﬄine) key agreement protocol where the
master key is updated periodically. This means that adversaries who compromise
the master key can only derive valid IMD keys for a limited period of time. We
faced two important research challenges: (i) how can device programmers and
IMDs know when they need to use a new master key? and (ii) how can IMDs
recompute their keys when a new master key is used? For the former challenge,
we leverage the fact that both device programmers and IMDs have a precise
internal clock which is synchronised at every communication session. The latter
challenge can be addressed by using bilinear pairings on the IMD. We argue
that, even though this operation is expensive, it needs to happen only once in a
while (e.g. every few months).
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4.2.3 Distance Bounding Protocols
Distance bounding protocols allow to establish an upper-bound on the physical
distance between two parties which are often denoted as verifier and prover.
For this purpose, they rely on cryptography and physics. All distance bounding
protocols proposed so far include at least two phases: (i) a setup phase and
(ii) a rapid-bit exchange phase. In the former phase, both parties typically
agree or commit to some parameters, whereas in the latter phase the verifier
sends a series of single-bit challenges to which the prover replies with single-
bit responses. To estimate the distance to the prover, the verifier measures
the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between sending its challenge and receiving the
response. In addition to the setup and rapid-bit exchange phases, some distance
bounding protocols also include a verification phase.
The security of distance bounding protocols is based on the fact that it is
impossible to transmit radio frequency (RF) signals faster than the speed of
light. Additionally, the time required for the prover to process the challenge
and compute the response should be negligible compared to the propagation
time. If the verifier overestimates the prover’s processing time (i.e. the prover
can process the challenge faster), the protocol might become insecure since the
prover could easily extend the distance from which it can successfully execute
the protocol. However, if the verifier underestimates the prover’s processing
time, the prover may not be able to successfully execute the distance bounding
protocol even when it is nearby.
Rasmussen et al. presented a proximity-based access control scheme suitable
for pacemakers [109]. By using the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol in
combination with distance bounding, a pacemaker can verify the distance and
establish a session key with any device programmer that is in its close proximity.
Instead of using an RF distance bounding, they proposed an ultrasonic distance
bounding where the challenge and the response are transmitted over an RF
channel and an audio channel, respectively. Two regions were defined with
different security levels depending on the operation carried out by the device
programmer. Critical operations, such as modifying the pacemaker settings,
can only be conducted if the device programmer is at most 3 cm away. This
distance condition is relaxed when performing non-critical operations, enabling
the device programmer to communicate with the pacemaker as long as it is less
than 10 m away.
The security of the solution of [109] relies on the fact that adversaries cannot
transmit data on the audio channel using a signal that propagates faster than the
speed of sound. The problem is that all ultrasonic distance bounding protocols
are vulnerable to wormhole attacks where a MiTM adversary uses both a proxy-
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prover and a proxy-verifier to convert the audio signal to a RF signal (and vice
versa), as shown in Figure. 4.1 [120]. This allows to accelerate the transmission
time on the relay channel, enabling adversaries to extend the distance from
which they can successfully authenticate by several orders of magnitude. It
is unclear, though, if this attack poses a real threat for IMDs. This attack
could only be conducted by a malicious patient with an IMD while being in the
doctor’s office for a medical check up. He then forwards the messages it receives
from the legitimate device programmer to an ally who is close to the victim.
Next, the ally impersonates the legitimate device programmer by forwarding
the messages it received.
Prover
(legitimate)
Verifier
(adversary)
Prover
(adversary)
Verifier
(legitimate)
RFAudio Audio
Figure 4.1: Wormhole attack.
The only way to protect against wormhole attacks is to use an RF distance
bounding protocol. Nevertheless, designing a secure and practical RF distance
bounding protocol that is suitable for IMDs is a very challenging task due to
two main reasons.
Firstly, the device programmer would need to compute the response using an
extremely fast function. Prior work has proposed different types of functions
which can be divided into two main categories: (i) those executed in the digital
domain (e.g. [46,71]) and (ii) those conducted in the analogue domain (e.g. [110]).
Recently, a hybrid approach has also been proposed that leverages the benefits
of the previous two approaches [108]. However, all of these solutions suffer
from important limitations and downsides. When using a function executed
in the digital domain, the processing time delay at the device programmer
would be in the order of a few hundred nanoseconds. This delay could allow
adversaries with dedicated hardware equipment to execute the protocol with
the verifier from several meters away. On the contrary, when using a function
executed in the analogue domain or an hybrid approach, complex hardware
and storage would be needed at the device programmer. We argue that the
latter would not be a problem since existing device programmers are powerful
devices. Adding complex hardware and storage in device programmers would
only slightly increase their cost.
Secondly, in this application the pacemaker takes the role of a verifier and the
device programmer acts as a prover. Several articles have proposed distance
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bounding protocols that are optimised for the prover. However, in all existing
distance bounding protocols, the verifier is assumed to be a powerful device. A
possible line of research for future work would be to design a distance bounding
protocol that is optimised for the verifier and still protects against the classical
distance bounding attacks.
4.2.4 External Devices
Multiple countermeasures have been introduced based on the use of an external
device to mediate between the device programmer and the IMD. Table 4.1
shows a comparison between the existing solutions.
Denning et al. were the first to propose the use of an external device – which
they called “cloaker” – to act as a bridge between the device programmer and
the IMD [54]. This system is designed in such a way that it offers security in
normal conditions and at the same time it allows doctors to access the patient’s
IMD in emergencies. If the cloaker is present, a secure wireless communication
can be established between the cloaker and the IMD. When the cloaker is
removed, the IMD can receive and respond to all messages. This leads to an
important question: how can IMDs know if the cloaker is present? There are
two possible ways to solve this challenge. In the first solution, the IMD remains
in “sleep mode” until the cloaker starts the communication. The communication
is initiated whenever the cloaker: (i) sends a “hello” message to announce its
presence to the IMD or (ii) sends a message to inform the IMD that there is a
legitimate device programmer which wants to communicate with it. The main
limitation of this approach is that it is rather energy demanding for IMDs. This
is because it would require IMDs to regularly wake up from “sleep mode” to
check if there are incoming messages from the cloaker. In the second solution,
the IMD queries the cloaker every time it receives a new message from a device
programmer. This approach would be more energy efficient but at the same
time it would expose IMDs to DoS attacks whose goal is to drain the IMD’s
battery. In both solutions, the cloaker authenticates the device programmer
before the latter starts to communicate with the IMD.
There are several ways to handle the communication between the device
programmer and the IMD when the cloaker is present. Similarly as before, each
of these alternatives comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. The
cloaker can either proxy the communication between the devices or provide
the device programmer with a valid credential so that it can interact with the
IMD directly. The former would allow the cloaker to keep track of all messages
exchanged between the devices. However, this approach is rather demanding
for the cloaker in terms of communications. On the contrary, the latter is less
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demanding for the cloaker but it does not offer the possibility for the cloaker to
track the messages exchanged between the devices.
In contrast to IMDs, the cloaker is an external device powered with a replaceable
battery allowing it to perform complex operations. As a result, public-key
cryptography can be used to secure the communication between the cloaker and
the device programmer. A list of public keys of authorised device programmers
can be pre-stored in the cloaker before it is given to the patient. Additionally,
the cloaker could have an Internet connection so that it periodically downloads
an up-to-date list of valid device programmer’s public keys. However, having a
robust worldwide PKI is costly and difficult.
For the cloaker and the IMD to establish a secure wireless channel, the authors
suggested to use symmetric key cryptography. Nevertheless, this has important
implications in terms of key management. As there is no mechanism to revoke or
update keys in IMDs, if the cloaker is ever lost, damaged or stolen, the security
of the patient’s IMD could be at risk. It is also unclear whether storing keys
in the cloaker provides a higher level of security than storing them in device
programmers. Device programmers are typically used in controlled isolated
locations, such as the doctor’s office, whereas cloakers are worn by patients,
making them more vulnerable to theft.
Table 4.1: Comparison between the existing countermeasures based on the use
of external devices.
Cloaker IMDGuard Shield
Requires to modify the IMD Yes Yes No
Relies on pre-shared secrets with the IMD Yes No No
Uses friendly jamming Yes No Yes
Supports emergency mode Yes Yes Yes
Known attacks No [113] [128]
Xu et al. devised a security scheme called “IMDGuard” that is based on a
wearable external device, also known as “Guardian”, which acts as a bridge
between the device programmer and the IMD. The Guardian performs an
authentication process with the device programmer on the ICD’s behalf [134].
In contrast to the cloaker, the Guardian does not rely on pre-shared secrets
between the IMD and itself. Instead, the devices use the patient’s ECG to
establish a symmetric session key that is known only to them. This protects
against adversaries who have permanent or temporal physical access to the
Guardian. Nevertheless, similarly to the cloaker, the IMDGuard requires to
modify the IMD and relies on public key cryptography for authenticating the
device programmer. Once the device programmer is successfully authenticated,
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the Guardian generates and provides a session key to the device programmer
and the IMD. This allows these devices to communicate with each other directly
(instead of exchanging messages through the Guardian). Following a similar
approach as the one proposed by Denning et al. [54], the IMD switches to
emergency mode if it does not detect the Guardian. This could be exploited
by adversaries to conduct attacks that trick the IMD into believing that the
Guardian is not present.
The IMDGuard offers security under the assumption that adversaries cannot
make physical contact with the patient to measure his ECG. However, there
are several papers that show that it is possible to gather information about
the patient’s ECG remotely without needing to physically touch the patient
[24, 47, 103, 122]. Furthermore, Rostami et al. found that the IMDGuard
is vulnerable to a MiTM attack which reduces its effective key length from
129 bits to 86 bits [113]. Although using cryptography with an 86-bit key
would significantly improve the current situation, this research result shows
that designing protocols for IMDs is a difficult task.
Gollakota et al. presented a small wearable external device, also known as
“shield”, that implements a full-duplex radio design that allows to simultaneously
transmit and receive signals [67]. The shield acts as a proxy between the
device programmer and the IMD, and ensures that no device programmer can
communicate directly with the IMD. For this purpose, the shield uses friendly
jamming to jam the messages to/from the IMD in order to prevent adversaries
from decoding the messages, while still being able to decode them itself. The
shield is proven to be very effective at protecting against adversaries who use
the same power as the shield. For example, the shield can successfully jam all
messages transmitted by this type of adversaries as long as they are more than
20 cm away from the IMD.
Similarly to the previous solutions, the shield uses standard cryptographic
mechanisms to establish a secure channel with the device programmer, and can
be removed or turned off in emergencies. However, unlike previous solutions, it
does not require to modify the IMD. Its main limitation is that it cannot protect
against adversaries who transmit signals with more power than the jamming
signals transmitted by the shield. For example, adversaries with 100 times the
shield’s power can successfully send messages to the IMD from distances up
to 5 meters. Furthermore, Tippenhauer et al. showed that it is possible to
perform attacks that compromise the message confidentiality [128]. By placing
several antennas in a specific set of locations, adversaries could suppress the
jamming signal and recover the data sent by the devices. However, this attack
does not break the authentication requirement, which is much more important
than the confidentiality requirement.
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From a research point of view, the shield offers an interesting and effective way
of mitigating the existing security issues, and is specially suitable for IMDs
that will remain within the patient’s body for several more years. Nevertheless,
an important drawback of the shield is that jamming could disrupt ongoing
communications between other legitimate devices. In some countries, jammers
are illegal and their use can result in large fines. We believe it is very unlikely
that this type of solutions will be accepted by the FDA and hence adopted by
IMD manufacturers.
4.2.5 Anomaly Detection
Existing solutions based on anomaly detection leverage the fact that IMDs
typically communicate to a small number of device programmers at specific
locations and pre-determined times.
Hei et al. introduced a lightweight security scheme based on the use of access
patterns to the patient’s IMD and on machine learning [73]. Their solution
is intended (i) to defend only against resource depletion attacks and (ii) to
be used in combination with other security mechanisms to restrict access to
the IMD only to legitimate device programmers. For each individual IMD,
detailed information about the patient/doctor’s access pattern is first collected.
This data is then used as a training data in a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier to create a model. The authors suggested that the patient’s cell phone
could store this data and run the classification algorithm.
Every time the IMD receives a new message from a device programmer, the
IMD notifies the patient’s cell phone, which in turn runs the classification
algorithm. If the patient’s cell phone decides that the device programmer is not
legitimate, it sends a message to which the IMD immediately switches to sleep
mode for a specific amount of time. This makes it more difficult for adversaries
to launch resource depletion attacks. If the output of the classifier is uncertain,
the decision of accepting the device programmer as legitimate is left to the
patient.
This solution presents several limitations. Firstly, it provides only very weak
security protection. While strict policies can increase the detection rate of
attacks, they could also result in an increased number of false alarms. Secondly,
the authors did not describe how the patient’s cell phone and the IMD can
securely establish and manage cryptographic keys. This task becomes even
more difficult due to the lack of mechanisms to update and revoke keys in IMDs
and the possibility that the patient’s cell phone gets stolen or lost. Thirdly,
this solution is neither lightweight nor flexible. Finally, adversaries can leverage
that the device programmer can authenticate to the IMD only after it has been
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verified by the solution proposed by Hei et al., to perform DoS attacks. These
attacks can be launched to prevent access to the patient’s IMD when needed.
To achieve their goal, adversaries could jam the messages from the patient’s
cell phone to the IMD.
Zhang et al. proposed “MedMon”, a multi-layered anomaly detection monitor
that can be implemented in a dedicated external device or in the patient’s
phone [136]. To determine whether transmissions are legitimate, MedMon relies
on finding anomalies in the signals sent by device programmers (i.e. physical
anomalies) as well as in the patient’s behaviour (i.e. behavioural anomalies).
To this end, MedMon first measures several characteristics of the physical
signal, such as the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) or the Time Of
Arrival (TOA), and compares them with the ones obtained during the training
phase. If these values are within a certain threshold, MedMon proceeds to
find behavioural anomalies. As the actions performed by patients typically
follow a pattern – unless it is an emergency – MedMon also inspects the data
contained in the messages and measures the frequency of certain operations.
Similarly as before, it compares these values with the ones from the training
phase and accepts the message as valid if they are similar. Otherwise, MedMon
can trigger several actions depending on the predefined security policy. This
includes passive actions, such as notifying the user by emitting a sound, or
active actions, such as jamming the malicious messages before they reach the
IMD.
The main advantage of MedMon is that it is suitable for legacy devices since
it does not require to modify the IMD. Nevertheless, MedMon has several
disadvantages. Firstly, MedMon does not provide strong security protection.
Adversaries could bypass both the “physical” and “behavioural” security checks
to modify the IMD’s settings. In addition, MedMon opens the door to DoS
attacks where adversaries could repeatedly send messages to the IMD to perform
a certain action so that the IMD prevents legitimate device programmers from
performing this action when necessary. Secondly, MedMon does not offer
message confidentiality. Passive adversaries who eavesdrop the wireless channel
can intercept the messages to/from the IMD in order to learn patient private
information. Finally, MedMon needs to be trained for each specific patient and
always needs to be worn in the same location (e.g. the patient’s wrist). It is
unclear what the effect is of slightly modifying the location of MedMon. The
authors did not discuss if this could prevent legitimate device programmers
from communicating with the IMD, or could allow malicious messages to reach
the IMD.
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4.3 Countermeasures for Analogue Attacks
There exist several countermeasures to detect or mitigate signal injection
attacks on sensors based on intentional, low-power EMI signals [84]. These
countermeasures aim at finding ways of (i) attenuating the injected signal
on the sensor’s analogue circuit, (ii) differentiating between the injected and
the measured signal and (iii) removing the injected signal. The proposed
countermeasures range from hardware-based (or analogue) defences, such as
shielding, differential comparators and filters, to software-based (or digital)
defences such as signal contamination, adaptive filtering, cardiac probe and
reverting to a safe default. Most of the hardware-based defences have been
already implemented in IMDs. However, they suffer from important limitations.
For example, IMDs cannot use very selective filters since this could also attenuate
the real measured signal. In addition, hardware-based defences may not be
sufficient to protect against some types of attacks.
Several software-based defences were proposed to defeat against adversaries
who are equipped with a strong emitter or conduct baseband attacks. For
example, they proposed a countermeasure based on anomaly detection that
measures the EMI level in the environment to determine if the sensor is under
attack. Similarly, adaptive filtering allows to attenuate the EMI in order to
increase the Signal-to-Interference (SI), whereas active probing leverages the
direct connection between the IMD and the cardiac tissue to distinguish between
the injected and the intended signal.
More research is needed to determine if all these countermeasures (i) can be
implemented in IMDs in practice or (ii) can affect the real measured signal in
some circumstances. All countermeasures should be designed considering the
constraints of IMDs and tensions explained in Section 4.1.

Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
An important part of our work focused on analysing the security of proprietary
protocols used by commercial IMDs to wirelessly communicate with device
programmers. Our research has shown that IMD manufacturers rely on
proprietary protocols with limited or no security protection as their only means
to provide “security”. There could be several reasons why manufacturers omitted
security on IMDs. We believe that this can be due to the lack of awareness
and expertise, the extra cost that this introduces or the difficulty to guarantee
that security does not affect safety and availability. We have demonstrated
that proprietary protocols can be reverse-engineered and consequently that
security-through-obscurity is a dangerous approach that should never be used.
The reverse engineering of these protocols led us to perform passive and active
wireless attacks against several types of IMDs which could compromise the
safety and privacy of patients. It is important that IMD manufacturers migrate
from the current insecure proprietary closed solutions to open and thoroughly
scrutinised security solutions.
Another important aspect of our work was the proposal of countermeasures for
addressing the security issues caused by wireless attacks. For designing practical
countermeasures, we had to consider the important constraints of IMDs as well
as the inherent tensions between some of the IMDs’ functional requirements
and the desirable security goals. In this line of work, our first research question
was: is it possible to use cryptography in IMDs without significantly reducing
their battery lives? To answer this question, we evaluated the feasibility of
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cryptography in a widely used insulin pump system. Our work demonstrated
that data confidentiality can easily be achieved through an optimised message
format, whereas data authentication is difficult to accomplish without negatively
affecting the insulin pump battery. Our work pointed out that there is a need
for future research on how to protect the message authentication without
significantly increasing its length.
We have also investigated several ways how to establish and manage
cryptographic keys between a device programmer and an IMD. More specifically,
we tackled this problem in two different ways depending on whether the devices
have pre-installed keys. For the former case, we proposed a novel semi-oﬄine
key agreement protocol that limits the time that a master key can be used
to derive the IMD’s key. For the latter case, we presented a novel security
architecture that includes the secure generation and transportation of keys from
the IMD to the device programmer.
There exist a significant number of countermeasures to mitigate or solve wireless
attacks on IMDs. However, most of these solutions suffer from limitations
and downsides, or have been broken by us and other researchers. We have
performed a critical evaluation of the most prominent countermeasures that
rely on patient’s physiological signals for establishing a key between the device
programmer and the IMD. This analysis resulted in the identification of serious
protocol and implementation weaknesses in two protocols proposed in the
literature. We also evaluated several assumptions on the adversaries and showed
that some of them do not hold in practical scenarios. Finally, we provided a set
of security design guidelines where we detailed the steps to be followed in order
to use patient’s physiological signals in cryptographic solutions.
Cryptography is needed not only to create a secure wireless channel between the
device programmer and the IMD, but also to protect the communication links
between other devices within the system. This also includes developing security
mechanisms for concealing the context information of these communications,
which is also known as metadata. This is of utmost importance since meta-data
could reveal highly sensitive information about patients. In this line of work, we
have presented a protocol through which an IMD can establish an end-to-end
secure channel with a hospital for remote monitoring and reprogramming of
the IMD while the patient is at home. An important feature of our protocol is
that it has been designed to protect the patient’s privacy. More specifically, our
protocol prevents unauthorized entities and adversaries from discovering the
patients’ real ID, their location or being able to link their messages.
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5.2 Future Work
The field of security and privacy of medical devices has received significant
attention over the last few years. However, this field still has many open research
problems. This section gives an overview of potential research directions for
future work on the security and privacy of IMDs.
1) Unified framework for analysing the security of IMDs
• Security analysis of new medical devices. In the upcoming years,
manufacturers will start to implement cryptographic solutions in the new
generations of IMDs. A potential direction for future work could be
to investigate the security of these cryptographic mechanisms. Adding
security mechanisms into IMDs is challenging. This implies not only using
well-scrutinised cryptographic primitives and protocols, but also finding
ways to appropriately manage cryptographic keys and protect the devices
against physical attacks. Therefore, a non-exhaustive list of aspects that
could be explored include: (i) identifying design and/or implementation
weaknesses in the cryptographic protocols, (ii) recovering cryptographic
keys from device programmers or base stations by performing side-channel
or physical attacks, or (iii) reverse engineering and analysing the security
of ciphers in case they are proprietary.
• Developing tools for automated black-box protocol reverse
engineering. Reverse engineering a proprietary protocol is a laborious
manual process that is often specific to a particular type of device, model
or manufacturer. One possible direction for future work could be to design
a tool that automatically reverse engineers protocols given some messages
exchanged between the device programmer and the IMD over the air.
Recently, several solutions have been proposed to automate the process of
reverse engineering protocols based on the use of machine learning [51].
However, it is unclear what the efficacy of these solutions is in determining
the message format and protocol state machine for proprietary protocols
used by IMDs.
• Analogue attacks. As IMDs become more computationally complex
and interconnected, they will also be more exposed to other types of cyber
attacks. Recently, researchers have shown that analogue attacks can be
conducted against IMDs by compromising the integrity of sensors readings.
However, the proposed attacks can only be conducted from a distance up
to 2 cm from the IMD, which significantly limits their impact in practice.
As a future work, researchers could attempt to overcome these limitations
and investigate how to perform these attacks from further away or if these
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low-power EMI could be produced by wearable devices that the patient
could carry close to the implantation site.
• Software attacks. Sooner than later, IMDs will be connected to the
Internet. This will allow doctors in the hospital to remotely (i) reprogram
the patient’s IMD while the patient is at home and (ii) update the IMD’s
software remotely. However, all these advantages come at the cost of
significantly broadening the attack surface of IMDs. For example, this
would make these devices more vulnerable to software vulnerabilities and
malware. Studying whether it is possible to inject malicious software into
IMDs could be an interesting avenue for future work.
2) Unified framework for evaluating countermeasures for IMDs
• Analogue defences. There is a need for designing simple yet
effective countermeasures that help defending against attacks that aim
at compromising the integrity of sensors’ readings. To achieve this, a
combination of defences – both in hardware and software – is required.
In order to evaluate the suitability of the defences, it is important not
only to investigate their complexity and cost but also to ensure that they
do not affect the real measured signal. For example, redundancy could
potentially help to detect attacks but this may not be effective due to the
limited size of the IMD. However, it is still unclear which would be the
most interesting research direction to tackle this problem.
• Software defences. Research is needed to ensure that IMDs do not
execute malicious software. To this end, there is a need to develop
mechanisms to detect malicious software and quarantine it before it
is executed. However, this is a challenging task because these devices
have limited memory storage and do not have an Internet connection
that enables them to be aware of the most recent security threats. An
interesting direction for future work would be to develop a lightweight
runtime anomaly detection system that reveals suspicious behaviour of
the IMD.
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A Privacy-preserving Remote Healthcare System
Offering End-to-End Security
Eduard Marin, Mustafa A. Mustafa, Dave Singelée, and Bart Preneel
ESAT-COSIC and iMinds, KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract. Remote healthcare systems help doctors diagnose,
monitor and treat chronic diseases by collecting data from
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) through base stations that are
often located in the patients’ house. In the future, these systems
may also support bidirectional communication, allowing remote
reprogramming of IMDs. As sensitive medical data and commands
to modify the IMD’s settings will be sent wirelessly, strong security
and privacy mechanisms must be deployed.
In this paper, we propose a user-friendly protocol that is used
to establish a secure end-to-end channel between the IMD and
the hospital while preserving the patient’s privacy. The protocol
can be used by patients (at home) to send medical data to the
hospital or by doctors to remotely reprogram their patients’ IMD.
We also propose a key establishment protocol between the IMD
and the base station based on a patient’s physiological signal in
combination with fuzzy extractors. Through security analysis, we
show that our protocol resists various attacks and protects patients’
privacy.
1 Introduction
Remote healthcare systems usually collect data from medical devices implanted
within the patient’s body, also known as Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs),
several times per day through a base station that is often installed in the
patient’s house. In the near future, these systems may support bidirectional
communication to enable remote reprogramming of the IMD by a doctor in
a hospital. While these remote healthcare systems can improve the patients’
quality of life and extend the time they can live independently at home, they
pose important security and privacy risks. Currently, proprietary protocols are
being deployed with limited security measures [70, 92]. These insecure wireless
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protocols may lead to several attacks that can result in fatal consequences for
patients.
Remote healthcare systems are typically built such that there is a central
node (denoted as data concentrator in the rest of this paper) that collects and
redirects all (encrypted) data sent between base stations and hospitals. Context
information about these communications, i.e. metadata, can be valuable for
insurance companies or government agencies to monitor public health or compile
statistics. However, even if cryptography is used, metadata can leak patients’
sensitive information to the data concentrator, which may lead to abuse of data,
e.g. denying individuals an insurance contract. To mitigate some of these issues,
a trivial solution would be to have several data concentrators (instead of only
one) that do not cooperate with each other. This solution would be expensive to
deploy and difficult to maintain. In addition, there would not be any guarantee
that the data concentrators do not share data with each other. Another solution
would be to use a fresh pseudonym in every message. Although this approach
would make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise the patient’s privacy,
this is not sufficient; if the data concentrator knows where the base station is
located, then unique patient identifiers may be revealed.
Our first contribution is a user-friendly protocol that allows an IMD to establish
an end-to-end secure channel with a hospital while preserving the patient’s
privacy. The protocol can be used by patients (at home) to send medical data to
the hospital or by doctors to remotely reprogram the IMD of their patients. Our
protocol makes use of cryptography and an anonymous communication channel
to prevent the data concentrator from learning patients’ sensitive information.
Our second contribution is a key establishment protocol that allows an IMD
and a base station to agree on a symmetric session key without using public-key
cryptography or any pre-shared secrets between devices. Instead, our protocol
uses a patient’s physiological signal in combination with fuzzy extractors.
2 Related Work
2.1 Security and Privacy in Remote Monitoring Systems
While much research has focused on making remote monitoring systems more
reliable, unobtrusive, energy efficient and scalable, security and privacy have
received less attention [88, 98]. Ko et al. acknowledged the importance of
security and privacy, but they did not provide details about cryptographic
mechanisms [81]. Ortiz et al. proposed a protocol to secure the wireless
communication between devices in a medical system [100]. However, the
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protocol does not provide message integrity, and the receiver keeps a list of keys
for each transmitter. Transmitters send messages along with their unique device
identity (ID) unencrypted to indicate to the receiver which of the keys is used
to decrypt the message. This may result in a privacy breach since adversaries
can use the unique transmitter ID to track, identify or locate individuals.
Perrig et al. presented SNEP, a protocol that provides data confidentiality,
integrity, mutual authentication and message freshness [102]. Pre-installed
symmetric keys, shared between each device and the base station, are used
to derive a new session key every time a device starts communicating with
the base station. In contrast to Perrig et al., we also consider privacy. More
specifically, our protocol aims to prevent unauthorized entities and adversaries
from discovering the patients’ real ID, their location or being able to link their
messages. Furthermore, the devices are implanted within the patient’s body
and the base stations do not have any pre-shared keys with them, which makes
key management more challenging.
2.2 Key Establishment Protocols
The unique characteristics of IMDs pose novel challenges in the design of key
establishment protocols and key management solutions. IMDs are battery-
powered and resource-constrained devices in terms of size, memory, processor
and energy. The battery typically lasts 7 years. When the battery is drained,
surgery is needed to replace the IMD. We note that a trade-off between security
and open-access in emergencies is also required. Consider a cardiac patient
who is travelling. Although it is clear that no one should be able to access
his pacemaker while he is walking on the street, medical staff should have
immediate access to his IMD in an emergency situation.
Intuitively, one possible way for the IMD and the base station to establish a key
would be to use public-key cryptography. However, IMDs cannot use expensive
cryptographic primitives in terms of computations and power consumption.
Another possibility would be to pre-install a master (symmetric) key in all IMDs,
but this may prevent a patient from receiving care in an emergency situation.
A pairing protocol could also be used for establishing a symmetric session
key [48,66, 127]. Nevertheless, IMDs do not contain a screen, a keyboard or an
accelerometer and it is not possible to physically access them once implanted;
thus none of the existing solutions can be used. In this paper, we propose a
key establishment protocol in which the IMD and the base station measure a
patient’s physiological signal independently and synchronously to agree on a
symmetric key. The protocol uses the time between heart beats, also known as
InterPulse Interval (IPI), as the source of randomness, similarly to the touch-
to-access protocol proposed by Rostami et al. [114]. Unlike their work, our
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protocol is more efficient as it only uses symmetric cryptography in combination
with fuzzy extractors.
3 Design Preliminaries
3.1 System Model
Our remote healthcare system, similar to existing architectures, consists of the
following entities (see Fig. 1). Without loss of generality, in the rest of this
paper we will assume that the IMD is a pacemaker.
HO1
HO2
HO3
HO4
CA
BS
PM
BS
PM
BS
PM
DC
Figure 1: Our remote healthcare system comprises pacemakers (PMs), base
stations (BSs), a data concentrator (DC), hospitals (HOs) and a certification
authority (CA).
A pacemaker (PM) is a device implanted within a patient’s body that is used
to monitor and control his heart beat. A base station (BS) is an external device
installed in a fixed location (e.g. home or a hotel) which collects and forwards
medical data to a hospital, and sends commands to PMs as instructed by a
doctor in the hospital. BSs have a programming head that incorporates a
built-in sensor to read a patient’s physiological signal (e.g. the IPI). A data
concentrator (DC) acts as a bridge between BSs and hospitals, and is in practice
often managed by the company that manufacturers the PMs and BSs. A hospital
(HO) is a medical institution where doctors analyse the medical data and send
commands to PMs, whereas a certification authority (CA) is a trusted entity
that issues digital certificates to HOs and the DC.
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A BS and a PM can communicate with each other wirelessly using the Medical
Implant Communication Service (MICS) band [117], or any other low-energy
wireless technology. The communication range between the BS and the PM
depends on the wireless communication technology being used, e.g. from two
to five meters when using the MICS band. The communication between the
BS and the DC takes place over the Internet using a low-latency anonymous
communication channel (e.g. a Mix network [118]), whereas the communication
between the DC and a HO takes place over the Internet using a standard secure
channel, e.g. TLS. To balance the load, multiple DCs are in place; however, for
the sake of simplicity, we consider them as one in the rest of this paper.
We consider two possible scenarios depending on whether the doctor is on-
line or off-line. For an on-line remote medical check, the patient first makes
an appointment with the doctor (e.g. via telephone). At the time of the
appointment, the patient sends medical data to the HO through the base
station. The doctor then analyses the data and, if required, sends commands
to the PM. If the doctor is off-line, the patient can still send medical data to
the HO; however, these data will be processed by the doctor at a later stage.
We note that in our system the doctor can only reprogram the patient’s PM in
the on-line scenario.
3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
Threat Model: PMs and HOs are honest and trusted. PMs follow the
protocol specifications as designed by their manufacturers and the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). PMs can only establish one communication
session with a BS at a time, and do not initiate any communication without
receiving a request from a legitimate BS [6]. Adversaries can eavesdrop, modify,
inject and jam the messages exchanged between any of the entities. Adversaries
can observe only a fraction of the Internet network traffic. This is a common
assumption when using low-latency anonymous communication systems. In
addition, adversaries might compromise any number of BSs, including the one
being used by the patient. The DC is honest but curious; it follows the protocol
specifications but it might attempt to discover information about patients by
looking at meta-data.
Assumptions: We assume that adversaries cannot make physical contact with
the patient without this being noticed by the patient. We assume that the
communication between the BS and the DC takes place over the Internet using
an anonymous communication channel. However, we do not specify which type
of anonymous channel is used, since this is out of the scope of this paper. We
assume that all entities (except PMs) have the CA’s certificate pre-installed. We
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assume that each HO has a server with a database that contains a list of their
patients along with their corresponding PM IDs and cryptographic keys. The
server is located in a secure room where it cannot be stolen or tampered with;
only authorized medical staff has access to it through appropriate identification,
authentication and authorization mechanisms.
3.3 Design Requirements
Our remote healthcare system should satisfy the following functional (F), security
(S) and privacy (P) requirements.
(F1) User-friendly: Reporting medical data and reprogramming the PM
should be easy and convenient for patients.
(F2) BS-independent: Patients should be able to use any legitimate BS, even
the ones belonging to other patients.
(F3) Energy Cost: Computational cost at PMs should be as low as possible
to reduce the energy consumption.
(S1) Mutual Entity Authentication: PMs and HOs should be assured of
each other’s identity when receiving messages.
(S2) Message Integrity: PMs and HOs should be assured that the received
messages are fresh and have not been altered during transit.
(S3) Confidentiality of Medical Data and Commands: Only the
authorized HO should be able to access patient’s medical data and send
commands.
(S4) Availability: Ensures that the system is accessible upon demand by
authorised entities.
(P1) Patient Privacy (minimum data disclosure):
(P1.1) Patient Identity Privacy: Only HOs should know the identity of the
patient who sends medical data.
(P1.2) Hospital Identity Privacy: No unauthorized entity should know to
which hospital the patient sends medical data.
(P1.3) Location Privacy: No entity should infer the patient’s location 1.
1In an emergency situation doctors have other means (e.g. necklace-based emergency
systems) to know the patient’s location.
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(P1.4) Session Unlinkability: Only the HO where the patient is registered
should be able to link messages sent from the same patient.
4 The Protocol
This section presents our protocol for medical data reporting and remote
reprogramming of the patient’s PM. It provides end-to-end security (i.e. data
confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication and message freshness) between
the patient’s PM and the hospital, and protects the patient’s privacy. Our
protocol is divided into two stages: the medical data reporting stage and the
PM reprogramming stage. Prior to the detailed protocol description, we first
outline the system initialization process. Table 1 shows the notation used in
the paper.
4.1 System Initialisation
Each HO and the DC generate a public/private key pair, PKhoi/SKhoi and
PKdc/SKdc, respectively. The public keys are signed by the CA. A list of valid
HO certificates is stored in the DC, whereas each HO has a valid DC certificate.
A group signature scheme is used by BSs to anonymously sign messages on
behalf of the BSs group, so that the DC can still verify the authenticity of the
message without knowing which specific BS signed the message, thus hiding
the ID and location of the patient. All BSs use the same (group) public key,
PKbsgroup , and have distinct private keys, SKbsi . Next, the DC signs the BSs
group public key, generates a digital certificate that contains the ID and group’s
public key, and stores it. The certificate of the DC is pre-installed in all BSs.
During the PM manufacturing process, a symmetric key, Kho-ps, is pre-installed
in each PM. Kho-ps is shared between all PMs and the DC, and used for
generating HO pseudonyms. Our protocol uses the same Kho-ps for all PMs,
so that the DC cannot identify the PM that generated the HO pseudonym.
In the PM setup phase, two independent symmetric keys, Kpm-ho and Kpm-ps,
are generated and installed in each PM. The procedure takes place in the HO
before the PM is implanted to avoid the PM’s manufacturer (often the DC)
from learning these keys. Kpm-ho and Kpm-ps are shared between the PM and
its corresponding HO. The former is used for encrypting the patient’s medical
data whereas the latter for generating PM pseudonyms.
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Table 1: Notations.
Symbols Meanings
d, cmd medical data of a patient, command sent to the PM
IDi, PSi unique identity of entity i, pseudonym of entity i
Kpm-ho key shared between PM and HO to encrypt/decrypt data/commands
Kpm-ps key shared between PM and HO to create PM pseudonyms (ps)
Kho-ps key shared between all PMs and DC to generate HO’s pseudonyms
(ps)
Ks session key established between PM and BS
Ni, TSi nonce generated by entity i, timestamp produced by entity i
msgi-j message constructed by entity i and intended for entity j
cti-j counter used in messages between the entity i and the entity j
Ci-j ciphertext generated by entity i and intended for entity j
PKi, SKi public and private key of entity i
PRFK(M) pseudorandom function of message M with key K
AEK(M) authenticated encryption of message M with key K
EPKi(M) asymmetric encryption of message M with public key of entity i
Sigi(M) digital signature of entity i on message M
Various circumstances may cause the certificates to become invalid before their
expiration date. If the private key of any of the entities is compromised, a new
public/private key pair is generated (as explained above). The new public key
is then signed by the CA and broadcasted to the network. All entities can then
verify the message authenticity by using the CA’s public key. From that point
onwards, the old certificate is no longer valid. If the private key of any BS is
compromised, the BS is sent to its manufacturer for being reconfigured and
replaced. We note that group signature schemes typically allow revocation and
addition of new members (i.e. BSs) into the group (for more details, see [44]).
4.2 Medical Data Reporting Stage
After the system initialisation phase, the PM can report medical data to the
HO (see Fig. 1). Prior to each reporting stage, a new symmetric session key is
established between the PM and the BS for securing the data exchanged over
the air. We next describe the proposed key establishment protocol followed by
the actual reporting stage more in detail.
IPI-based Key Establishment Protocol: Our protocol requires the IMD
and the BS to independently measure the patient’s IPI (i.e. time between
heart beats) at the same time. These IPI readings, which can be measured
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anywhere in the patient’s body just by touching the patient’s skin, are then
used for establishing a symmetric key that is valid only for one session. Previous
work has shown that the four least significant bits of IPIs are uncorrelated
and independently identically distributed (i.i.d) [134]. The IPI cannot be read
remotely (e.g. via a webcam), as shown by Rostami et al. [114]. Therefore,
based on their results and our assumptions, a remote attacker cannot measure
the IPI. Fig. 3 shows the IPI-based key establishment protocol.
BS PMStart key generation
Take an IPI reading α Take an IPI reading β
Gen
(
α
) → (k, P)
P
Rep
(
β, P
) → k
Nbs, MACk(Nbs)
MACk(Nbs + 1)
Figure 2: IPI-based key establishment protocol between the BS and the PM.
To trigger the key establishment procedure, the patient first presses a button on
the BS. The PM and BS then take two readings of the patient’s IPI at the same
time. However, these readings are not equal (but rather similar) due to the
noise. Let us denote the reading taken by the BS as α and the reading taken
by the PM as β. Fuzzy extractors allow generating a cryptographic key k from
α and then successfully reproduce k from β, iff α and β are almost equal [57].
Fuzzy extractors are composed by two functions: generate
(
Gen
)
and reproduce(
Rep
)
. Gen is executed by the BS with α as an input, and outputs a key k

{
0, 1
}l and helper data P  {0, 1}∗. The BS then sends P in order to help
the PM to reproduce k. The PM executes Rep with β and P as inputs, and
outputs a key k’ (if β and α are similar, then k equals k’).
To achieve key confirmation, the BS generates a nonce, Nbs, and sends it to the
62 A PRIVACY-PRESERVING REMOTE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM OFFERING END-TO-END SECURITY
PM along with a Message Authentication Code (MAC), MACk(Nbs). Upon
receiving the message, the PM verifies MACk(Nbs) using k’. If the MAC is
verified correctly, the PM is assured that the BS knows the key; however the BS
does not have any assurance that the PM knows the key. For the PM to prove
knowledge of the key, it computes MACk(Nbs + 1) and sends it to the BS. The
BS repeats this operation with its own key and checks whether the result of this
operation corresponds to the received MAC. If the MAC is verified correctly,
both devices can use k, (hereafter denoted as Ks), to securely communicate
with each other, otherwise they execute the key establishment protocol again.
Reporting Medical Data to the HO
In this stage the patient’s PM sends medical data to the HO. Fig 3 depicts the
processes executed by the entities.
PM: The PM performs the following steps.
1. It generates a fresh nonce, Npm, that is used to compute two fresh pseudonyms.
First, it computes a pseudonym for itself, i.e. PSpm = PRFKpm-ps(IDpm ‖ Npm),
where PRF is a pseudorandom function (e.g. a secure block cipher) and IDpm
is the PM’s real identity (e.g. serial number). This pseudonym is only used
once (i.e. in the message sent from the PM to the HO). Next, it computes a
pseudonym for the HO, i.e. PSho = PRFKho-ps(IDho ‖ Npm), where IDho is the
HO’s real identity. This pseudonym is used in a pair of messages (i.e. the one
sent from the PM to the HO and vice versa). Both pseudonyms protect the
patient’s privacy while communicating with the HO, i.e. the PM uses PSpm and
PSho instead of IDpm and IDho.
2. It encrypts the patient’s medical data, d, and a counter, ctpm-ho, using the
secret key it shares with the HO, Kpm-ho, i.e. (C,T)pm-ho = AEKpm-ho(ctpm-ho ‖
d). Since PMs do not contain a precise clock, a counter is used to prevent replay
attacks. The counter is initialised to zero every time a new session key between
the BS and the PM is established. For better performance, the encryption
method used is an authenticated encryption scheme (e.g. AES-CCM [133]),
which outputs a ciphertext, C, and an authentication tag, T.
3. It constructs a message, Mpm-bs = PSs ‖ (C,T)pm-ho ‖ Npm, where PSs =
PSpm ‖ PSho, and encrypts it using the session key previously established with
the BS, Ks, i.e. (C,T)pm-bs = AEKs(ctpm-bs ‖ Mpm-bs).
4. It sends msgpm-bs = (C,T)pm-bs to the BS.
BS: Upon receiving msgpm-bs, the BS performs the following steps.
1. It verifies the authenticity of msgpm-bs and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain
(ctpm-bs ‖ Mpm-bs). It then checks whether the counter, ctpm-bs, is valid, i.e. if
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it is higher than the counter of the last received message. If this condition is
satisfied, the message is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.
2. It generates a random session ID, Sid, that is valid for a pair of messages and
allows the HO to anonymously send a message back without knowing which
specific BS sent the message. Then it encrypts Sid along with Mpm-bs using the
public key of the DC, PKdc, i.e. Cbs-dc = EPKdc(Sid ‖ Mpm-bs).
3. It constructs a message, Mbs-dc = (TSbs ‖ Cbs-dc), where TSbs is a timestamp
of the BS used to counter replay attacks. TSbs does not need to be kept secret
and is sent unencrypted to the DC; however, its integrity is protected by means
of a digital signature. This allows the DC to check the freshness of the message
before decrypting the message and verifying its authenticity.
4. It generates a signature on Mbs-dc using its private key, SigSKbs(Mbs-dc). Then
it constructs a message, msgbs-dc = Mbs-dc ‖ SigSKbs(Mbs-dc), and sends it to
the DC via an anonymous communication channel.
DC: Upon msgbs-dc reception, the DC performs the following steps.
1. It verifies the freshness of msgbs-dc by checking TSbs and the authenticity of
the message using the BSs group public key, PKbsgroup . It then decrypts Cbs-dc
to obtain (Sid ‖ Mpm-bs), where Mpm-bs = (PSpm ‖ PSho ‖ (C,T)pm-ho ‖ Npm).
2. It retrieves IDho by computing PS’ho = PRFKho-ps(IDhoi ‖ Npm) for all HOs,
(IDho1 , . . . , IDhon) until the DC finds a match, i.e. PS’ho equals PSho.
3. It constructs a message, Mdc = (PSpm ‖ IDho ‖ (C,T)pm-ho ‖ Npm), in which
PSho is replaced with IDho. Then it encrypts the message and the session ID,
Sid, using the public key of the HO, PKho, i.e. Cdc-ho = EPKho(Sid ‖ Mdc).
4. It constructs a message, Mdc-ho = (TSdc ‖ Cdc-ho), where TSdc is a
timestamp of the DC, and generates a signature on Mdc-ho using its private key,
SigSKdc(Mdc-ho). Finally, it appends the signature to Mdc-ho in order to form a
message, msgdc-ho = Mdc-ho ‖ SigSKdc(Mdc-ho), and sends it to the HO.
HO: Upon msgdc-ho reception, the HO performs the following steps.
1. It verifies the freshness of msgdc-ho by checking TSdc and the authenticity
of the message by checking the validity of SigSKdc(Mdc-ho). It then decrypts
Cdc-ho to obtain (Sid ‖ Mdc), where Mdc = (PSpm ‖ IDho ‖ (C,T)pm-ho ‖ Npm).
2. It retrieves IDpm by computing PS’pm = PRFKpm-ps(IDpmi ‖ Npm) for
all PMs, (IDpm1 , . . . , IDpmw), where w is the number of patients with a PM
registered in the HO, until a match is found, i.e. PS’pm equals PSpm.
3. It searches for IDpm in its database to retrieve Kpm-ho. Using this key, the
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HO verifies and decrypts (C,T)pm-ho to obtain (ctpm-ho ‖ d). Next, the HO
verifies the freshness of the message by checking if the counter, ctpm-ho, is higher
than the counter of the previously received message. Only if this condition is
fulfilled, the HO accepts the patient’s medical data, d, as authentic and genuine.
Figure 3: Medical data reporting protocol.
Figure 4: PM’s reprogramming protocol data reporting protocol.
PM Reprogramming Stage After examining the patient’s medical data, the
doctor can send the necessary command(s) to adjust the PM’s settings. This
stage, which can only take place if the doctor is on-line, is described next and
shown in Fig. 4.
HO: The HO performs the following steps.
1. It generates a fresh nonce, Nho, to create a fresh pseudonym for the PM,
PSpm. Then it increases the counter ctpm-ho, and encrypts it along with the
command, cmd, using Kpm-ho, i.e. (C, T)ho-pm = AEKpm-ho(ctpm-ho ‖ cmd).
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2. It constructs a message, Mho = (IDho ‖ PSs ‖ (C, T)ho-pm ‖ Ns), where
PSs = (PSpm ‖ PSho) and Ns = (Npm ‖ Nho). Next it encrypts Mho and the
session ID using the public key of the DC, i.e. Cho-dc = EPKdc(Sid ‖ Mho).
3. It constructs a message Mho-dc = (TSho ‖ Cho-dc) and generates a signature
on it, SigSKho(Mho-dc). Then it constructs a message, msgho-dc = Mho-dc ‖
SigSKho(Mho-dc), and sends it to the DC.
DC: Upon msgho-dc reception, the DC performs the following.
1. It verifies the freshness and authenticity of msgho-dc, and decrypts it to obtain
(Sid ‖ Mho). Once it learns IDho and Sid, it checks if Sid is a valid session ID
for this HO, i.e. if a message containing this session ID was previously sent to
this specific HO. It then constructs Mdc-bs = (Sid ‖ TSdc ‖ Mdc), where Mdc =
(PSs ‖ (C, T)ho-pm ‖ Ns), generates a signature on it, SigSKdc(Mdc-bs), and
constructs a message, msgdc-bs = Mdc-bs ‖ SigSKdc(Mdc-bs). Finally, msgdc-bs is
sent to the BS over the anonymous communication channel previously used.
BS: Upon msgdc-bs reception, the BS performs the following.
1. It verifies the freshness and authenticity of msgdc-bs before checking
the validity of Sid, i.e. checking if this session ID is the same as one
previously generated by the BS. It then increases the counter by one, i.e.
ctpm-bs = (ctpm-bs + 1). It encrypts ctpm-bs and Mdc using the session key,
i.e. (C, T)bs-pm = AEKs(ctpm-bs ‖ Mdc), and constructs and sends a message,
msgbs-pm = (C, T)bs-pm, to the PM.
PM: Upon msgbs-pm reception, the PM performs the following steps.
1. It verifies the authenticity of msgbs-pm, decrypts it to obtain (ctpm-bs ‖ Mdc)
and verifies the freshness of Mdc by checking ctpm-bs. It then verifies the validity
of PSho, i.e. checks if PSho has been previously generated at the PM.
2. It uses Kpm-ps, its own ID and Ns to verify the PM’s pseudonym, PS’pm =
PRFKpm-ps(IDpm ‖ Ns).
3. It verifies the authenticity of (C,T)ho-pm, decrypts it to obtain (ctpm-ho ‖ cmd)
and verifies the freshness of cmd. If the verifications are correct, it accepts cmd
as an authentic and genuine command sent from the patient’s HO.
5 Security Analysis
Message Authenticity: Messages exchanged between any of the entities
contain either a digital signature of the message originator or a MAC. Assuming
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that a standard digital signature scheme (e.g. RSA or Schnorr variant of
ECDSA [79]) or a MAC algorithm (e.g. AES CBC-MAC) are used, our protocol
guaranties source authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation (only
with digital signatures). Thus, attacks that attempt to modify the messages in
transit can be detected. All messages include either a counter or a timestamp
to ensure freshness, and hence prevent replay attacks (satisfy (S1) and (S2)).
Confidentiality of Medical Data and Commands: Medical data and
commands to modify the PM’s settings are always encrypted twice (i.e. in two
encryption layers). The inner-layer encryption is carried out between the PM
and the HO. This provides end-to-end security. The outer-layer encryption
is performed between any two communicating entities, and used to hide the
pseudonyms from adversaries. In addition, it helps to prevent some types of
denial-of-service attacks (satisfy (S4)). Assuming that a standard encryption
scheme (e.g. AES) is used, it will be hard for eavesdroppers to learn the content
of the messages. Only authorised medical staff will be able to access the medical
data or send commands (satisfy (S3)).
Patient’s Identity Privacy: Each message exchanged between the PM and
the HO contains a distinct pseudonym to hide the PM’s real ID. This pseudonym
is generated using a PRF, e.g. AES-128, and the symmetric key that is known
only to the PM and the authorized HO. AES-128 can be used as a PRF as long
as the number of messages for one key is less than 240, which corresponds to
more than 4,000 encrypted messages per second exchanged between the HO and
the PM (assuming that the battery lasts 7 years). All unauthorized internal
entities (i.e. BSs and DC) as well as external adversaries will not be able to
obtain the PM’s real ID. Only the authorized hospital can recover the real ID
of the PM, and link the medical data to a specific patient (satisfy (P1.1)).
Hospital’s Identity Privacy: For each pair of messages exchanged between
the PM and the HO, the PM generates a distinct pseudonym to hide the real ID
of the hospital where it sends medical data. This pseudonym is generated using
a PRF, e.g. AES-128, and the symmetric key shared between all PMs and the
DC. As explained above, AES-128 is a secure PRF if the number of encrypted
messages is less than 240. However, external adversaries cannot have access to
the pseudonyms produced by the PRF, since pseudonyms are always sent in an
encrypted format between the communicating entities (satisfy (P1.2)).
Location Privacy: A low-latency anonymous channel (e.g. a Mix network)
between the BSs and the DC in combination with a group signature scheme
prevents the DC from learning the location of the BS while being used by the
patient (satisfy (P1.3)).
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Session Unlinkability: Fresh and random pseudonyms are used in each
message exchanged between the PM and the HO. Therefore, by looking at the
exchanged messages, no unauthorized entity can link different sessions or learn
if two messages have been sent by the same PM (satisfy (P1.4)).
Protection against Stolen BSs or Pre-owned PMs: Since BSs are simply
relay devices that do not have any pre-installed shared secrets with PMs,
adversaries who get a BS cannot access the content (i.e. medical data and
commands) of the messages exchanged between the PM and the HO. In addition,
adversaries who obtain a new or a pre-owned PM cannot send data to the HO.
Upon a PM replacement, the old PM’s ID and the corresponding keys are
removed from the database so that the patient is no longer linked to the old
PM.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a protocol that provides end-to-end security between
a PM and a HO while preserving the patient’s privacy. Each PM uses two fresh
pseudonyms for hiding the unique PM’s ID and the HO where the medical data
is sent. These pseudonyms allow the DC to forward the medical data to the
authorized HO without learning to whom the data belongs to, and prevent
adversaries from discovering the PM’s real ID and to which hospital the medical
data is sent. In addition, all BSs sign their messages using a group signature
scheme and send them to the DC over an anonymous channel. This allows
(i) the DC to verify the authenticity of the messages and (ii) the HO to link
the medical data to the patient without learning which specific BS sent the
messages (i.e. the location of the patient). Moreover, we presented an IPI-based
key establishment protocol that allows a PM and a BS to agree on a symmetric
key without using public-key cryptography or any pre-installed shared secrets.
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Abstract. This paper analyses the security and privacy properties
of a widely used insulin pump and its peripherals. We eavesdrop the
wireless channel using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software-
based radios to intercept the messages sent between these devices;
fully reverse-engineer the wireless communication protocol using a
black-box approach; and document the message format and the
protocol state-machine in use. The upshot is that no standard
cryptographic mechanisms are applied and hence the system is
shown to be completely vulnerable to replay and message injection
attacks. Furthermore, sensitive patient health-related information
is sent unencrypted over the wireless channel.
Motivated by the results of our attacks, we study the feasibility
of applying cryptography to protect the data transmitted over
the air and prevent unauthorized access to the insulin pump. We
present a solution based on AES in combination with an updated
message format optimized for energy consumption. We implement
our solution on a 16-bit micro-controller and evaluate its security
properties and energy requirements. Finally, we discuss potential
strategies for further reducing the energy consumption.
1 Introduction
Wearable and Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers,
neurostimulators and insulin pumps are currently used to monitor and treat
physiological conditions within the patient’s body. For example, patients with
diabetes require a precise daily dosage of insulin, combined with a strict schedule
for diet, physical activity and insulin injections. The dosage can be automated
via an insulin pump. Unlike self-injection, insulin pumps provide more flexibility,
tighter control of the patient’s diabetes and better predictability by delivering
more precise insulin doses.
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Nowadays, most insulin pumps have a radio that enables wireless communication
with various peripherals (e.g. a glucose meter), a more powerful embedded
processor and connectivity to a back-end computing infrastructure. While these
advances bring substantial clinical benefits, new security and privacy threats
emerge. More specifically, the wireless interface of these devices is of particular
concern as it could be exploited by adversaries to perform remote attacks;
adversaries might eavesdrop the wireless channel to compromise the patient’s
privacy, or even worse, send unauthorized commands to the insulin pump.
Contributions. Our first contribution is to show that (at least) two commercial
insulin pump models use proprietary wireless communication protocols without
any security protection. By fully reverse-engineering the wireless communication
protocol, we are able to: (i) discover sensitive information on the patient sent
in the clear over the air and (ii) send unauthorized commands to the insulin
pump. Our second contribution is a practical case study on the feasibility of
using cryptography to secure the wireless channel between these devices. We
present a cryptographic AES-based solution with an updated message format
optimized for energy consumption, an important requirement for these devices.
We evaluate the security properties and energy requirements of our solution.
Finally, we implement our solution on a 16-bit micro-controller, similar to the
one used in the insulin pump system, and discuss possible ways to further reduce
the energy consumption.
Disclosure of results. Our study examines a widely adopted insulin pump
system that is being used by many diabetic patients worldwide. Given the
sensitive nature of our results, we deliberately omit some details (e.g. model
and manufacturer) as they would allow anyone to easily reproduce our attacks
on insulin pump systems used by patients.
Paper outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of related work. Section 3 describes the devices that
are part of the insulin pump system. Section 4 shows the laboratory setup
used to eavesdrop the wireless channel and perform the remote attacks. The
methodology of how to reverse-engineer the proprietary wireless communication
protocol is explained in Section 5. Section 6 shows several software radio-based
attacks that are carried out on the insulin pump, whereas a cryptographic
solution to secure the wireless link is presented and evaluated in Section 7,
particularly focusing on the energy consumption. Section 7 provides a final
conclusion on the paper.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Attacks on Medical Devices
Recently, it has been shown that some medical devices are vulnerable to
security attacks. Halperin et al. surveyed a wide range of security issues,
and explained the need to balance the security and privacy of IMDs with safety
and effectiveness [69]. Halperin et al. also performed a security and privacy
analysis of a widely used Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD). More
specifically, they carried out several software radio-based attacks that could
compromise both the safety and privacy of the patient [70]. Similar attacks
were also executed on the wireless channel between an insulin pump and a
remote control, as shown by Li et al. [86]. The main focus of their paper
was to show different types of attacks that adversaries could perform after
fully reverse-engineering the wireless communication protocol. In this paper,
we validate and extend their attacks by fully reverse-engineering the wireless
communication protocol between all the peripherals of the insulin pump system.
This includes the wireless link between: (i) the remote control and the insulin
pump, (ii) the glucose meter and the insulin pump, (iii) the glucose sensor and
the insulin pump and (iv) the USB stick and the insulin pump. This paper also
describes the methodology of how to reverse-engineer the proprietary wireless
communication protocol.
2.2 Countermeasures
Researchers have proposed several countermeasures to solve or mitigate the
vulnerabilities found on medical devices. Li et al. suggested using rolling codes,
as used in garage doors, to protect against unauthorized entities [86]. However,
some rolling codes do not offer strong authentication. Another weak point of
their proposal is that it assumes that the remote control and the insulin pump
share an encryption key, but it does not explain how this key is updated and
revoked. The solution proposed by Gollakota et al. consists of introducing an
external device, known as “shield”, which acts as a relay between the IMD and
the external device programmer [67]. The “shield” has been prototyped for a
cardiac device to mitigate some of the security problems, but it has not been
tested for wearable medical devices, such as insulin pumps. Anomalous detection
is also a promising technique that could be used in combination with other
security mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access, as shown by Hei et al. [72].
They proposed to use past glucose trends to detect anomalous behaviours.
However, while strict policies can increase the detection rate, they may also
result in false alarms. Undoubtedly, cryptography is the only strong approach for
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securing the data transmitted over the wireless communication and preventing
unauthorized access. The use of cryptography, though, is challenging because
IMDs are resource-constrained devices that require reduced size, low peak power
and a low duty cycle. Key management also presents important challenges
in terms of scalability, usability and the capacity to deal with emergency
situations [114]. This makes it non-trivial to propose cryptographic solutions
that increase the level of security and privacy of the system without jeopardizing
the patient’s safety. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing an
AES-based solution optimized for the insulin pump system. Furthermore, we
investigate how the energy cost of this security solution can be reduced without
compromising the security.
3 Insulin Pump System
This section describes the devices that are part of the insulin pump system (see
also Figure. 1).
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Figure 1: Insulin pump system.
The insulin pump can administer two types of insulin doses: a bolus dose,
which is pumped quickly to the patient after meals, or a basal dose, which
is continuously delivered at an adjustable rate. The remote control allows
patients to send commands wirelessly to their insulin pump from a distance up
to 1-2 meters. The glucose meter and the glucose sensor (attached to the body)
measure the glucose’s concentration in the patient’s blood, and send this value
wirelessly to the insulin pump. This is then used as an indicator for the patient
to adjust the dose. The USB stick (with software for therapy management) is a
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remote monitoring tool that collects data from the patient’s insulin pump, and
then uploads these data to a website managed by the manufacturer.
Before any of these devices can communicate with the insulin pump, the patient
needs to manually enter the device’s serial number on the insulin pump (except
for the USB stick). This serial number is typically printed on the back of the
device. This pairing process only needs to be done once. From then onwards,
these devices can interact with the insulin pump as long as the patient does not
modify the list of valid serial numbers stored on the insulin pump. If any of
these devices is lost, damaged or stolen, the patient can manually remove its
serial number from the list of valid devices, and enter the serial number of the
new device.
4 Laboratory Setup
In our laboratory we employed available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
hardware including a Universal Serial Radio Peripheral (USRP) [12], an
oscilloscope, an insulin pump, a remote control, a glucose meter, a glucose
sensor and a USB stick. Initially, we used the USRP, a commercial antenna and
a receiver program to eavesdrop the wireless channel and intercept messages.
Using this setup, the sending/receiving communication range is more than
5 meters. In practice, adversaries can extend this range to several orders of
magnitude. At a later stage, we were able to transmit messages by means of the
USRP, the antenna and a transmitter program. Our receiver and transmitter
programs were built in LabVIEW [7], a software tool which allows to interact
with the USRP.
5 Methodology
The first step in the security and privacy analysis of this insulin pump system is
to understand which data are sent and how these data are exchanged between
devices. This is a difficult task because the protocol specifications are kept
secret, since IMDs manufacturers often rely on obscurity to provide security, also
known as security-through-obscurity. However, experience has shown that these
proprietary solutions can be broken via several reverse-engineering techniques.
More specifically, we follow a black-box based approach, i.e. we only give some
inputs to the devices and then look at their outputs. In other words, we conduct
an operation on the device (e.g. we press any of the remote control buttons),
and then we look at the produced message format.
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Our black-box approach can be divided into four steps:
1. Find the wireless communication parameters: Several wireless
communication parameters, including the transmission frequency, modulation
and symbol rate, need to be first discovered. This step is crucial, as using
slightly different values would result in an erroneous received message.
2. Reverse-engineering: Secondly, we eavesdrop the wireless channel to
intercept messages sent from any of the peripherals to the insulin pump (and
vice versa). We then analyse these messages to discover both the message
format as well as the protocol state-machine. For example, the existence of
the remote control’s serial number within the message might be revealed by
intercepting and comparing two messages sent by two different remote controls
while performing the same action, i.e. pressing the same button.
3. Obtain the serial number: Most active attacks can only be mounted if
the serial number of a valid device, i.e. in the list of patient’s devices with
which the insulin pump can communicate, is known. There are several means
to obtain the serial number of any of the patient’s devices: (i) we could either
peek at the back of the device itself, (ii) get it through an insider working in
the hospital, (iii) eavesdrop once the wireless channel or (iv) brute-force it.
4. Perform the attacks: Once the previous steps are completed, various
attacks including replay, message injection and privacy attacks can be carried
out on the insulin pump. In the next section, we will describe these attacks
more in detail.
6 Experimental Results
This section describes various types of active and passive software radio-based
attacks that we can perform on the insulin pump.
6.1 Wireless Communication Parameters
The transmission frequency of any wireless device is publicly available on-line,
and it can be easily obtained through its Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) ID [5]. By checking the remote control’s FCC ID, we discovered that
this device transmits at 868.35 MHz. Fig. 2 shows the waveform of the signals
transmitted by the remote control. By observing this waveform, we found that
the modulation scheme uses the presence of a carrier wave to indicate a binary
‘1’ and its absence to indicate a binary ‘0’. This type of modulation is known as
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On-Off Keying (OOK). To find the symbol rate, we opened our remote control
and looked at the raw bits (i.e. bits before modulation) to be transmitted by
tapping one pin of its micro-controller. Using the oscilloscope, we measured the
duration of a bit, which corresponds to the duration of a symbol. Following
the same steps, we found that the other peripherals also use the same wireless
communication parameters.
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Figure 2: Waveform of the signal transmitted by the remote control.
6.2 Reverse-engineering the Wireless Communication Proto-
col
In this section, we show how to reverse-engineer the wireless communication
protocol between the insulin pump and its peripherals.
We found that the messages sent from any of the peripherals to the insulin
pump (and vice versa) consist of common message fields and information bits
that depend on the peripheral being used. In particular, all messages have
a common start-of-frame and frame synchronization sequences. The former
consists of a series of “1s” and “0s” sent consecutively to wake up the insulin
pump from power saving mode, whereas the latter is used to indicate that the
information bits are about to start. Next, there is a 6-bit sequence used to
distinguish between the four types of devices that can communicate with the
insulin pump. We will now explain how to discover the information bits sent by
each peripheral more in detail.
Remote control - insulin pump
As explained in Section 2, in 2011, Li et al. reverse-engineered the wireless
communication protocol between the remote control and the insulin pump [86].
In our experiments, presented below, we obtained similar results and hence
validated their findings.
We started our tests by capturing the messages sent by the remote control while
performing the same operation (i.e. pressing the same remote control’s button)
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several times. The result of this test showed that the remote control produces
messages that differ in 24 bits each time. On the one hand, by computing
the entropy of these bits, we determined that 12 bits seemed to be unifornmly
distributed, which made us think that a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
could be used to detect bit errors in the transmissions. CRCs are easy to
implement and very effective at detecting bit errors caused by noise in the
communication channel. In order to find the CRC generator polynomial, rather
than bruteforcing all possible polynomials, we took the GCD of two observed
messages (in polynomial form). This allowed us to discover that a standard
CRC commonly used in mobile networks, known as CRC-8-WCDMA, is being
used. On the other hand, the remaining 12 bits are repeated after 256 messages
and hence they are used as a message counter, which is increased every time
the patient presses any of the remote control’s buttons.
Afterwards, we ascertained whether pressing different buttons on the remote
control or using different remote controls causes some part(s) of the message to
change. These tests led us to conclude that a 12-bit sequence depends on the
button being pressed, and a 36-bit sequence depends on the remote control being
used. Furthermore, by looking at two 36-bit sequences and their corresponding
6-digit remote control’s serial numbers, we found that each digit is represented
by 6 bits. A mapping sequence is then used to convert each 6-bit sequence to
a 4-bit hexadecimal number. Thus, due to this mapping sequence, the serial
number only contains 24 unique bits. Note that for security reasons we do not
disclose the table containing the mapping sequences in the paper. Fig. 3 shows
the remote control’s message format.
Device type︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 bits
Remote control’s SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
36 bits
Button︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Counter︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Figure 3: Remote control’s message format.
Glucose meter - insulin pump
Several messages sent by two different glucose meters, wherein a wide range
of glucose levels were measured, were first intercepted. Based on our previous
results, we investigated whether using different glucose meters causes some
part(s) of the message to change. We found that the glucose meter’s serial
number is represented by 36 bits (6-bit per digit) and that it uses the mapping
sequence previously found. This is followed by the information field, which
remains empty (i.e. all zeros) for all captured messages. Subsequently, we
grouped messages with identical and different glucose level, separately, in
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several clusters. By comparing the messages in these clusters, we discovered
that 12 bits are used to transmit the measured glucose level. Finally, there is
a 12-bit CRC that is computed using the CRC-8-WCDMA. Fig. 4 shows the
glucose meter’s message format.
Device type︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 bits
Glucose meter SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
36 bits
Info︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Glucose level︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Figure 4: Glucose meter’s message format.
Glucose sensor - insulin pump
Given the similarities between the previous message’s formats, the first step
was to determine whether the messages sent by the glucose sensor contain its
serial number. This test showed that, unlike the previous cases in which we
found a 36-bit serial number, the glucose sensor’s serial number is represented
by 84 bits. In order to discover the rest of the message, we then looked at
several consecutive messages sent by the glucose sensor. This allowed us to find
a 6-bit counter along with the current and past eight measured glucose levels.
Because of the longer message’s length in comparison with the messages sent by
the previous peripherals, these messages use a 24-bit CRC (instead of a 12-bit
CRC). We found that the CRC being used is the standard CRC-16-CCITT.
Fig. 5 shows the glucose sensor’s message format.
Device type︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 bits
Glucose sensor’s SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
84 bits
Counter︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 bits
Info︸ ︷︷ ︸
282 bits
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
24 bits
Figure 5: Glucose sensor’s message format.
USB stick - insulin pump
Without looking at the bits being transmitted, we first studied the message
exchange process between the USB stick and the insulin pump. For this,
we placed the insulin pump close to our USRP while keeping the USB stick
(connected to our laptop) further away, thus, getting more power from the
insulin pump, as shown in Figure. 6. During a communication session, the USB
stick and the insulin pump send to each other a fix number of messages. The
USB stick always initiates the communication by sending a “wake up” message
several times to the insulin pump. If the remote control and the insulin pump
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are within the same communication range, the latter replies to this message and
the interrogation process starts, as shown in Figure. 6. From that point onwards,
two different consecutive phases can be distinguished: in the first phase, the
USB stick requests data such as the model, firmware or the current settings
from the insulin pump, whereas in the second phase the insulin pump first sends
a message to the USB stick and the latter responds with an ACKnowledgement
message (ACK).
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Figure 6: Communication between the USB stick (connected to the computer)
and the insulin pump. From left to right, the message sent several times by the
USB stick to wake up the insulin pump, the response sent by the insulin pump
to the first USB stick’s message, the second message sent by the USB stick to
the insulin pump and the response sent by the insulin pump to the second USB
stick’s message.
Device type︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 bits
Insulin pump SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
36 bits
Message type︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Info︸ ︷︷ ︸
x bits
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
Figure 7: USB stick/insulin pump’s message format.
Once we understood the message exchange process between these devices, we
started to analyse the messages sent from the USB device to the insulin pump
(and vice versa). A first test consisted on capturing several messages sent by the
USB stick while interrogating two different insulin pumps. This test revealed
that the insulin pump’s serial number is transmitted in both messages; the ones
sent by the USB stick and the ones sent by the insulin pump. We found that
the mapping sequence previously discovered is also used. By comparing two
consecutive messages sent by the USB stick and the insulin pump, respectively,
we found a 12-bit message type (or message identifier) sequence which indicates
the USB stick message the insulin pump replies to.
Subsequently, insulin pump’s data such as the model, firmware or current
settings are transmitted within the message. The length of this field (denoted
by x in Figure. 7) depends on the information requested/provided by the devices.
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Finally, similarly to the cases above, there is a 12-bit CRC at the end of the
messages that is computed using the CRC-8-WCDMA. Fig. 7 shows the message
format being used by the USB stick and the insulin pump.
6.3 Software Radio-based Attacks
In this section, we focus on the active and passive attacks that we can carry out
on the insulin pump after having reverse-engineered the wireless communication
protocol.
Replay attacks: We first investigated the feasibility of carrying out replay
attacks, as these attacks can even be conducted without reverse-engineering
the protocol; knowing the transmission frequency being used by the devices is
sufficient. At first, we intercepted several messages sent by the remote control
to the insulin pump and simply re-sent each message without demodulating the
signal. Our experiments demonstrated that some sort of anti-replay mechanism
is being used. This anti-replay mechanism does not allow to re-send the last
message accepted by the insulin pump, but it does not impede us to send
any other arbitrary message previously recorded. Thus, just by obtaining two
different messages while performing an action (e.g. activate the insulin pump),
we can alternatively re-send these messages as many times as needed in a
protocol instance. Following the same approach, we also successfully performed
this attack on the wireless link between: (i) the glucose meter and the insulin
pump and (ii) the USB stick and the insulin pump. In both cases, messages
were accepted the first time they were re-sent, meaning that no anti-replay
mechanism is being used.
Message injection attacks: With the knowledge gained during the reverse-
engineering process, we can create messages containing a valid serial number and
successfully send them to the insulin pump. As a result, we can activate/suspend
the insulin pump, deliver a high amount of insulin to the patient and send
any arbitrary glucose value to the insulin pump. In addition to this, two
different types of message injection attacks can be mounted on the wireless
link between the USB stick and the insulin pump. On the one hand, we can
emulate the insulin pump’s behaviour by replying to USB stick transmissions.
This attack, though, has several limitations. Since the USB stick initiates the
communication, triggered when a doctor clicks a button in the website managed
by the manufacturer, the attacker has to wait for such an event and hijack the
session, potentially even having to block the communication from the genuine
insulin pump. On the other hand, we can also impersonate the USB stick
to trigger an interrogation process. This could compromise both the security
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and privacy of the patient, as it might be launched either to discover sensitive
patient health-related information or to drain the insulin pump’s battery.
Privacy attacks: Our analysis of the wireless communication protocol reveals
that messages sent from any of the peripherals to the insulin pump (and vice
versa) are not encrypted. Therefore, these messages disclose the type of device
with which the insulin pump is communicating and its serial number, the current
and past patient glucose levels, the insulin pump’s model/software version, the
current insulin pump’s settings, the basal rate information or the total amount
of insulin taken by the patient.
7 Security Defences
In the previous sections, we executed several active and passive attacks on the
insulin pump that could compromise the safety and privacy of the patient. In
this section, we present a cryptographic solution based on AES [52] that provides
data confidentiality, authentication and freshness at a reasonable energy cost.
Furthermore, we propose an optimized message format to reduce the energy
cost. Without loss of generality, we will only focus on the wireless link between
the remote control and the insulin pump. However, our solution can be applied
as well to the wireless link between the insulin pump and any of the other
peripherals.
7.1 Key Management
The remote control and the insulin pump need to share two independent
symmetric cryptographic keys: one for encryption and one for authentication.
We will now briefly explain the process of generating, transporting, updating
and revoking these keys.
Key generation: To reduce the software footprint and the redundant
computation on the remote control, both keys are generated by the insulin
pump. To guarantee an appropriate level of entropy, a true randomness source is
required. This randomness could originate either from the Static Random-Access
Memory (SRAM) [130] or a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) [15].
Key transport: After the key generation process, both keys have to be
securely transported from the insulin pump to the remote control. For this, we
suggest to make physical contact between both devices via a secure channel (e.g.
we connect a cable between devices), similarly as the Resurrecting Duckling
approach proposed by Stajano and Anderson [127].
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Key update: The patient is required to update the cryptographic keys every
time the battery is replaced, i.e. every three weeks. During this process, the
anti-replay counter is re-initialised to zero.
Key revocation: If the patient’s remote control is lost, stolen or damaged,
both keys have to be revoked. If this occurs, the key generation procedure has
to be executed with the new remote control. From that point onwards, the old
keys are removed from the insulin pump.
7.2 Our Approach
AES-based encryption and MAC
Our solution makes use of two cryptographic primitives: AES-128 in counter
(CTR) mode to encrypt messages and AES-128 as a MAC. To find the energy
requirements of our solution, we implemented both AES-128 in CTR mode
and AES-128 MAC for openMSP430 [13] on a Spartan-6 FPGA. This is a
representative mid-range micro-controller similar to the one used in the insulin
pump. This software implementation can be easily converted to any other 16-bit
micro-controller. Our implementation has been compiled with GNU Tools for
Texas Instruments MSP430 micro-controllers optimized for code size with -Os
gcc flags. In the rest of this section, we will investigate how to optimize this
solution.
Table 1: Implementation on MSP430 @16 MHz, 1.8 V.
Operation ROM
(Byte)
Cycles Time
(µs)
Energy
(µJ)
MAC
generation 2684 9430 590 2.14
MAC
verification 2760 9561 598 2.16
Encryption/Decryption 2664 9404 588 2.13
Encryption +
MAC generation 2879 18865 1180 4.27
Decryption +
MAC verification 2847 18964 1186 4.30
1Original remote control’s message format without the mapping sequence.
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Table 2: Energy cost (per day) of each solution for the remote control (RC)
and the insulin pump (IP).
Solution Confidentiality Authentication Computation Communication Total cost Cost increase
cost cost
No security RC: 0 mJ RC: 26.32 mJ RC: 26.32 mJ RC: -
(original system) 7 7 IP: 0 mJ IP: 8.77 mJ IP: 8.77 mJ IP: -
No security RC: 0 mJ RC: 18.9 mJ RC: 18.9 mJ RC: -28.19%
(new message format1) 7 7 IP: 0 mJ IP: 6.30 mJ IP: 6.30 mJ IP: -28.16%
MAC + opt SN RC: 0.64 mJ RC: 35.10 mJ RC: 35.74 mJ RC: +35.79%
encryption 3 3 IP: 0.65 mJ IP: 11.86 mJ IP: 12.51 mJ IP: +42.64%
Only RC: 0.32 mJ RC: 20.25 mJ RC: 20.57 mJ RC: -21.84%
encryption 3 7 IP: 0.32 mJ IP: 6.75 mJ IP: 7.07 mJ IP: -19.38%
Only RC: 0.32 mJ RC: 39.15 mJ RC: 39.47 mJ RC: +50%
MAC 7 3 IP: 0.32 mJ IP: 13.05 mJ IP: 13.37 mJ IP: +52.45%
Communication cost vs. computation cost
Although our solution provides data confidentiality and authentication to prevent
the remote attacks previously shown, the use of cryptography increases the
energy consumption in both the remote control and the insulin pump. The energy
consumption can be divided into two main components: the computation and
the communication cost. The former indicates the cost of performing operations
such as encrypting/decrypting messages, whereas the latter refers to the cost of
transmitting/receiving bits to/from a device.
On the one hand, to calculate the computation cost, we measure the number
of clock cycles needed to perform an operation. By looking at the power
consumption (in the micro-controller specifications [10]) and knowing the number
of clock cycles required, we can compute its energy cost, as shown in Table 1.
(Note that all the operations described in this table consider a 128-bit block). On
the other hand, to compute the communication cost, we looked at the datasheet
specifications of the remote control’s radio transmitter and the insulin pump’s
radio receiver [16]. As a result, we found that the cost of transmitting and
receiving one bit at 868.35 MHz using an OOK modulation scheme is 2.25µJ
and 0.75µJ , respectively.
Assumptions: To demonstrate the practicality of our solution, we consider
the following worst case scenario. We assume that there is a patient in a very
crowded hospital full of patients who all use an insulin pump. We assume that
each patient has 5 meals per day, during which any of the remote control’s
buttons are pressed 30 times, so 150 remote control’s buttons are pressed per
patient daily. Given the 2 meter communication range between the remote
control and the insulin pump, we can estimate the interference, i.e. the number
of messages received from other patients’ remote control. Assuming a density of
4 people per square meter, the number of patients within a radius of two meters
is 52. In other words, the insulin pump of the patient receives 7800 messages
sent by other patients’ remote control daily.
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New message format
When observing the original message format (see Figure. 3), we note that
several message fields can be optimized or removed when adding security
countermeasures. In the new message format, the mapping sequence used to
convert each 4-bit hexadecimal sequence to a 6-bit sequence can be removed, as
it provides no extra security and it is costly to transmit extra bits. As a result,
the length of several fields is reduced, resulting in an energy reduction (see
Table 2). In the rest of this section, we will further optimize this new message
format to reduce the communication cost without significantly increasing the
computation cost.
MAC + optimized SN + encryption
Our solution consists of encrypting the messages sent by the remote control
using AES-128 in CTR mode, and then append a AES-128 MAC tag to each
message. Intuitively, another possible solution would be to use authenticated
encryption like Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM). However, from an energy
point of view, there is no advantage on using CCM in comparison with our
solution because of the small message length.
Message format: we notice that we can further optimize the message format
previously proposed. For example, the CRC used in the original message format
to verify the message’s integrity can be removed, as the MAC by itself already
provides integrity protection. To prevent replay attacks during the three weeks
lifetime of the key, a counter needs to be increased every time the patient presses
any of the remote control buttons. This counter needs to be large enough to
avoid reuse of previous values. In contrast to the original design, the insulin
pump will now only accept a message if and only if the counter of the message
is higher than the value of the previously received message.
Remote control’s serial number optimization: Since the MAC by itself
is used to authenticate the remote control, another possible optimization is
to reduce the length of the remote control’s serial number. However, there is
an important trade-off between the communication cost and the computation
cost. On the one hand, if there is no remote control’s serial number in the
messages, the insulin pump would have to verify the MAC of the messages
sent by: (i) the patient’s remote control and (ii) other patients’ remote control
within the communication range. This approach increases the computation cost
while reducing the communication cost. On the other hand, if the entire remote
control’s serial number is sent, the insulin pump would only need to verify the
MAC of the messages sent by the patient’s remote control. However, although
this approach requires less computations, more bits need to be sent/received.
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Therefore, we investigate if it is possible to reduce the remote control’s serial
number length while keeping the cost of verifying some extra MACs at a
reasonable level. The relation between the energy consumption and the remote
control’s serial number length for both the remote control and the insulin pump
is shown in Figure. 8. When analysing this figure, we notice that the most
optimal serial number’s length in the remote control (i.e. when no serial number
is used) is the option that introduces the largest energy cost in the insulin
pump. In this context, though, we take the serial number’s length where the
total energy cost in the insulin pump is the lowest (i.e. 12-bit), as the patient
can not receive the treatment if the insulin pump has no battery.
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Figure 8: Relation between the energy consumption and the remote control
serial number’s length for both the remote control and the insulin pump.
As a result, because of using a 12-bit remote control serial number (instead of
a 24-bit serial number), the insulin pump does not only receive messages sent
by the patient’s remote control, but also from other remote controls with the
same optimized 12-bit serial number within the communication range. Given
the assumptions explained in section 7.2 and assuming a uniformly distributed
12-bit serial number, the expected number of collisions per day is 7800 · (2−12),
namely, 2 collisions.
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Optimized solution: Fig. 9 shows the encryption-then-MAC schematic.
Initially, the message is encrypted using the encryption key and a fresh counter
value. The message contains two fields: the device type and information bits.
Subsequently, the 12-bit remote control’s serial number (not encrypted), the
ciphertext and the counter are used to generate a 64-bit tag, which is appended
to the message.
Device type
4 bits
Information
8 bits
Counter
16 bits
AES-128 CTR mode
encryptionEnc Key
12 bits
Ciphertext
12 bits
Counter
16 bits
12 bits
40 bits
AES-128 CMAC MAC Key
64 bits
Counter
16 bits
Tag
64 bits
Remote control
SN 12 bits
Ciphertext
12 bits
Remote control
SN 12 bits
Figure 9: Encryption-then-MAC schematic.
When the insulin pump receives a message from a remote control (not necessarily
from the patient’s remote control), the former checks (i) whether the 12-bit
serial number equals the 12-bit serial number of the valid remote control and (ii)
whether the counter is higher than the value of the previously received message.
If both conditions are satisfied, the insulin pump verifies the 64-bit tag. If the
latter is done successfully, the insulin pump decrypts the message. Otherwise,
the message is discarded.
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Total energy cost: Because of the message format previously introduced and
all the other optimizations, the message length, compared with the original
remote control’s message format, is increased from 78 to 104 bits. Given the
solution that we propose and the assumptions above mentioned, the remote
control sends 26 extra bits per message, 150 times per day, which results in an
extra communication cost of 8.77mJ. Similarly, the insulin pump receives 26
extra bits per each of the 150 messages sent by the patient’s remote control as
well as 2 messages sent by other patients’ remote control caused by collisions in
the serial number. This corresponds to an extra communication cost of 2.92mJ
and 0.16mJ, respectively. To encrypt-then-MAC each of these 150 messages,
the remote control requires 0.64mJ. Likewise, the insulin pump needs to verify
the MAC and then decrypt the 150 messages sent by the patient’s remote
control and the 2 additional messages sent by other patients’ remote controls.
To perform these operations, an extra computation cost of 0.65mJ is required.
7.3 Discussion
Table 2 shows the security properties of the different security solutions with
their corresponding energy costs for both the remote control and the insulin
pump.
Our results show that in all these solutions the computational cost is negligible
compared to the cost of transmitting/receiving bits, which evidences the
importance of optimizing the message format. On the one hand, we demonstrate
that the data confidentiality requirement can be easily accomplished if these
devices transmit/receive messages with an optimized format. We show that,
by using a reduced message format to lower the communication cost, even
adding encryption/decryption still requires a lower energy cost compared to
the original design (without security and a non-optimized message format).
On the other hand, we show that the authentication requirement is more
difficult to accomplish, as this can only be achieved by appending a MAC to
the message, which inevitably increases the message length and so the cost of
transmitting/receiving bits.
How can the energy costs be further reduced? Our results show that the
computation cost is about the 2% of the total energy cost of our final solution.
So, even if the cost of computing cryptographic operations could be theoretically
reduced to zero, the total energy cost would only be slightly decreased. Therefore,
the problem does not solely lie in the design of lightweight cryptographic
algorithms but particularly on finding ways to reduce the communication
cost, e.g. further optimize the message format previously proposed. Another
possibility would be to use a 32-bit tag rather than a 64-bit tag (as currently
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used in our solution). However, even though 32-bit MACs are considered to be
secure against on-line attacks, attacks where an attacker can capture messages
and then try all possible keys off-line could still be carried out. While not
practical in this insulin pump system, another option could be to compute the
MAC over several messages rather than doing it per every message. Our work
clearly shows that there is a need for lightweight integrity solutions which do
not significantly increase the message size.
8 Conclusions
In this work we have demonstrated, by reverse-engineering two models of a
commonly used insulin pump system, that security through obscurity is a
dangerous design approach. Our protocol analysis resulted in the identification
of serious security and privacy vulnerabilities. We discovered that no defences
against replay and message injection attacks were present, and sensitive
patient health-related information was disclosed unencrypted in the wireless
communication.
To prevent these active and passive software radio-based attacks, we showed how
to secure the wireless link using a security solution based on AES in combination
with an optimization of the message format. We evaluated and implemented
this solution on a low-cost 16-bit micro-controller similar to the one used in
the insulin pump, and compared its security properties and energy costs with
alternative solutions that provide less security. We show that there is a need
for future research on how to protect the message integrity without largely
increasing its length.
In accordance with the principle of responsible disclosure, we have notified the
manufacturer six months before disclosure.
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Abstract. Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) typically use
proprietary protocols with no or limited security to wirelessly
communicate with a device programmer. These protocols enable
doctors to carry out critical functions, such as changing the
IMD’s therapy or collecting telemetry data, without having to
perform surgery on the patient. In this paper, we fully reverse-
engineer the proprietary communication protocol between a device
programmer and the latest generation of a widely used Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) which communicate over a long-
range RF channel (from two to five meters). For this we follow
a black-box reverse-engineering approach and use inexpensive
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment. We demonstrate
that reverse-engineering is feasible by a weak adversary who has
limited resources and capabilities without physical access to the
devices. Our analysis of the proprietary protocol results in the
identification of several protocol and implementation weaknesses.
Unlike previous studies, which found no security measures, this
article discovers the first known attempt to obfuscate the data
that is transmitted over the air. Furthermore, we conduct privacy
and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and give evidence of other
attacks that can compromise the patient’s safety. All these attacks
can be performed without needing to be in close proximity to the
patient. We validate that our findings apply to (at least) 10 types
of ICDs that are currently on the market. Finally, we propose
several practical short- and long-term countermeasures to mitigate
or prevent existing vulnerabilities.
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1 Introduction
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers and Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) are used to monitor and help control abnormal
heart rhythms. ICDs are battery-powered devices that deliver electric shocks
to the patient’s heart if the heartbeat is too fast. Some ICDs can also act as
a pacemaker and give tiny electrical shocks if the heartbeat is too slow. ICDs
have evolved over three generations. The first generation (or the oldest) do not
have any wireless interface and hence do not allow reprogramming once the ICD
is implanted. The second and third generation enable wireless communication
with external devices including device programmers and base stations. Device
programmers are used by medical personnel to wirelessly modify the ICD’s
settings or collect telemetry data, whereas base stations, installed in the patients’
home, allow remote monitoring by gathering telemetry data from the ICD and
sending this data to the hospital. Both device programmers and base stations
have a programming head that activates the ICD’s wireless interface when it is
placed above the implantation site (the patient’s chest) for a few seconds.
The second generation of ICDs supports wireless communication between the
programming head and the ICD only over a short-range communication channel
(less than 10 cm). In the third generation (the latest), the programming head
is first used over the short-range communication channel to activate the long
range communication link of the ICD. This process is illustrated in Fig 1. Both
devices can then communicate with each other over a long-range communication
channel (from two to five meters), not requiring the use of the programming
head anymore, unless the session expires.
While these advances bring substantial clinical benefits to patients, new security
and privacy threats also emerge, specially due to the wireless communication
between these devices. Adversaries may eavesdrop the wireless channel to learn
sensitive patient information, or even worse, send malicious messages to the ICD.
The consequences of these attacks can be fatal for patients as these messages
can contain commands to deliver a shock or to disable a therapy.
Our contribution: This paper presents the first reverse engineering and
security analysis of the proprietary long-range communication protocol between
the device programmer and the latest generation of ICDs. For the reverse
engineering we use a black-box approach and inexpensive Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) equipment. This task is not trivial since it was first necessary
to find the symbol rate from the waveform of the signals sent by the devices
in order to demodulate the captured messages correctly. We show that for
proprietary protocols on which we had no prior knowledge or documentation,
reverse-engineering is possible by a weak adversary without even needing to have
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physical access to the devices. Our second contribution consists of demonstrating
several attacks that can compromise the ICD’s availability and the patient’s
privacy. We give evidence that replay and spoofing attacks are possible as
well. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we describe several ways to
circumvent the short-range communication step, which requires being close
to the patient, and perform session hijacking. We validated that our findings
apply to (at least) 10 different ICD models. Our third contribution is the
proposal of several short- and long-term measures to mitigate or solve the
existing vulnerabilities in the latest generation of ICDs including a novel key
agreement protocol which we formally verified using ProVerif.
Disclosure of results: In accordance with the principle of responsible
disclosure, we have contacted and discussed our findings with the manufacturer
before disclosure. Given the sensitive nature of our work, we omitted some of
the obtained results to avoid easy replication of the attacks.
Paper outline: The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1
gives an overview of related work and shows our laboratory setup. Section 2
explains the process of reverse-engineering the proprietary protocol between
the device programmer and the ICD. Section 3 describes several strategies to
circumvent the short-range communication, which requires close proximity to
the patient. Section 4 shows the protocol weaknesses and implementation flaws
whereas practical and effective short- and long-term countermeasures to mitigate
or solve these vulnerabilities are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 gives
concluding remarks.
ICD
programming head
device 
programmer
Figure 1: ICD activation procedure.
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1.1 Related Work
Software radio-based attacks on IMDs: Several papers have demonstrated
that IMDs often lack strong security mechanisms, which makes them vulnerable
to different types of remote attacks. Hei et al. showed a simple yet effective
attack where adversaries force the IMD to respond to their messages, which
reduces the battery life of the IMD [73]. Halperin et al. analysed the proprietary
protocol between the device programmer and a second generation ICD to
communicate over the short-range communication channel [70]. As no security
mechanisms were found, they were able to carry out several software radio-
based attacks just by replaying past transmissions sent by the legitimate device
programmer. Similar attacks can also be performed on an insulin pump, as
shown by Li et al. [86]. Marin et al. fully reverse-engineered the proprietary
protocol between all devices in a wireless insulin pump system, and extended
the attacks of Li et al. [92]. Unlike the work by Halperin et al. [70], which
focused on the short-range communication (less than 10 cm), we analyse the
proprietary protocol between the device programmer and a latest generation of
ICD over long-range communication (from two to five meters).
Countermeasures: Various countermeasures have been proposed to solve
the vulnerabilities found in IMDs. Gollakota et al. presented the “shield”, an
external device that acts as a proxy between the device programmer and the
ICD. The shield jams the messages to/from the IMD to prevent others from
decoding them, while still being able to successfully decode them itself [67].
Although this solution mitigates some of the existing problems, it does not
protect against adversaries who can transmit malicious messages with much
more power than the shield. Tippenhauer et al. demonstrated that the shield
does not provide confidentiality as a MIMO eavesdropper could cancel out
the interference produced by the shield and then recover the messages sent
by the devices [128]. Xu et al. introduced a wearable device, also known
as “IMDGuard”, which does not only work as a proxy but also performs an
authentication process on the ICD’s behalf [134]. But Rostami et al. found
that the “IMDGuard” is vulnerable to a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack
which reduces its effective key length from 129 bits to 86 bits [113]. Rostami
et al. presented Heart-to-Heart (H2H), a commitment-scheme-based pairing
protocol through which the device programmer authenticates to the IMD without
needing to share any prior secrets [114]. H2H implements a novel access-control
policy called “touch-to-access” that ensures access to the IMD by any device
programmer that can make physical contact with the patient and measure
his heart rate. However, Marin et al. found that the H2H is vulnerable to a
reflection and a MITM attack [89].
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Another line of research relies on exchanging a cryptographic key between
the device programmer and the IMD via an auxiliary or Out-Of-Band (OOB)
channel. Halperin et al. proposed a zero-power authentication that uses an
RFID tag in combination with a piezo-element for audio-based key distribution.
However, Halevi et al. demonstrated the feasibility of eavesdropping the audio
transmissions of the piezo element [68]. Rasmussen et al. proposed an access
control scheme based on ultrasonic distance bounding which enables the IMD
to grant access to its resources to only a device programmer that is in its close
proximity [109]. However, this typically requires dedicated analog hardware,
which makes the solution expensive to integrate in resource-constrained devices
like IMDs. Another proposal is to use a Body-Coupled Communication (BCC)
channel. Yet, Li et al. showed that remote eavesdropping on a BCC channel is
possible with a very sensitive antenna [86]. In this paper, we present practical
and effective countermeasures that can be divided into two groups: short-
term and long-term measures. The former do not require any modification on
the ICDs and hence may be immediately adopted whereas the latter can be
implemented in future generations of ICDs.
1.2 Laboratory Setup
Our laboratory setup comprises available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
hardware including an Universal Serial Radio Peripheral (USRP) [12], a data
acquisition system (DAQ) [11] and a few antennas, as shown in Fig 2. In
addition, we have the following medical devices: a device programmer, a base
station and several ICD models of the latest generation. For our experiments,
we created a receiver and a transmitter programs using LabVIEW [7]. The first
step of our black-box reverse-engineering approach is to eavesdrop the wireless
channel and capture the messages exchanged between the device programmer
and the ICD. We then analyse the messages to discover its format, and study
how the messages are exchanged between the devices, i.e. the protocol state-
machine. Subsequently, we are able to create and send our own messages to
the ICD by means of the USRP, the antenna and our transmitter program. To
better evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we also study the ICD activation
procedure. For this we use a DAQ and an antenna to intercept the messages
exchanged over the short-range communication channel.
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Figure 2: Laboratory setup. At the top, from left to right, are our USRP and
the DAQ. Our antennas are shown at the bottom.
2 Intercepting the Wireless Transmissions
Several articles [70,86,92] have already pointed out that IMD manufacturers
often rely on hiding the protocol specifications to provide security. This is
commonly known as security-by-obscurity. Proprietary protocols typically offer
very limited or no security guarantees and have been broken via different reverse-
engineering techniques. This paper analyses the proprietary protocol between
device programmers and the latest generation of ICDs to communicate over a
long-range channel. Instead of opening the devices to get their firmware for the
purpose of reverse-engineering the protocol, we follow a black-box approach. A
similar approach has been used in other articles [64,65]. Our black-box approach
consists of giving some inputs to the devices and then inferring information by
looking at their outputs, i.e. the produced messages. In our work we study the
feasibility of reverse-engineering the proprietary protocol by a weak adversary
who has limited resources and capabilities. Through meticulous analysis of these
messages, we can infer the message format and the protocol state-machine. Our
black-box approach, which is a labour-intensive process, is more challenging
yet more realistic than other existing techniques, as it assumes a weak attacker
who can intercept the messages sent wirelessly using a USRP and an antenna,
but cannot have physical access to the devices. We will now summarise our
approach and main findings.
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2.1 Wireless Communication Parameters
Transmission frequency: The ICD and the device programmer’s program-
ming head first communicate over the short-range communication channel
(between 30-300 kHz)4. After the ICD is activated, both devices communicate
over the long-range communication channel using the MICS5 band (402-405
MHz). The transmission frequency of the devices can be obtained through their
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ID [5].
Modulation: By examining the signals sent by the devices both in the time
and frequency domain, we found that the device programmer and the ICD use
distinct modulations to transmit their data. In particular, the transmissions
from the device programmer to the ICD use a Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
modulation, whereas a Differential Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) modulation is
used in the transmissions from the ICD to the device programmer [105].
Symbol rate: Due to the modulations being used, discovering how many
symbols (i.e. modulated bits) are sent in each message simply by looking at
signal’s waveform is a challenging problem.
To estimate the symbol rate, we created a Matlab program that uses the
Hilbert transform to obtain the instantaneous frequency of the signal. A key
observation is that by demodulating the signals using an FM receiver and
looking at the demodulated waveforms, we found that the message sent by the
device programmer to request telemetry data is always identical. This message
is sent continuously to the ICD when no operation is performed. The first step
is to intercept several of these messages and store their waveforms in a file.
Our program takes these waveforms as inputs and produces a graph that shows
where the frequency shifts occur, i.e. where each symbol starts and ends.
Fig 3 shows the instantaneous frequency of the device programmer’s signal. The
symbol rate can then be obtained by computing the inverse of the difference
between the times where two abrupt peaks occur. However, instead of giving
only one symbol rate value, this approach gives a small range of possible values.
Therefore, the second step was to create another program that performs a sweep
over all possible symbol rate values within this range, increasing the symbol rate
by one symbol each time. For each iteration, our program demodulates several
of the messages previously captured, and then checks whether the demodulated
bits are equal for all the messages. This allows us to find the symbol rate being
used by the devices, as the correct symbol rate is the one for which no bit errors
are produced.
4We do not specify the exact transmission frequency as this may implicitly reveal the
manufacturer’s identity.
5Medical Implant Communications Service.
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Figure 3: Symbol rate estimation based on the Hilbert transform. In the top
chart, the waveform of the signal transmitted by the device programmer. In the
bottom chart, the instantaneous frequency of the device programmer’s signal.
2.2 Reverse-engineering the Long-range Communication
Protocol
In this section, we show how to reverse-engineer the proprietary protocol between
the device programmer and the ICD to communicate over the long-range channel.
We first activate the ICD and put the device in “interrogation” mode. More
details on how adversaries can activate the ICD are given in Section 3.
We found that all messages have a common Start-of-Frame (SoF) that consists of
a series of alternating “1s” and “0s” sent consecutively to indicate the presence
of an incoming message. This is followed by a preamble sequence which indicates
that the information bits are about to begin. To distinguish the messages sent
by the device programmer and the ones sent by the ICD, we placed the device
programmer close to our USRP while keeping the ICD further away, thus getting
more power from the device programmer. Unlike the messages sent by the
ICD, which only use one preamble sequence, two preamble sequences can be
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used in the messages sent by the device programmer; a specific sequence or its
inverse. Messages from device programmers have a fixed length and include
a 3-bit End-of-Frame (EoF) sequence whilst ICDs send messages with three
possible lengths that do not contain any EoF.
Transmissions device programmer - ICD
We intercepted the messages sent from the device programmer to the ICD while
carrying out different operations (e.g. changing the therapy settings). For the
sake of simplicity, we will focus only on the messages sent from the device
programmer to the ICD in order to change the patient’s name. This process
typically includes 16 messages and is always composed of two differentiated
groups of messages separated by a long message sent by the ICD, as shown in
Figure 4. The former group includes messages 1-8, whereas the second group
includes the 9th up to the 16th message.
We found that the 16 messages have a x-bit sequence that denotes the message
type. In each of the two messages’ groups, there are three possible message
types independently of the operation being conducted: (i) an opening message,
(ii) intermediate messages and (iii) a closing message. We determined that the
first and the eighth messages within the second group contain the Serial Number
(SN) of the device programmer. The ICD SN appears only in the messages sent
by the device programmer when the ICD is in the “no telemetry” mode. In
other words, this is sent only if the ICD loses the connection with the device
programmer during an ongoing session. Each SN is represented by a 24-bit
sequence. Subsequently, we observed that there is a y-bit sequence to indicate
the message number within the first group of messages. This field is kept static
in the second group of messages. Since the message number field only has a
short length and eight messages are sent by the device programmer within the
first group of messages, this field is reset frequently. By capturing and analysing
the 16 messages sent by the device programmer in several consecutive iterations
within a reprogramming session, we found two short counters, in the first and
ninth message respectively. Both counters are increased every time an operation
is performed and are reset when a new reprogramming session is established.
We discovered that there is a 16-bit sequence at the end of each message that
seems to be random and varies depending on the headers and data being sent.
This lead us to think that a checksum, such as a Cyclic Redundancy Code
(CRC), is used. To validate our hypothesis, we took the GCD of several of
these messages (in polynomial form), and discovered that the CRC-16-CCITT
is being used [83]. Other mechanisms, such as repetition codes, are used to help
the ICD detecting bit errors. We noted that if the patient’s name contains less
than 14 characters, it is sent three times, otherwise it is sent twice within the
first group of messages. Fig 3 shows the device programmer’s message format.
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Figure 4: Messages exchanged between the device programmer and the ICD
while changing the patient’s name.
SoF︸ ︷︷ ︸
49 bits
Preamble︸ ︷︷ ︸
31 bits
Message type︸ ︷︷ ︸
x bits
Message number︸ ︷︷ ︸
y bits
Payload︸ ︷︷ ︸
z bits
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
16 bits
EoF︸ ︷︷ ︸
3 bits
Figure 5: Device programmer’s message format. The exact bit lengths are not
shown.
Data whitening
We carried out a series of experiments to find how the data is encoded in the
message. For this we focused on the messages sent by the device programmer
when changing the patient’s name.
The first experiment consisted on finding where the letters are within the
messages and see how many bits are used to represent each letter. In particular,
we changed the patient’s name to “A”, “AA”, “AAA”, “AAAA” and “AAAAA”,
respectively. We then intercepted the messages and compared them with the
ones sent by the device programmer when the patient’s name field is left empty.
We found that the first four letters are sent within the first message and that
each letter is represented by an 8-bit sequence. In addition, we observed
that there is no unique pattern to represent the “A”. The next step was to
reprogram the patient’s name while keeping a specific letter in more than one
position. We modified the patient’s name to “AAAA”, “ABAB” and “ACAC”,
respectively. This experiment demonstrated that the way how each letter is
encoded depends on its position within the patient’s name. In other words, an
“A” in the first position is always represented in the same way but differently
to an “A” in another position. By comparing the 8-bit sequences of the “A”,
“B” and “C” in the second and the fourth position, respectively, we noticed
that the Hamming distance between the sequences is constant. This allowed
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us to conclude that the data is XORed with an output sequence from a Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) (see Figure 6)6. The vendor states that this is
a data whitening operation to prevent long strings of “1s” and “0s” in the data.
However, this operation could also serve as data obfuscation.
In our experiments, we were able to recover the LFSR sequence by intercepting
the messages sent by the device programmer when the patient’s name is left
empty (i.e. only spaces). We then computed the XOR between the first message
sent by the device programmer when changing the patient’s name to “AAAA”
and the LFSR sequence. After performing this operation, we found a unique
pattern to represent each of the four “As” of the patient’s name. This pattern
turned out to be identical to its ASCII representation. Our experiments
reveal that this LFSR sequence is constant throughout sessions. Moreover,
we found that the LFSR sequence is the same for all the ICDs we studied in
our experiments. We validated our findings in 10 different ICD models, and
concluded that all models use this technique to encode the data that is sent
over the air.
00101011 10111101 00011010 
00011010 
01101001 01010001
01010001
01010001
11101000 
11101000 
00101011
00101011
00101011 11101000 
10001001 
01100001 
01101001 
00001000 
01100001 
01111101
00011100
01100001
01001010
01100001
-----------------------------------
A A A A
(a)"A"
"AA"
"AAA"
"AAAA"
 LFSR seq
 ASCII
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Figure 6: LSFR XOR operation.
Transmissions ICD - device programmer
We intercepted and examined several messages transmitted by the ICD. We did
not find any header that is specific for the ICD type or any field that denotes
the ICD type. We verified that all messages sent from the ICD to the device
programmer use the same LFSR sequence as the one previously described. We
noted that all the messages have the ICD SN. In contrast, the ICD includes the
device programmer’s SN only in replies to no telemetry messages. We discovered
that the ICD messages have a counter that helps the device programmer to sort
the incoming messages or detect message losses. We observed that most of the
6The data and the LFSR sequence that are shown in Figure 6 are not the real ones.
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information bits seem random. Since the ICD’s leads are no longer connected to
the patient’s heart and are very sensitive to low-frequency changes, we noticed
that they were measuring the ambient noise and treating it as random telemetry
data. To investigate where the telemetry data is within the message, instead of
injecting our own signal to the ICD’s leads, we introduced the ICD’s leads into
a Faraday cage to isolate them. We then captured several messages sent by
the ICD, and noted that they have a more constant pattern which is no longer
random. Furthermore, we identified several bit sequences that are common to
the three types of ICD message regardless of the operation being performed.
These sequences are most likely used for synchronization purposes. Finally, we
discovered that, similarly to the messages sent by the device programmer to
the ICD, all messages have a 16-bit checksum, which is based on the standard
CRC-16-CCITT.
3 How to Activate the ICD?
Before exploiting our findings to carry out attacks, we first need to activate
the ICD. To demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks, we describe several
ways to bypass the current activation procedure, which requires almost physical
contact with the patient and is carried out over a short-range communication
channel. For simplicity, in the next sections we often use the term “external
device” to denote both device programmers and base stations.
Sleep mode
Standby
 mode
Interrogation 
mode
Reprogramming
 mode
2h
5min
Figure 7: ICD modes of operation.
HOW TO ACTIVATE THE ICD? 105
Our experiments show that the ICD can operate in five different modes: “sleep”,
“interrogation”, “reprogramming”, “no-telemetry” or “standby”. In the rest
of this paper, we will not discuss the “no-telemetry” mode further since this
mode was not relevant for our experiments. Figure 7 gives an overview of the
modes. Initially, the ICD is in a “sleep” mode in which it occasionally activates
the wireless interface to check whether there is an incoming message sent by a
device programmer over the short-range communication channel. Once the ICD
is activated, it remains in “interrogation” mode where it continuously sends
telemetry data to the device programmer over the long-range communication
channel. If no reprogramming operation is performed by the doctor, the ICD
is in the “interrogation” mode for two hours. If the doctor modifies the ICD
settings within this two-hour window, the ICD switches to “reprogramming”
mode for a few seconds and then goes back to the “interrogation” mode, where
is kept active for two hours. When the session expires (after two hours), we
observed that, instead of immediately switching to “sleep” mode, the ICD goes
first to “standby” mode. We will explain the “standby” mode more in detail
later in this section.
We will now describe four possible ways to send malicious messages to the ICD,
depending on whether the ICD is active, in “standby” or in “sleep” mode.
Exploit an active session: Intuitively, adversaries could attempt to hijack
an ongoing session between the external device and the ICD to send malicious
commands to the ICD. This is a challenging task since this requires the adversary
to be in close proximity to the patient (e.g. in the hospital). Furthermore,
adversaries need to send the malicious commands to the ICD while having
to block the messages sent by the genuine external device. To masquerade
their attacks, adversaries may also send fake telemetry data to the genuine
external device to avoid that the doctor/patient notices that the ICD is no
longer communicating with it.
Standby mode: We discovered that the ICDs do not immediately switch to
“sleep” mode after finishing an ongoing session with the device programmer, but
they all remain in a “standby” mode for five minutes. This is a safety feature
but also has security consequences.
While being in “standby” mode, any device programmer can activate the ICD
again by sending a specific message over the long-range communication channel.
This message turns out to be identical for all ICDs. We also found this weakness
in the case where the ICD is activated by means of the base station. In that
case, the ICD is active for five minutes only if the session with the base station
is not terminated correctly.
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We were able to impersonate the device programmer and successfully send
this message to the ICD to keep it alive. For our experiments, we used the
transmitter port of our USRP to emulate the device programmer’s behaviour
and the receiver port of our USRP to capture this signal and the response sent
by the ICD. To distinguish between the messages sent by our USRP and the
responses sent by the ICD, we placed the ICD close to the receiver port of our
USRP while keeping the transmitter port of our USRP further away, thus getting
more power from the ICD. This attack is illustrated in Figure 8. Therefore,
adversaries could wait until the session between the device programmer and the
ICD finishes and then repeatedly send this message to the ICD. This could be
used to drain the ICD’s battery, or even worse, to extend the time window as
long as needed to send as many malicious messages as required to compromise
the patient’s safety.
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Figure 8: Messages sent to the ICD while the ICD is in “standby” mode in
order to activate it. From left to right, two messages sent (with different gain)
from our USRP to wake up the ICD, the response of the ICD and two messages
sent by the USRP.
Wake up the ICD from “sleep” mode: We noted that the device
programmer’s programming head is magnetic. To eliminate the possibility
that a magnet is needed to bootstrap the communication with the ICD, we
conducted an experiment where we placed a magnet near the ICD. The result
of this experiment showed that the magnet alone cannot activate the ICD’s
wireless interface. The next step was to investigate which data is exchanged
between the devices before the long-range communication starts. For this we
studied the short-range communication between the device programmer and
the ICD, focusing on the messages sent by the device programmer.
We used our DAQ and an antenna to capture the messages sent by the device
programmer at 30-300 kHz. Every time a new session is established, the
device programmer sends three messages to the ICD via the programming head.
Following the same steps as those described in the previous section, we were
able to unveil the wireless communication parameters being used. In particular,
we found that the messages sent by the device programmer are modulated using
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a FSK and encoded under Non-Return-to-Zero Inverted (NRZI). In NRZI, a ‘1’
is represented by a transition of the voltage level, whereas a ‘0’ has no voltage
transition. We also determined that the symbol rate is 12500 symbols/second.
We created a LabVIEW program to intercept and demodulate the three messages
transmitted by the device programmer’s programming head. We noted that the
first message is always identical regardless of the ICD being used, whilst the
second and third message vary depending on the ICD’s SN. The other headers
and information bits within the second and third message are kept constant,
making the short-range communication vulnerable to replay attacks. Thus,
adversaries need to eavesdrop the wireless channel only once to intercept the
three messages sent by the device programmer. Adversaries could then carry a
backpack with all the necessary equipment and re-send these messages to the
ICD when the patient is in a crowded place (e.g. the public transportation)
where adversaries can be relatively close to the patient and still go unnoticed.
Using legitimate external devices: Alternatively, adversaries can also
use any legitimate external device to conduct the attacks. Unlike device
programmers, which are big, heavy and cannot be hidden easily, base stations are
inexpensive, portable and can be easily purchased. Therefore, one possibility
is to use a legitimate base station to carry out these attacks. However, a
base station by itself cannot send commands to reprogram the ICD. In our
experiments, we show that adversaries can use any legitimate base station to
activate the ICD. Since the ICD remains in “standby” mode if the session
with the base station is not terminated correctly, adversaries can simply carry
the base station in a backpack and turn it off before the communication with
the ICD ends in order to keep the ICD alive. Adversaries can then use their
own equipment to send malicious messages to the ICD over the long-range
communication.
4 Existing Vulnerabilities
In this section we will briefly summarise the weaknesses we found after fully
reverse-engineering the proprietary protocol. These weaknesses can result in
several types of active and passive software radio-based attacks. We want
to stress that adversaries could use sophisticated equipment and directional
antennas to extend the distance from which they can carry out attacks by
several orders of magnitude.
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4.1 Privacy Attacks
Our analysis of the proprietary protocol between the device programmer and
one model of the latest generation of ICDs reveals that the messages sent over
the air are “obfuscated” using an LFSR sequence. This LFSR sequence is the
same for all models that we studied.
The messages exchanged between the devices include patient private sensitive
information such as personal data (e.g. his name or medical history) or telemetry
data. Clearly, the way they use the LFSR sequence to obfuscate the data can
result in serious patients’ privacy breaches. Passive adversaries can compromise
the patient’s privacy just by eavesdropping the wireless channel while there is an
ongoing communication. However, this attack typically requires the adversaries
to wait until the devices exchange this data. This limitation can be overcome
by active adversaries who can additionally send malicious messages to the ICD
to request this data.
By intercepting the messages sent by ICDs and looking at their unique SN,
adversaries could track, locate or identify patients. For example, adversaries
could install beacons in strategic locations (e.g. the train station or the hospital)
to infer the patients’ movement pattern based on the signals transmitted by
their ICDs. This could reveal their addresses, the places they often go, and
other potential sensitive information. Furthermore, the messages sent between
the devices during a reprogramming session may allow adversaries to infer
the patient’s treatment or the therapy details. Telemetry data, which is sent
continuously by the ICD when it is active, could reveal the patient’s health
state. Overall, it is clear that the consequences of all these attacks can be severe
for patients.
4.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks
As shown in the previous sections, ICDs can operate in four distinct modes:
“sleep”, “interrogation”, “reprogramming” and “standby”.
Intuitively, the ICD should immediately switch to “sleep” mode when the
communication session with the device programmer finishes or when it expires
after two hours with no reprogramming operation. However, we discovered that,
after the ICD has been activated, it remains in “standby” mode for five minutes,
where it can be put in the “interrogation” mode again if it receives a specific
message. This message turns out to be identical for all ICDs and is sent over the
long-range communication channel. In other words, there is no need for being
in close proximity with the patient to activate his ICD. This is an important
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implementation flaw that makes these devices vulnerable to DoS attacks. The
purpose of these attacks is to keep the ICD alive by continuously sending this
message over the long-range communication, which could drastically reduce the
ICD battery life. Yet, this also opens up the door for adversaries to perform
other types of attacks more easily, as they can send this message to extend the
five minute window as many times as needed to send malicious messages to the
ICD without requiring being close to the patient.
4.3 Spoofing and Replay Attacks
After fully reverse-engineering the proprietary communication protocol between
the device programmer and the ICD, we were able to fully document the
message format in use. Our results show that there is no mechanism to prevent
replay attacks; the counters found in the first and ninth message are reset
every time a new session is established or after a relatively small number of
operations. Without even knowing the protocol specifications, adversaries could
successfully perform replay attacks just by re-sending past transmissions sent by
the legitimate device programmer. In addition, the protocol does not provide
any means to check the integrity and authenticity of the messages. Thus, it is
possible to perform spoofing attacks, which allow adversaries to send arbitrary
commands to the ICD.
5 Countermeasures
In this section, we present practical and effective countermeasures to
mitigate/solve the vulnerabilities found in the previous sections. We divide our
countermeasures into two groups: short-term measures and long-term measures.
The former group could be deployed immediately to mitigate some of the existing
security issues in already-implanted ICDs, whereas the latter group require
minor modifications on the devices and hence could be integrated into future
generations of ICDs.
5.1 Short-term Measures
Jamming the wireless channel
As shown in the previous section, adversaries can take advantage of the time
the ICD is in “standby” mode to carry out a DoS attack, or even worse, to
extend the time they can send malicious messages to the ICD. Thus, our
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first countermeasure consists of adding a “shutdown” command in all external
devices so that they continuously jam the wireless channel while the ICD is in
“standby” mode. A more efficient solution is to jam the wireless channel only
if an adversary is detected. This is also known as reactive jamming. Several
articles have already used friendly-jamming as a defensive mechanism.
One possible drawback of our countermeasure is that it could interrupt the
ongoing communications between other legitimate devices. We leverage the
fact that the patient typically has his ICD being reprogrammed/interrogated
in isolated controlled locations; either in the doctor’s office or in the patient’s
home. This clearly reduces the risks of jamming other ongoing communications.
Another downside of our countermeasure is that it works only if the patient stays
close to the external device for five minutes while his ICD is in “standby” mode.
Due to that the ICD listens to all MICS channels while being in “standby” mode,
external devices need to be equipped with several antennas to simultaneously
jam all MICS channels.
5.2 Long-term Measures
Adding a shutdown command in the ICDs
Instead of relying on friendly-jamming to prevent adversaries from sending
malicious messages to the ICD, our second countermeasure is based on modifying
both external devices and ICDs to include a “shutdown” message. This way, the
external device can send the “shutdown” message to the ICD before they finish
the communication to ensure that the ICD goes directly to “sleep” mode. Even
though this countermeasure does not completely solve the existing vulnerabilities,
this makes it more difficult for adversaries to send malicious messages to the
ICD.
Key agreement protocol
As a long term improvement, Halperin et al. proposed adding standard
symmetric key authentication and encryption between the ICD and the
programmer. For this they proposed to have the master key on every device
programmer (stored in tamper-resistant hardware) and diversified keys in the
ICDs. This setup is clearly a significant improvement over existing systems. Yet,
having the master key stored in every device programmer is latent risk. If the
tamper-resistant hardware of a single device programmer is ever compromised,
then there is no way to revoke the keys and every patient with an implant will
be exposed indefinitely, or until the IMD is replaced.
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Another alternative is to store the master key in the cloud, in order to limit its
distribution to a single instance, and have the device programmers online. But
this is not a viable option as the device programmers are required to operate
(in case of emergency) at all times, including during Internet or cloud provider
outages.
In this paper we propose a middle ground between these two approaches: a semi-
oﬄine protocol. We leverage the fact that both IMDs and device programmers
have a precise internal clock which is synchronised at every communication
session. This clock allows the IMD to keep a log file with all critical events and
the time when they occurred. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative groups of
prime order q. Furthermore, let e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map satisfying:
Bilinearity ∀g, h ∈ G1,∀a, b ∈ Z∗q , e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
Non-degeneracy ∀g ∈ G1, g 6= 0 implies that e(g, g) is a generator of G2.
Computability e can be computed in polynomial time.
Device Programmer IMD
Stores: H2(id)msk, H2(id), idStores: H1(t)msk
id
check id ∈ ID t = current time period
e(H1(t)msk, H2(id)) = e(H1(t), H2(id))msk e(H1(t), H2(id)msk) = e(H1(t), H2(id))msk
Figure 9: A semi-oﬄine key agreement protocol for IMDs.
Let H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be two different cryptographic hash functions
satisfying standard security requirements.
When the system is initialised, the key generation centre generates the system
master secret key msk which is stored securely at the back office, and is never
shared with anyone. Let ID be the IMD identities domain which is assumed
to be disjoint to the time domain. Each IMD id ∈ ID stores a diversified key
H2(id)msk which is provided at manufacture time (all the operations here are
done modulo q). Device programmers receive a temporal key H1(t)msk which
is valid to derive all IMD’s diversified keys but only for the time period t.
This period of time can be anything, but for the sake of example let us take
this time period to be three months. In that case, every three months, the
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device programmer (or a health-care employee) needs to contact the device
manufacturer to obtain the key for the next quarter H1(t+ 1)msk which is sent
over a secure channel. In this way, if a device programmer is lost, stolen or
tampered with, this can be reported to the device manufacturer and then this
device will no longer receive key updates, rendering it useless. Any key material
which may have been extracted from the device becomes obsolete after (at most)
three months and then the system goes back to a secure state. Fig 9 describes
our semi-oﬄine key agreement protocol in detail.
This protocol requires one bilinear pairing computation on the IMD which
is expensive, but this only needs to happen once every three months. On a
daily basis, IMD and device programmer simply run a standard symmetric
key authentication protocol like the one proposed by Halperin et al., using the
agreed key e(H1(t), H2(id))msk. Note that this protocol does not provide key
confirmation, but this can be easily achieved by the symmetric key authentication
protocol as it is the case in Halperin et al.
Formal analysis of our protocol
To provide some level of assurance for our protocol we model and analyse it using
the applied pi-calculus [35] and the checking tool ProVerif [43]. The applied
pi-calculus allows us to model protocols, using primitives such as input, output,
new name generation and parallel composition. It also allows us to define
functions and equations that can be used to model a range of cryptographic
primitives. The ProVerif tool can ensure secrecy and correspondence properties
for an arbitrary number of runs of a protocol using a automated theorem proving
method, however the tool is not guaranteed to terminate and may report false
attacks.
We model an idealised version of bilinear pairings using functions and equations
in the applied pi-calculus, i.e., we define the functions power(x, y), prod(x, y)
and e(x, y) to represent xy, xy and the bilinear map e(x, y). We would then
like to define the equation:
equation e(power(a, x),power(b, y)) = power(e(a, b),prod(x, y))
However, such an equation causes ProVerif’s proof tactics to enter any infinite
loop. Therefore, we introduce an auxiliary function to represent the right
hand side of this equation, i.e., we define powere(a, b,prod(x, y)) to represent
e(a, b)xy. We note that this gives an abstract model of bilinear pairings that
does not include any number theoretic attacks, such as factoring the product,
inverse powers, or low entropy secrets.
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Our model is made up of four processes: Programmer, which models the pro-
grammer protocol role, IMD which models the IMD, CompromisedReader,
which publicly broadcasts a programmers diversified key for a time period
different to the one used by Programmer, and CompromisedUnAuthIMD
which models a compromised IMD by publicly broadcasting the diversified key
for a medical device that is not one accepted by the programmer.
At the end of their run the Programmer and IMD processes broadcast a
secret value encrypted with the key they have established. We test the system
to see if it is possible for an attacker to learn this secret, which would mean
they had successfully established a key with the IMD or Programmer. The full
model is given in Appendix A.1.
Testing this model in ProVerif we find that it does indeed keep the keys secret.
This means that only an IMD with an ID accepted by the programmer, and a
programmer with a diversified key for the right time period, can set up and learn
keys, even if there are an arbitrary number of old compromised programmers
and IMDs.
To check for redundancy in our protocol, and to see what kinds of attacks
ProVerif can find, we experiment with possible simplifications. We first try
removing the IMD identity check in the programmer (the “if imdID=id then”
line of the model), in this case ProVerif finds an attack in which the attacker
uses a diversified key from an old, compromised IMD. If we also remove the
CompromisedUnAuthIMD process, we find that the protocol is then safe.
This tells us that this identity check by the programmer is only needed to stop
attacks using compromised IMDs, if we decided to discount compromised IMDs
in our attacker model we would not need this check.
As a second test, we tried using a single hash function, rather than two. In
this case, ProVerif finds an attack that lets an attacker impersonate an IMD:
The attacker sends the old time stamp from a compromised programmer (t′) in
place of the id to the targeted programmer. This leads to the key programmer
using the key e(H(t)msk, H(t′)), however from the compromised programmer the
attacker can learn H(t′)msk and so construct the matching key e(H(t), H(t′)msk).
This suggests that our protocols use of two hash functions is a sensible precaution
to avoid attacks based on confusing times and identities. These additional checks
gived us increase confidence that the analysis method we use can find attacks,
when present, and that our protocol is not unnecessarily complex.
Differentiating between Device Programmers and Home monitors
There is an important distinction to make between Device Programmers and
Home monitors as the former are in a much more controlled environment than
the latter. Device programmers are not sold to anyone: they are available only to
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accredited health-care professionals and institutions whereas home monitors are
much more available at the patients home. Some home monitors are sometimes
available to purchase on auction sites such as Ebay and is relatively easy to
get hold of one. But their usage is also very different. Home monitors only
need read access to the IMD in order to forward telemetry information to the
relevant health-care practitioner. Therefore, it makes sense to have different
keys for each of these devices which provide different access levels. In this way,
if the key of a home monitor gets compromised for a period of time, this still
represents a potential privacy violation but at least it is not life threatening.
6 Conclusions
In this work we have analysed the security and privacy properties of the latest
generation of ICDs. For this we fully reverse-engineered the proprietary protocol
between the ICD and the device programmer using commercial and inexpensive
equipment. We want to emphasise that reverse-engineering was possible by only
using a black-box approach. Our results demonstrated that security-by-obscurity
is a dangerous design approach that often conceals negligent designs. Therefore,
it is important for the medical industry to migrate from weak proprietary
solutions to well-scrutinised security solutions and use them according to the
guidelines.
Our work revealed serious protocol and implementation weaknesses on widely
used ICDs, which lead to several active and passive software radio-based attacks
that we were able to perform in our laboratory. Our first attack consisted
on keeping the ICD alive while the ICD is in “standby” mode by repeatedly
sending a message over the long-range communication channel. The goal of
this attack was to drain the ICD’s battery life, or to enlarge this time window
to send the necessary malicious messages to compromise the patient’s safety.
Our second attack aimed at compromising the patient’s privacy. For this we
leveraged the fact that we were able to recover the LFSR sequence used to
“obfuscate” the messages. We discovered that this LFSR sequence is constant
throughout sessions and is the same for all ICDs we studied.
We proposed short-term and long-term countermeasures. As a short-term
countermeasure, the only solution is to use jamming as a defensive mechanism.
As long-term countermeasures, external devices could send a “shutdown”
message to the ICD so that the ICD can immediately switch to “sleep” mode
after the communication ends. Moreover, we designed and formally verified a
semi-oﬄine key agreement protocol between the device programmer and the
ICD.
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A Appendices
A.1 A Formal Model of Our Proposed Protocol
(* Secure IMD protocol *)
free c.
(* bilinear pairings *)
fun power/2. (* power(x,y) = x^y *)
fun powere/3. (* powere(a,b,x) = e(a,b)^x *)
fun prod/2. (* prod(a,b) = a x b *)
fun e/2. (* e (a^x,b^y) = e(a,b)^(xy)*)
equation e(power(a,x),power(b,y)) = powere(a,b,prod(x,y)).
equation prod(x,y) = prod(y,x).
data one/0.
(* hashes *)
fun H1/1.
fun H2/1.
(* Shared key cryptography *)
fun senc/2.
reduc sdec(y, senc(y,x)) = x.
private free sec.
private free msk.
116 ON THE (IN)SECURITY OF THE LATEST GENERATION IMPLANTABLE CARDIAC
DEFIBRILLATORS AND HOW TO SECURE THEM
(*
Test if the attacker can learn secret
encrypted with the established key
*)
query attacker:sec.
let Programmer = in (c,imdID);
if imdID=id then
let rkey = e(rsec,power(H2(imdID),one)) in
in(c,message);
out(c,senc(rkey,sec)).
let IMD = let imdkey = e(power(H1(t),one),psec) in
out(c,id);
out (c,senc(imdkey,sec)).
let CompromisedReader = new t’; out(c,t’);
out(c,power(H1(t’),msk)).
let CompromisedUnAuthIMD = new id’; out (c,id’);
out(c,power(H2(id’),msk)).
process new msk;
!new t; out(c,t);
!new id; out(c,id);
( let psec = power(H2(id),msk) in !IMD
| let rsec = power(H1(t),msk) in !Programmer
| !CompromisedReader | !CompromisedUnAuthIMD )
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Abstract. Implantable medical devices (IMDs) typically rely on
proprietary protocols to wirelessly communicate with external
device programmers. In this paper, we fully reverse engineer the
proprietary protocol between a device programmer and a widely
used commercial neurostimulator from one of the leading IMD
manufacturers. For the reverse engineering, we follow a black-box
approach and use inexpensive hardware equipment. We document
the message format and the protocol state-machine, and show
that the transmissions sent over the air are neither encrypted nor
authenticated. Furthermore, we conduct several software radio-
based attacks that could compromise the safety and privacy of
patients, and investigate the feasibility of performing these attacks
in real scenarios.
Motivated by our findings, we propose a security architecture that
allows for secure data exchange between the device programmer
and the neurostimulator. It relies on using a patient’s physiological
signal for generating a symmetric key in the neurostimulator,
and transporting this key from the neurostimulator to the device
programmer through a secret out-of-band (OOB) channel. Our
solution allows the device programmer and the neurostimulator to
agree on a symmetric session key without these devices needing to
share any prior secrets; offers an effective and practical balance
between security and permissive access in emergencies; requires
only minor hardware changes in the devices; adds minimal
computation and communication overhead; and provides forward
and backward security. Finally, we implement a proof-of-concept
of our solution.
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1 Introduction
In the US, chronic pain already affects more people than those suffering from
diabetes, heart disease and cancer altogether [1]. In recent years, the number
of people with movement disorders such as Parkinson’s disease or essential
tremor has also increased. It is estimated that seven to ten million people
worldwide are living with Parkinson’s disease [14]. Many of these problems can
be relieved with neurostimulators that deliver controlled electrical signals to
specific targeted areas in the patient’s brain.
The newest generations of neurostimulators often include wireless capabilities
that enable remote monitoring and reprogramming through an external device
programmer. While the wireless interface enables more flexible and personalized
treatments for patients, it also opens the door for adversaries to conduct software
radio-based attacks. If strong security mechanisms are not in place, adversaries
could send malicious commands to the neurostimulator in order to deliver
undesired electrical signals to the patient’s brain. For example, adversaries
could change the settings of the neurostimulator to increase the voltage of the
signals that are continuously delivered to the patient’s brain. This could prevent
the patient from speaking or moving, cause irreversible damage to his brain, or
even worse, be life-threatening.
Beyond attacks that can endanger the patient’s safety, there are other attacks
that can, for example, compromise the patient’s privacy. On the one hand,
adversaries could leverage the wireless nature of the communication to intercept
the data transmitted over the air. The transmitted data is personal data, and
some of it is sensitive medical data. On the other hand, a more sophisticated
form of privacy attack would be to use signals extracted from the brain to
make inferences about patients. While this is currently not possible, future
generations of neurostimulators will use information extracted from patients
brain signals for the development of more precise and effective therapies. In that
case, adversaries could capture and analyze brain signals such as the P-300 wave,
a brain response that begins 300 ms after a stimulus is presented to a subject.
The P-300 wave shows the brain’s ability to recognize familiar information.
Martinovic et al. performed a side-channel attack on a Brain Computer Interface
(BCI) while connected to several subjects, and showed that the P-300 wave can
leak sensitive personal information such as passwords, PINs, whether a person
is known to the subject, or even reveal emotions and thoughts [94]. All the
attacks described above clearly show the need for analyzing the security and
privacy of neurostimulators.
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1.1 Problem Statement and Challenges
Several papers have demonstrated that implantable medical devices (IMDs)
with wireless capabilities often lack strong security mechanisms. Halperin et
al. were the first to identify some of the potential security and privacy threats
on IMDs [69]. Hei et al. proposed simple yet effective denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks against IMDs that cannot be prevented with traditional cryptographic
approaches. The goal of these attacks is to deplete the IMD’s resources such
that the battery lifetime is reduced from several years to a few weeks [73]. These
attacks are similar to the sleep deprivation torture attack proposed by Stajano
and Anderson [127]. In 2008, Halperin et al. analyzed the proprietary protocol
between a device programmer and an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD)
over a short-range communication channel (less than 10 cm) [70]. Because of
the lack of security mechanisms, they were able to realize various attacks by
replaying past transmissions sent by legitimate device programmers. Marin et al.
fully reverse engineered the proprietary protocol between a device programmer
and a latest generation ICD over a long-range communication channel (from
2 to 5 m) [91]. They also showed that it is possible to conduct attacks
using only inexpensive hardware equipment without needing to be close to
the patient. Similarly, Li et al. were able to emulate legitimate remote controls
to perform attacks against insulin pumps [86]. Marin et al. extended the previous
work by reverse engineering the proprietary protocol between an insulin pump
and all its potential peripherals [92]. In previous work, Denning et al. and
Rushanan et al. highlighted the need for evaluating the security and privacy of
neurostimulators [56,116]. In this paper, we tackle this problem and investigate
the security of the proprietary protocol between a device programmer and a
widely used commercial neurostimulator.
Securing the communication between IMDs and device programmers is a non-
trivial task. Firstly, IMDs are resource-constrained devices with tight power
and computational constraints, and a limited battery capacity. Furthermore,
IMDs lack input and output interfaces, such as a keyboard or a screen, and
cannot be physically accessed once they are implanted. Secondly, IMDs need to
satisfy several important requirements for proper functioning, such as reliability,
availability and safety. Adding security mechanisms into IMDs is challenging
due to inherent tensions between some of these requirements and the desirable
security and privacy goals. For example, IMDs should provide permissive access
control policies such that doctors can access the IMD to reprogram it or extract
patient’s data from it in emergencies. A small delay when contacting care
providers for device-specific cryptographic keys could prevent the patient from
receiving care on time. However, if access control policies are not sufficiently
strong, IMDs could be exposed to attacks. This example clearly shows the need
for designing security solutions that achieve a trade-off between security and
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permissive access control in emergencies.
To bootstrap a secure communication channel between the IMD and the device
programmer, cryptographic keys first need to be securely initialized and shared.
This can be achieved using traditional approaches based on symmetric or
public-key cryptography. For example, one could pre-install a device-specific
symmetric key in each IMD during manufacturing, or use a key diversification
protocol [70,91]. However, as explained above, it may not be possible for medical
personnel to contact care providers on the fly for requesting device-specific
cryptographic keys. If a key diversification protocol is used, storing the master
key in tamper-proof hardware in all device programmers would bring substantial
security risks; if the master key is ever compromised, the security of millions of
IMDs would be at risk. Instead, one could opt for storing the master key in
the cloud but this is not a viable option since device programmers are required
to operate at all times, including during Internet or cloud provider outages.
Another solution would be to pre-install a public-private key pair in each IMD,
and use any secure key transport or key agreement protocol. This approach
would require a robust, worldwide infrastructure that keeps an updated list of
trustworthy device programmers as well as a revocation mechanism that ensures
that IMDs cannot communicate with untrustworthy device programmers [36].
Unfortunately, having such a robust worldwide infrastructure is difficult, and
IMDs do not have an Internet connection to periodically get a certificate
revocation list (CRL) or sufficient memory to store all the necessary certificates.
This shows that traditional solutions may not be applicable for IMDs due to
their unique functional requirements and limited resources.
1.2 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that evaluates the security of
the wireless communication protocol between a device programmer and a widely
used neurostimulator from one of the leading IMD manufacturers. In addition,
we propose a practical and efficient security architecture that enables the device
programmer and the neurostimulator to create a secure communication channel.
In detail, our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Security analysis. We describe the process of how to reverse engineer
the proprietary protocol between the device programmer and the
neurostimulator. We follow a black-box reverse engineering approach
and use inexpensive commercial hardware equipment.
• Software radio-based attacks. We assess the feasibility and demon-
strate software radio-based attacks on neurostimulators. Furthermore, we
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elaborate on how adversaries can overcome some of the limitations and
challenges of these attacks.
• Low-cost source of randomness for neurostimulators. We explore
the possibility of using a patient’s brain physiological signal as a
randomness source for generating keys, and detail the process of extracting
entropy from it. We evaluate our technique using real data extracted from
the brain of 22 mice.
• Security architecture for neurostimulators. We present a complete
security architecture that includes the generation of random session keys,
the secure transportation of these keys from the neurostimulator to
the device programmer and the cryptographic protocols to secure the
communication flow.
Disclosure of results. We followed the principle of responsible disclosure and
contacted the manufacturer six months before publishing our results. After
discussing our findings with the manufacturer, we chose not to disclose the full
details of the obtained results since this could help someone to mount these
attacks on neurostimulators used by patients.
Paper outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of related work. Section 3 describes the devices that comprise
the neurostimulation system, whereas our laboratory setup is shown in Sect. 4.
Section 5 details the process of reverse engineering the proprietary protocol
between the device programmer and the neurostimulator to discover the message
format and the protocol state-machine. Section 6 shows several software radio-
based attacks that we are able to conduct on the neurostimulator, while a
security architecture to preclude these attacks is proposed in Sect. 7. Section 8
discusses possible limitations of our solution and provides some directions for
future work. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
There are two main categories of countermeasures to secure the communication
between the IMD and the device programmer: (i) those based on using an
external device as a proxy, and (ii) those relying on an out-of-band channel to
allow the devices to securely agree on a cryptographic key.
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2.1 External Devices
Gollakota et al. proposed an external device known as “shield”, that jams
the messages to/from the IMD to prevent others from decoding them, while
still being able to successfully decode the messages itself [67]. While the
shield can mitigate some of the existing security problems, it offers only very
limited protection since adversaries could bypass it by transmitting messages
with more power than those sent by the shield. Furthermore, a multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) eavesdropper could suppress the jamming
signal and recover the data sent by the devices, as shown by Tippenhauer
et al. [128]. Xu et al. presented the “IMDGuard”, a wearable proxy device that
performs an authentication process on the ICD’s behalf [134]. The IMDGuard
relies on patient’s electrocardiography (ECG) signals to generate a symmetric
key that is valid for one session and is known only to the IMD and itself.
However, Rostami et al. found that the IMDGuard is vulnerable to a man-in-
the-middle (MiTM) attack which reduces its effective key length from 129 bits
to 86 bits [113]. Overall, although external devices that use friendly jamming
could help protecting legacy devices, they could also jam transmissions sent
by legitimate devices. In some countries, jammers are illegal and their use can
result in large fines. Thus, it is unlikely that these solutions will be accepted by
the US federal drug administration (FDA) and adopted by manufacturers.
2.2 Out-of-band Channels
Another prominent family of countermeasures relies on establishing a
cryptographic key between the device programmer and the IMD via an auxiliary
or out-of-band (OOB) channel. OOB channels typically have low-bandwidth
and are easy to set up. There exist two types of OOB channels: (i) authentic
or (ii) secret. The former represents a channel where Bob is guaranteed that
the message he receives was actually sent by Alice. The data can however
be eavesdropped by others. The latter represents a channel where Alice is
guaranteed that the message she sends is only received by Bob. However, Bob
does not know that the data comes from Alice.
Halperin et al. proposed to use a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag in
combination with a piezo-element to achieve audio-based key distribution [70].
They were the first to introduce a countermeasure that does not consume
energy from the battery. Nevertheless, the audio transmissions generated by
the piezo-element can be eavesdropped, as shown by Halevi et al. [68]. As this
technique uses a carrier frequency within the audible range so that it can be
perceived by patients, it is unclear whether this technique could be applied
in noisy environments. Kim et al. presented a vibration-based key transport
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protocol through which the device programmer and the IMD can agree on
a cryptographic key [80]. Since vibration results in unintentional acoustic
emanations, the authors proposed that the device programmer generates a
masking sound to hide the acoustic emanations. However, it requires the IMD
to have extra hardware, and it is unclear whether the masking sound produced
by the device programmer can have an effect in the data sent over the vibration
channel. Furthermore, Trippel et al. showed that the integrity of audio and
vibration sensor outputs can be compromised by injecting malicious analog
acoustic signals [129]. This could allow adversaries to modify the key being
sent over the audio/vibration channel in their favor so that the IMD establishes
a key with a malicious device. Rasmussen et al. proposed an access control
scheme based on ultrasonic distance bounding which enables the IMD to accept
any device programmer that is in its close proximity [109]. The main limitation
of this solution is that it requires dedicated analog hardware, which makes it
not suitable for IMDs. Unfortunately, all the previous solutions have important
limitations and drawbacks or have been proven to be vulnerable to security
attacks.
The closest solution to ours is the heart-to-heart (H2H) protocol proposed by
Rostami et al. [114]. H2H uses a novel access control policy called “touch-
to-access” which ensures access to the IMD by any device programmer that
can touch the patient’s skin to measure his interPulse Interval (IPI) (i.e. the
time between heart beats). In H2H, both the device programmer and the IMD
need to simultaneously measure the patient’s heart rate. The heart rate is
then used as a “fuzzy password” that is known only to the device programmer
and the IMD. The authors state that one of the main advantages of using the
patient’s heart rate is that it can be measured anywhere in the patient’s body
just by touching his skin. However, this solution has several weaknesses and
limitations. Firstly, Marin et al. showed that H2H is vulnerable to a reflection
and a MiTM attack [89]. Secondly, it is unclear how the authors transformed
the IPI signal from analog to its digital form. Thirdly, the H2H protocol has a
large communication and computation cost. It requires the IMD to transmit
a substantial amount of messages and uses public-key cryptography, which
can be too energy consuming for resource-constrained devices such as IMDs.
Lastly, several articles have shown that the IPI can be measured remotely
using a wide range of techniques. For example, Calleja et al. showed that it is
possible to remotely gather information of cardiac signals using widely available
inexpensive hardware [47]. Seepers et al. evaluated the feasibility of remote
attacks using the existing remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) methods [122].
Their evaluation demonstrates that rPPG achieves similar accuracy as when
measuring the heart rate by touching the patient’s skin. Poh et al. proposed a
simple, low-cost technique through which it is possible to measure the heart rate
using a standard webcam [103]. Recently, Katabi et al. demonstrated that WiFi
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signals can be used to detect the breathing and heart rate of individuals [24].
All these papers render H2H (and other systems relying on the secrecy of the
patient’s heart rate such as the IMDGuard) insecure. In this paper, we propose
a practical and effective solution that follows the “touch-to-access” principle,
but overcomes all the previous limitations.
3 Neurostimulation System
This section describes the devices that comprise the neurostimulation system.
This includes device programmers used by doctors and patients as well as
neurostimulators.
Device programmers: they are external portable devices used to read out
patient’s medical data stored on the neurostimulator or to reprogram its settings.
There are two types of device programmer: those used by doctors and those
used by patients. The former has full privileges to read data and modify
the neurostimulator’s settings, whereas the latter has restricted permissions,
allowing only controlled therapy modifications, as established by the doctor.
Neurostimulators: they are devices implanted subcutaneously near the
clavicle that are connected to the brain through several leads. They have
limited memory storage, processing power and a battery with limited capacity
that cannot be recharged or replaced. When the battery is depleted, the patient
needs to undergo surgery in order to get a new implant. Such a surgery always
introduces a small, but not negligible risk of infections, sometimes even with
lethal consequences. We deliberately chose not to disclose how long the battery
lasts because this could implicitly reveal the manufacturer and neurostimulator
models that we investigated.
The device programmer contains a magnetic programming head that is used
to communicate with the neurostimulator over a wireless bi-directional short-
range communication channel (less than 10 cm). The programming head needs
to be placed on the patient’s chest in close proximity to the neurostimulator
for the entire duration of the communication. In most cases, patients have
their neurostimulators being interrogated and/or reprogrammed in isolated
controlled locations, e.g. in the doctor’s office. However, patients also need to
frequently use their own device programmer in order to adjust the stimulation
configuration, for example, when lying, sitting or walking.
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4 Laboratory Setup
Figure 1: Antennas used for receiving and transmitting signals. The transmit
antenna is shown on the left, the receive antenna on the right.
Our laboratory setup comprises inexpensive commercial hardware devices
including a standard laptop and a USB-6351 data acquisition system (DAQ) from
National Instruments [11]. Moreover, we built two antennas for receiving and
transmitting messages respectively, as shown in Fig. 1. For receiving messages,
we created a simple antenna by cutting a coaxial cable and connecting a circular
piece of copper to it. Even though this antenna allowed us to capture messages
exchanged between the devices, its impedance was too low to transmit signals
with enough power. To overcome this problem, we designed our own antenna
for transmitting signals (for more details, we refer the reader to Appendix A.1).
5 Intercepting RF Transmissions
This paper analyzes the security of the proprietary protocol between the device
programmer and the neurostimulator to communicate wirelessly over a short-
range communication channel. This is a challenging task because there is no
information available about the protocol specifications. IMD manufacturers
typically rely on keeping the protocol specifications secret as a means to provide
security (i.e. security-through-obscurity). Protocol reverse engineering implies
finding both the message format and the protocol state-machine without knowing
the protocol specifications. Several articles [70, 91] have already shown that
proprietary protocols can be reverse-engineered. While several techniques can
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be applied to reverse engineer proprietary protocols, physical access to the
devices is often necessary, e.g. to extract the firmware.
In this paper, we follow a black-box reverse engineering approach which allows
us to find the inner-workings of the protocol by only providing inputs to the
devices and looking at their outputs. In other words, we change any of the
neurostimulator’s settings using the device programmer, and then inspect the
format of the transmitted messages. Our black-box methodology is a labor-
intensive and challenging process yet it is more realistic than other approaches.
By following this approach, we assess the feasibility of reverse engineering the
proprietary protocol by a weak adversary with limited resources and capabilities
who cannot have physical access to the devices but can only intercept the
messages sent wirelessly. We acknowledge that having access to the device
programmer during our experiments in order to perform certain actions can
speed up the process of reverse engineering the protocol. However, although
this process may take longer when the actions being performed on the device
programmer are not known, adversaries can still learn the inner-working of
the protocol by intercepting and analyzing transmissions sent over the air by
legitimate devices.
Next, we describe how to reverse engineer the proprietary protocol used by a
specific neurostimulator model. However, we also conducted various experiments
using other neurostimulator models, and came to similar findings as the ones
described in this paper. Figure 3 shows the format of the messages sent by the
device programmer.
5.1 Wireless Communication Parameters
Before capturing the messages exchanged between the device programmer and
the neurostimulator, we first needed to discover several wireless communication
parameters such as the transmission frequency, modulation and encoding scheme,
and the symbol rate being used. This step is crucial as the use of slightly different
parameters compared to those used by the devices would result in an incorrect
demodulation of the captured messages, i.e. messages with erroneous bits.
The first step of our analysis was to find the frequency at which the devices
transmit their messages. By entering the unique device programmer’s federal
communications comission identifier (FCC ID) in the FCC database [5], we
determined that these devices transmit their messages at 175 KHz. We then
captured several messages sent by the devices, and visualized the signals in the
time domain. The waveform of these signals indicates that an on-off keying
(OOK) modulation scheme is being used, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In an OOK
modulation, the presence of a carrier wave is used to indicate a binary ‘1’ and its
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absence indicates a binary ‘0’. Similarly to passive RFID devices, all messages
are encoded to ensure that the neurostimulator receives enough power from the
device programmer even when a long string of “0s” is sent. Encoding of ‘1’ or
‘0’ is based on a variable width high-pulse and a fixed width space. For security
reasons, we decided not to reveal the symbol rate being used.
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Figure 2: Waveform of a signal transmitted by the device programmer.
5.2 Reverse Engineering the Proprietary Protocol
We intercepted messages exchanged between the two types of device programmer
and several models of neurostimulator. However, we focused on analyzing the
messages sent by the device programmer since understanding these transmissions
would allow us to emulate a legitimate device programmer. (In Sect. 5.3 we show
that most messages sent by neurostimulators are simply acknowledgements).
After demodulating the captured messages, we observed that they all include
a common synchronization sequence (not shown in Fig. 3) that consists of a
series of alternating ‘1s’ and ‘0s’. Subsequently, we found several message fields
including headers, information data and checksums.
As a first experiment, we grouped the messages sent by the doctor’s device
programmers and patient’s device programmers, respectively, in two different
clusters. This experiment allowed us to determine that there is a 16-bit sequence
at the beginning of each message which can take two values depending on the
type of device programmer being used. Similarly, we compared the messages
sent by each different device programmer, and discovered that there is a unique
16-bit sequence that varies depending on the device. This led us to conclude that
this field represents the unique serial number (SN) of each device programmer.
Following this approach, we also found two 16-bit sequences that denote the
model and SN of the neurostimulator, respectively.
At the end of some messages, there are two 16-bit sequences that seem to be
uniformly distributed. This made us think that they could be checksums to
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Progr model and SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
32 bits
Neuro model and SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
32 bits
State︸ ︷︷ ︸
x bits
Action︸ ︷︷ ︸
y bits
Payload︸ ︷︷ ︸
z bits
Checksums︸ ︷︷ ︸
32 bits
Figure 3: Device programmer’s message format.
detect or correct bit errors. Our first hypothesis was that these sequences
correspond to a cyclic redundancy check (CRC). This is because CRCs are
widely used, easy to implement and very effective at detecting bit errors. Since
CRCs are linear functions, we first checked whether the linearity property holds
for the second 16-bit checksum. For this purpose, we computed the XOR of
two messages and verified whether the result produces a valid message. As
the linearity property was satisfied, the second step was to find all the CRC
parameters such as the polynomial, initial XOR value, final XOR value as
well as whether the input and/or the output is reflected. To discover these
parameters, we created a program that brute-forces all possible combinations
of CRC parameters. This task required less than 5 minutes on a standard
laptop. Following the steps described above, we discovered that the second
16-bit checksum corresponds to a CRC checksum that is computed over the
entire message using the standard CRC-16-CCITT [83].
We then repeated this approach for the first 16-bit checksum but we did not
succeed on finding the CRC parameters. A key observation was that this
checksum remains identical when performing a specific action regardless of
the device programmer and/or neurostimulators being used. In other words,
this checksum depends only on the state, action and payload fields. To create
messages with a valid checksum, we intercepted several messages sent by the
device programmer, and XORed them to create new messages where only one
bit is set to ‘1’ and the rest of bits are set to ‘0’. We repeated this approach for
each of the bits within these message fields, and created a code-book with all
possible messages and their corresponding checksums. Let us give an example
to describe how to compute the first 16-bit checksum of a message using our
approach. Assuming that our message contains a ‘1’ in the third, fifth and
eleventh position, then we can compute this checksum by XORing the checksums
of the third, fifth and eleventh messages, respectively, within our code-book.
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5.3 Protocol State-machine
This section describes the three phases of the communication between the device
programmer and the neurostimulator. This includes the initialization phase,
the reprogramming phase and the termination phase.
Initialization phase: Initially, both devices exchange several messages
so that the device programmer requests all the information stored on the
neurostimulator.
We found that the device programmer always starts the communication by
sending a message that is identical across sessions which contains the model and
serial number of the device programmer. Within this message, the fields that
denote the SN and model of the neurostimulator are kept empty. This is because
the device programmer is not linked to any neurostimulator and does not yet
know with which neurostimulator it is communicating. The neurostimulator
then replies with a message containing its SN and model. From that point
until the end of this phase, the device programmer always sends one message
to request data whereas the neurostimulator replies back with two distinct
messages. The former is an acknowledgment that indicates whether the message
was received correctly, while the latter contains the data.
Reprogramming phase: After the initialization phase, the device programmer
can be used to modify the neurostimulator’s settings as many times as needed
within the same protocol session. We discovered that the device programmer
sends only one message to adjust the settings, to which the neurostimulator
replies with two different messages that remain identical regardless of the action
being performed.
Termination phase: Before an ongoing communication is terminated, the
device programmer sends a message to the neurostimulator which enables the
latter to switch to power saving mode. The neurostimulator replies back with
the same two messages that it sends after it has been reprogrammed.
In the next section, we show that it is not necessary to follow the normal
protocol flow in order to perform attacks on the neurostimulators.
6 Software Radio-based Attacks
This section details several software radio-based attacks that we are able to
perform on the neurostimulator which could endanger the safety and compromise
the privacy of patients. We conducted all these attacks in an isolated laboratory
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environment with the device programmer turned off. We focus on an experiment
where we changed the patient’s name (programmed on the neurostimulator)
since this allows us to easily verify whether the experiment succeeded. However,
we want to emphasize that we can mimic the behavior of a legitimate device
programmer to send valid messages to a neurostimulator in order to change any
of its settings.
Replay attacks: We were able to modify any of the neurostimulator settings
just by intercepting and replaying past transmissions sent from legitimate device
programmers. However, this attack has two important practical limitations.
The adversary needs to wait until there is an ongoing communication between
a device programmer and a neurostimulator in order to intercept the messages.
Furthermore, the adversary can only replay messages that were already
transmitted by legitimate device programmers, which clearly limits the impact
of the attack.
Spoofing attacks: Unlike the previous attack, spoofing attacks require to have
partial or full knowledge of the protocol. After reverse engineering the protocol,
we were able to create any arbitrary message and send it to the neurostimulator.
One possible limitation that makes this attack less practical is that the adversary
needs to know the neurostimulator’s SN in order to create a valid message.
Intuitively, adversaries could obtain the neurostimulator’s SN by intercepting
the exchanged messages while there is an ongoing communication. As the first
message sent by the device programmer is always identical regardless of the
neurostimulator, adversaries could also replay this message to a neurostimulator
and intercept the response since this contains its SN.
We found a way to overcome even this limitation, which allows adversaries to
send messages to a neurostimulator without knowing its SN. More specifically, we
discovered that neurostimulators accept messages with an empty neurostimulator
SN field. In our experiments, we were able to change the patient’s name,
programmed in the neurostimulator, by sending a single message with no
neurostimulator’s SN. The impact of this attack is quite large as an adversary
could create a valid message, without a SN, and reuse it for all neurostimulators.
The only challenge for adversaries is to be close enough to the victim in order
to communicate to the neurostimulator. However, there are definitely several
scenarios, such as a crowded subway, where this would be possible.
Privacy attacks: Since our reverse engineering on the proprietary protocol
shows that the data sent over the air is unencrypted, passive adversaries can
eavesdrop the wireless channel to infer private information about patients.
Active adversaries can additionally send messages to the neurostimulator to
request specific data. The data sent over the air between the device programmer
and the neurostimulator includes diagnosis, symptoms, disease or therapy
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information. Moreover, all messages exchanged between the devices include
a unique neurostimulator SN which could be used for adversaries to identify,
locate and track patients. For this purpose, adversaries could install beacons
in strategic locations (e.g. in hospitals or train stations) to learn the patients’
movement pattern based on the signals transmitted by their neurostimulators.
DoS attacks: One would expect that neurostimulators switch to “sleep
mode” once an ongoing communication is terminated. However, we found
that neurostimulators always remain active and accept a message as long as
its format and checksums are correct. We also observed that adversaries can
send valid messages to the neurostimulator without needing to first execute the
initialization phase. While we did not try to quantify the effect of performing a
DoS attack against these devices, adversaries could repeatedly send malicious
messages to the neurostimulator in order to deplete its resources faster, similarly
to the attacks proposed by Hei et al. [73].
7 Security Architecture
In this paper, we propose a practical security architecture that allows the
device programmer and the neurostimulator to securely exchange messages.
Our solution consists of three main items: (i) session key initialization, (ii)
key transport and (iii) secure data communication. The first two items are
particularly challenging for medical implants.
To bootstrap a secure communication channel, a symmetric (session) key need
to be shared between the devices. This key could be generated by the device
programmer and transported from the device programmer to the neurostimulator
using an OOB channel. However, this approach presents two limitations. Most
OOB channels, that allow to transport a key from the device programmer to
the IMD, are shown to be vulnerable to security attacks or require to add
extra hardware components in the neurostimulator. An alternative solution
would be to generate the key in the neurostimulator and transport it from the
neurostimulator to the device programmer. Halperin et al. presented a audio-
based key transport solution where the IMD generates a random symmetric key
and transports it to the device programmer through an acoustic channel [70].
Even though the authors stated that the key can be received only by a device
programmer that can make physical contact with the patient, Halevi et al.
showed that it is possible to recover the key from far away by eavesdropping
the acoustic channel [68].
We propose a solution where a symmetric (session) key is also generated in
the neurostimulator and transported from the neurostimulator to the device
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programmer using a secret OOB. Our solution overcomes the previous limitations
and ensures that the key can only be picked up by a device programmer that
touches the patient’s skin long enough. Below, we define our adversarial model
and give an overview of all the building blocks of our solution.
7.1 Adversarial Model
We consider the presence of strong adversaries who can eavesdrop or jam the
wireless channel, as well as modify, replay or forge messages. Adversaries
can be in close proximity with the patient and can possess any legitimate
device programmer, even those that already interacted with the neurostimulator.
However, adversaries cannot compromise the neurostimulator or the device
programmer while being used, since this would make it impossible to protect
the neurostimulator. Doctors are trusted and do not collude with adversaries.
Adversaries can neither touch the patient’s skin long enough without the patient
noticing it, nor compromise any device that can make physical contact to the
patient (e.g. a smart watch). Within the community, it is accepted to assume
that physical contact to a patient means the ability to cure or harm [114]. When
designing security solutions and defining the adversarial model for medical
devices, it is important to note that the primary goal of a medical device is
to treat patients. Clearly, safety is of utmost importance and security should
never interfere with this task.
7.2 Overview of the Solution
Our solution involves three main steps: (i) key generation, (ii) key transport and
(iii) secure data exchange. More concretely, our solution works as follows. Firstly,
the neurostimulator uses a physiological signal from the patient’s brain as a
source of randomness for generating a 128-bit symmetric key. This key is valid
only for a single session and is independent from old and future keys. Thus, if an
adversary ever compromises a session key, he will not be able to compute past
and future keys, i.e. backward and forward security are guaranteed. Secondly,
this session key is transported securely and reliably from the neurostimulator to
the device programmer through a secret OOB channel. Similarly to H2H [114],
our solution follows a “touch-to-access” access control policy where access to
the neurostimulator is granted only to device programmers that can touch
the patient’s skin long enough. This provides a practical yet effective balance
between security and permissive access in emergencies since it allows medical
personnel to have immediate access to the neurostimulator without needing
to contact care providers for device-specific cryptographic keys. In contrast
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to the existing solutions, key transportation can be achieved without adding
extra hardware components on the neurostimulator. Once the key has been
transported, the devices can optionally run a standard authentication protocol
so that they can prove to each other that they posses the session key. Finally,
this session key is used to bootstrap a secure communication channel between
the devices.
7.3 Key Generation
True random number generators (TRNGs) are an essential building block of
cryptographic systems for generating cryptographic keys, nonces and masks.
Unfortunately, IMDs typically use microcontroller-based platforms and lack
dedicated TRNGs, making it non-trivial to generate random numbers on these
devices. Several articles have proposed to use the initial content of the static
random-access memory (SRAM), on-chip RC oscillators and on-board external
clocks as an alternative to TRNGs [74,76]. However, these approaches need to
be evaluated for each specific device since their performance depends on the
platform and hardware components being used.
Recently, the use of physiological signals extracted from the patient’s body has
been proposed for generating cryptographic keys. This approach has several
advantages with respect to traditional approaches based on PRNGs or TRNGs.
Specifically, they allow to reuse signals that are already being gathered by the
devices as a low-cost source of randomness. A possible limitation is that some
physiological signals, such as those extracted from the patient’s heart, can be
predicted or measured remotely, which makes them vulnerable to attacks. In
this paper, we explore the potential of using a signal from the patient’s brain,
that cannot be measured remotely by adversaries, as a randomness source for
generating cryptographic keys. Our approach can be applied to any medical
device that can measure the LFP signal from the patient’s brain.
LFP signal as a randomness source
We propose to use a physiological signal from the patient’s brain called local field
potential (LFP), which refers to the electric potential in the extracellular space
around neurons. The choice of the LFP for randomness extraction is based on
the following reasons. Firstly, neurostimulators can easily measure signals in
the patient’s brain. There are already neurostimulators on the market that use
the LFP to create feedback for the delivered stimulation. As the LFP can be
collected with the existing lead configurations (i.e. without changing the leads’
position or requiring extra leads), future generations of neurostimulators will
require only minor software changes to be able to measure this signal. Secondly,
unlike other physiological signals such as the ECG, the LFP can be measured
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only through direct contact with the patient’s brain, thus cannot be obtained
remotely.
To analyze the feasibility of extracting randomness from the LFP to generate
a 128-bit key in the neurostimulator, we used real LFP data collected from
22 mice4. Figure 4 shows LFP data collected from one of the 22 mice. While
we recorded LFP data simultaneously from 16 electrode contacts connected to
the mice brain using the W16 wireless recording device [17], we only looked at
one of these channels. Our technique to extract randomness can be applied to
LFP data collected from any of the 16 different channels. During each LFP
recording, the mice were walking on a horizontal ladder. This is a well-known
test that is used for many different purposes (for more details about this test,
see Metz and Wishaw [95]).
The first step in our assessment was to extract the least significant bit of the
sampled LFP data and used it as the raw random number. This is because
the lower bits of LFP data seem to be quite noisy. Another possibility would
be to extract multiple bits from the sampled LFP data but this would require
to evaluate their joint probability distribution. We then computed the XOR
of three consecutive bits using a simple two-stage parity filter to increase the
entropy density. Figure 5 shows the histogram of 8 consecutive bits after
applying the two-stage parity filter. Based on our results, these bits are to some
extend uniformly distributed, which demonstrate the potential of the LFP as a
randomness source for deriving a symmetric key. Following the test suites from
NIST 800-90B [42], we estimated that the Shannon-entropy is around 0.91/bit.
The Shannon-entropy could be further improved by increasing the number of
stages of the parity filter.
4Using data from mice to extract preliminary results to better understand the human
brain is common practice in many scientific disciplines.
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Figure 4: LFP data of one of our mice collected from one channel and sampled
with 16-bit precision.
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Figure 5: Histogram of bits (in groups of 8 consecutive bits) after applying the
parity filter.
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7.4 Key Transport
Once a fresh cryptographic session key is generated in the neurostimulator,
it has to be securely transported to the device programmer. Our technique
for key transportation leverages the fact that both the patient’s skin and the
neurostimulator’s case are conductive. We propose to apply an electrical signal
(with the key bits embedded in it) to the neurostimulator’s case such that the
device programmer can measure this signal by touching the patient’s skin, as
shown in Fig. 6. To realize this technique, two extra short wires are needed
from the microcontroller to the case of the neurostimulator. We discussed this
technique with doctors and they claim that applying a signal of a few microvolts
or millivolts to the neurostimulator’s case would not cause any problem or be
unpleasant to patients.
device 
programmer
neurostimulator
microcontroller
programming head
= skin
Figure 6: Technique to transport a session key from the neurostimulator to the
device programmer.
To evaluate the suitability of this technique, we implemented a proof-of-concept
using a NI USB-6351 DAQ and a neurostimulator. To emulate the human body,
we used a 1 cm layer of bacon on a 4 cm layer of beef, as suggested by Kim et
al. [80]. While this model does not account for changes in the skin conductance,
for example, due to patient’s emotions or sweat, all these factors can only make
the patient’s skin to be slightly more conductive than usual. In other words,
none of these factors will affect the reliability of our technique. However, this
could make it easier for adversaries to capture the EM radiations generated
when transporting the key.
To preclude potential EM eavesdropping attacks, our system should be designed
to minimize undesired EM radiation produced by the hardware components.
This can be done by lowering the transmission power. While this comes at the
cost of having a lower data rate, this would not be a problem in our solution.
Another way of decreasing the EM emanations would be to use wires (from the
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microcontroller to the neurostimulator’s case) that are sufficiently short and
twisted. To further decrease the EM emanations, one could follow widely used
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) guidelines [4]. In addition, the undesired
EM emanations generated from other devices that are in close proximity with the
patient (e.g. his smart-phone) could be used to masquerade the EM radiations.
To simulate the process of transporting the key, we created a transmitter and a
receiver LabVIEW program. We modulated the data using a standard OOK and
set the symbol rate and the sampling rate to 100 symbols/s and 500 ksamples/s,
respectively. Given that the duration of each symbol is 10 ms, the 128-bit
key can be transported in less than 1.5 s. A few additional delays could be
deliberately introduced in the key transport process such that access to the
neurostimulator is guaranteed only to device programmers that can touch the
patient’s skin long enough.
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Figure 7: Waveform of the signal received by our DAQ at the other side of the
meat.
For our experiments, we connected two wires from the transmission port of
the DAQ to the neurostimulator’s case. We then placed the meat on top
of the neurostimulator, and attempted to measure the transmitted signal at
the other side of the meat. Then we mimicked the behavior of a legitimate
device programmer by using two wires to touch the meat while connected
to the receiver port of the DAQ. The first step was to modulate the “1s”
and “0s” corresponding to the 128-bit session key using the OOK modulator.
Subsequently, we applied the modulated electrical signal to the neurostimulator’s
case using our transmitter. A short preamble sequence could be sent before the
key is transmitted to help to synchronize the devices. Existing techniques to
detect and correct bit errors could also be used to increase the robustness of
our technique. Using our receiver, we measured and demodulated the signal to
retrieve the key bits previously transmitted by the neurostimulator.
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Progr model and SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
32 bits
Neuro model and SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
32 bits
Counter︸ ︷︷ ︸
12 bits
State︸ ︷︷ ︸
x bits
Action︸ ︷︷ ︸
y bits
Payload︸ ︷︷ ︸
z bits
MAC︸ ︷︷ ︸
64 bits
Figure 8: Optimized message format.
We conducted a series of experiments to determine the minimum signal power
from which the device programmer can recover the key bits transmitted by the
neurostimulator. It is important to note that the transmission power could be
even further reduced by using an enhanced multi-feature OOK demodulation
scheme, as the one proposed by Kim et al. [80]. Figure 7 illustrates the waveform
of the signal (with the key bits embedded in it) that is received by our DAQ at
the other side of the meat. This figure shows that it is possible to recover the
key bits, which consists of a series of alternating ‘1s’ and ‘0s’, by demodulating
a signal whose amplitude is less than 1 mV. Our results show that, when using
the parameters mentioned above, the key can successfully be transported from
the neurostimulator to the device programmer.
Furthermore, we tested whether it is possible to recover the key without needing
to touch the patient’s body when using the minimum signal power that we used
in the experiment discussed above. For this, we connected two wires to the
receiver port of the DAQ and used them as an antenna to try to measure the
EM emanations. We repeated this experiment from several distances ranging
from 3 meters to a few centimeters. In none of these cases, we were able to
capture the transmitted key. This led us to conclude that the key can only be
successfully received when touching the patient’s skin.
7.5 Secure Data Exchange
For the sake of completeness, we describe how to establish a secure
communication channel once the session key has been transported from the
neurostimulator to the device programmer. First, both devices could (optionally)
execute any authentication protocol to prove to each other knowledge of the
shared session key. For efficiency reasons, we chose not to use an authentication
protocol. Instead, both devices can implicitly demonstrate knowledge of the
key during the first communication session.
The use of cryptography allows for secure data exchange between devices.
However, it also increases the energy consumption in both the neurostimulator
and the device programmer. This energy consumption can be divided into
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two components: (i) computation and (ii) communication cost. The former
indicates the cost of performing cryptographic operations while the latter refers
to the cost of transmitting/receiving bits to/from a device. However, several
papers have shown that the computation cost is often negligible compared to
the communication cost [92, 124]. Thus, we propose to use a new optimized
message format that is slightly different from the original message format (see
Fig. 3). This allows to build security mechanisms into the devices while keeping
the additional energy consumption as low as possible in the neurostimulator.
Figure 8 shows the new optimized message format. It includes the same fields
as those in the original message except for the two 16-bit checksums, and
additionally has a 12-bit counter and a 64-bit MAC that is computed over the
entire message. The reasoning behind the proposed message format optimization
is the following. A 64-bit MAC offers a good trade-off between cost and security
against both off-line and on-line attacks. To prevent replay attacks, the 12-bit
counter is increased by one in each message and reset every time a new session
key is generated. A message is accepted only if its counter is greater than the
one in the previous received message. All these message optimizations lead to
an increase of the message size of only 44 bits, which corresponds to an extra
communication overhead of less than 10% compared to the original message
format.
Since we need to encrypt all message fields except for the SN and model fields
of both the device programmer and the neurostimulator, we recommend to use
any secure authenticated encryption scheme [3].
8 Limitations and Future Work
Lack of stochastic model for LFP. Our results indicate that the use of the
LFP signal is a promising way for extracting randomness in neurostimulators.
However, we conducted all our experiments without having a stochastic model
on the entropy source or a physical model on the mechanism of the signal origin.
In future work, we will develop a stochastic model for the LFP, and conduct a
thorough analysis to gather more evidence that LFP can be used as a source of
randomness in neurostimulators.
Consider a more powerful adversarial model. Our current solution
assumes that adversaries cannot compromise any device that can make physical
contact to the patient (e.g. a smart watch). In future work, we want to relax
this requirement and also allow the adversary to compromise any wearable
device of the patient.
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9 Conclusions
In this work we have evaluated the security and privacy properties of a widely
used commercial neurostimulator. For this, we fully reverse engineered the
proprietary protocol between the device programmer and the neurostimulator
over a short-range communication channel. We demonstrated that reverse
engineering was possible without needing to have physical access to the devices
by using a black-box approach. This allowed us not only to document the
message format and the protocol state-machine, but also to discover that the
messages exchanged between the devices are neither encrypted nor authenticated.
We conducted several software radio-based attacks that could endanger the
patients’ safety or compromise their privacy, and showed that these attacks
can be performed using inexpensive hardware devices. The main lesson to be
learned is that security-through-obscurity is always a dangerous design approach
that often conceals insecure designs. IMD manufacturers should migrate from
weak closed proprietary solutions to open and thoroughly evaluated security
solutions and use them according to the guidelines.
To preclude the above attacks, we presented a practical and complete security
architecture through which the device programmer and the neurostimulator
can agree on a session key that allows to bootstrap a secure communication
channel. Our solution grants access to the neurostimulator to any device
programmer that can touch the patient’s skin long enough. This allows to
create a secure data exchange between devices while ensuring that medical
personnel can have immediate access to the neurostimulator in emergencies.
Our solution accounts for the unique constraints and functional requirements
of medical devices, requires only minor hardware changes in the devices and
provides backward and forward security.
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A Appendices
A.1 Design of an Antenna Operating at 175 kHz
Since there are no off-the-shelf antennas suitable for transmitting at 175 kHz,
this component had to be designed and manufactured in house. The low
working frequency points at a loop antenna as the optimal solution. A small
loop antenna with N turns and a surface area S carrying an electric current
Io behaves similarly to a magnetic dipole with magnetic moment Iml given in
Eqn. 1:
Iml ≈ NSIo . (1)
Thus, to maximize the magnetic field component, the equivalent dipole moment
should be maximized. The conventional topology for near field communication
systems assumes that the antenna size is comparable with the size of the
neurostimulator antenna. Thus, the surface area S is determined by the size
of the neurostimulator. The number of turns N can easily be adjusted. The
electric current Io depends on the output power and on the antenna matching.
A small loop antenna behaves like an inductor with very small losses [41]. So it
is not matched with a conventional 50 Ohm output and special antenna tuning
is required. Due to the low frequency this tuning circuit can be constructed
using lumped elements. The simplest type of matching network is a so called L
matching network based on two reactive elements to match almost any load
impedance to a 50 Ohm output at a single frequency [59]. Unfortunately, due to
the large detuning of the antenna, the antenna impedance and the exact circuit
model of the lumped elements, thus including parasitic components, should
be known at the working frequency with a very high accuracy. Because the
capacitor equivalent series resistance (ESR) can be comparable with the very
small antenna resistance, the design of such a small loop antenna is typically
based on a trial and error approach. We manufactured the loop antenna from a
4 m long blue 7 x 0.25 mm cable with PVC insulation from LappKabel. The
antenna input impedance was measured using a low cost vector analyzer called
miniVNA. The measured value was about 1.8 + j 79.4 Ohm at 175 kHz. The
input antenna resistance is determined mainly by the Ohmic wire resistance.
A perfect matching can be obtained with two ideal capacitors of 2.4 nF and
9.4 nF. Since there were no such capacitors available, the actual tuning was
performed by the consecutive testing of different capacitors. The final matching
circuit contains two capacitors of 1 nF in parallel and 1 capacitor of 10 nF. All
capacitors were fixed on a breadboard to ensure the possibility to easily retune
if necessary.
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The magnetic field level was tested using a 6 cm H-field probe, Model 901 from
the EMCO 7405 Near Field probe kit, and an Anritsu MS2721A spectrum
analyzer. At first the field level of an original RF transmission was measured
and recorded. Then the recorded message was re-transmitted using the set-up
based on our antenna, and the magnetic field level was again measured. The
new transmitter with the designed antenna provides a magnetic field level and
a bandwidth comparable with those generated by the original neurostimulator.
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Abstract. A growing number of implantable medical devices
(IMDs) are equipped with a wireless interface that enables non-
invasive monitoring and reprogramming through an external device
programmer. However, the wireless interface also poses major
security and privacy risks to patients. The use of cryptography
is challenging due to the IMDs’ constraints and the inherent
tensions between functional requirements, such as availability
and utility, and the desirable security and privacy goals. A well-
studied problem yet unsolved is how to securely establish and
manage cryptographic keys between the device programmer and
the IMD. This paper presents a critical evaluation of cryptographic
solutions that rely on using patient’s physiological signals for the
device programmer and the IMD to agree on a cryptographic key.
We first challenge several widely adopted assumptions made by
cryptographic solutions, and show that they do not always hold in
practice. We go on by conducting a thorough analysis of two well-
conceived cryptographic solutions, namely the H2H protocol and
the Biosec protocol. We found that these solutions have serious
security weaknesses and design flaws. Finally, we describe the
process of how to securely use patient’s physiological signals in
cryptographic solutions, and discuss research directions for future
work.
1 Introduction
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers, implantable car-
dioverter defibrillators (ICDs) or insulin pumps, are used to monitor and
treat patients with chronic diseases such as arrhythmia or Parkinson disease.
Currently, the vast majority of IMDs is equipped with a radio interface that
allows wireless communication with external devices, also known as device
programmers. Device programmers enable doctors not only to gather telemetry
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data and patient information stored in the IMD, but also to modify the IMD’s
settings remotely. This helps to enhance the patients’ life quality by providing
more flexible and personalized treatments while improving the sustainability
of health-care systems. However, despite the benefits of the wireless interface,
there are also significant security concerns for patients. For example, adversaries
could eavesdrop the wireless channel to compromise the patient’s privacy, or
send malicious commands to the IMD to alter its settings or disable the therapy.
The latter can endanger the patient’s life and in worst case can lead to fatal
consequences for patients.
Several articles have already shown that IMD manufacturers often rely on hiding
the protocol specifications as a means to provide security (i.e. security-through-
obscurity). Moreover, an important body of research has identified several
security shortcomings in these systems. For example, Hei et al. introduced
simple yet effective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against IMDs that cannot be
prevented with traditional cryptographic solutions [73]. These attacks can reduce
the IMD’s battery lifetime from several years to a few weeks only. Halperin et
al. analyzed the proprietary wireless communication protocol between a device
programmer and an ICD to communicate over a short-range communication
channel (less than 10 cm) [70]. As no security mechanisms were found, they were
able to perform various attacks, that range from changing the therapy to inducing
fibrillation, by just replaying past transmissions sent by legitimate device
programmers. Marin et al. investigated the security of the proprietary protocol
between a device programmer and the latest model of an ICD over a long-range
communication (few meters) [91]. After fully reverse engineering the protocol
using a black-box approach, they were able to conduct several types of attacks
using only inexpensive hardware devices. Similarly, Li et al. reverse engineered
the proprietary protocol between a remote control and an insulin pump [86].
Marin et al. extended the previous work by reverse engineering the proprietary
protocol between an insulin pump and all its potential peripherals [92].
Prior work has also studied countermeasures to protect the wireless commu-
nication channel between the device programmer and the IMD. Among these
countermeasures, a promising approach for the device programmer and the IMD
to establish a cryptographic key is to use a physiological signal of the patient,
such as the electrocardiogram (ECG), as a source of randomness.
Contributions: This paper provides a critical evaluation of key establishment
and authentication protocols that rely on physiological signals. In detail, our
main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Identification of unrealistic assumptions. We challenge several
assumptions that are widely adopted, and explain why they do not hold
in real scenarios.
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• Attacks against two well-known cryptographic solutions. We
discovered several protocol weaknesses and design flaws in the H2H and
Biosec.
• Propose a set of security design guidelines. We describe all the steps
that need to be followed in order to securely use patient’s physiological
signals in cryptographic solutions.
Paper outline: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of related work. Section 3 challenges several widely used
assumptions considered in previous works and demonstrates that some of them
do not hold in real scenarios. Section 4 shows that the H2H protocol and the
Biosec protocol have serious protocol weaknesses and design flaws that make
them vulnerable to attacks, whereas a set of security design guidelines that
describe the process of how to securely use physiological signals in cryptographic
solutions is given in Section 5. Section 6 discusses several research directions
for future work. Finally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
Several types of security solutions have been proposed to create a secure data
exchange between the device programmer and the IMD. These countermeasures
can be grouped into three main categories: (i) using external devices as shields,
(ii) using auxiliary or Out-Of-Band (OOB) channels and (iii) using patient’s
physiological signals. In this section, we review each of these solutions.
2.1 External Devices
Gollakota et al. proposed to use an external device, also known as “shield”, in
order to mediate between device programmers and legacy IMDs. It relies on
friendly jamming to jam the messages to/from the IMD in order to prevent
unauthorized entities from decoding them, while still being able to receive and
decode them itself. While the shield can alleviate some security issues, it also
has important downsides. Specifically, the shield can interfere with ongoing
communications between legitimate devices, and does not protect against high-
powered adversaries. Furthermore, the shield provides only weak confidentiality
guarantees since multiple input multiple output (MIMO) adversaries can
cancel out the jamming signal and recover the message content, as shown
by Tippenhauer et al. [128]. Xu et al. presented a wearable device called
“IMDGuard” that authenticates the device programmer on behalf of the ICD
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through an ECG-based key establishment protocol [134]. However, Rostami et
al. found that the IMDGuard is vulnerable to a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM)
attack which reduces its effective key length (EKL) from 129 bits to 86 bits [113].
Zhang et al. introduced “Medmon”, a multi-layered anomaly detection system
that relies on physical and behavioral anomaly detection to detect malicious
actions [136]. Depending on the severity of the threat, Medmon can either
warn the patient or jam the wireless channel to block malicious messages. Yet,
Medmon is energy-consuming, offers very limited security protection and is
neither flexible nor user-friendly. Another limitation of all these approaches
is that jammers are illegal in many countries and their use can result in large
fines.
2.2 Auxiliary or OOB Channels
Halperin et al. presented a zero-power authentication protocol by which the
device programmer and the IMD can agree on a key. For this purpose, a
random symmetric key is first generated in the IMD and then transported to
the device programmer over an audio channel [70]. The authors stated that
the key can only be picked up by device programmers that touch the patient’s
skin. However, Halevi et al. demonstrated that it is possible to recover the key
by eavesdropping the acoustic channel from a few meters away [68]. Kim et
al. [80] and Abhishek Anand et al. [38] proposed two similar pairing schemes
that consist of transmitting a key over a vibration channel while jamming the
acoustic channel to mask the acoustic emanations produced as a side effect of
the vibration. Although this technique prevents adversaries from recovering the
key transmitted over the acoustic channel, it remains unclear what the effects
are on the key sent over the vibration channel, and also whether the vibration
channel can be eavesdropped. Rasmussen et al. proposed an access control
system that is based on using ultrasonic distance bounding in combination
with the Diffie-Hellman protocol [109]. In this solution, the IMD establishes a
key with any device programmer that is in its close proximity, meaning that
this provides security only under the assumption that the adversary cannot be
sufficiently close to the patient.
2.3 Using Patient Physiological Signals
The use of physiological signals (PS) extracted from the patient for generating
and establishing a cryptographic key between two (or more) devices was first
proposed by Poon et al. [104]. In contrast to biometrics, which are to some
extend time-invariant, PSs are random signals that vary over time. Examples
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of PSs used in authentication and key establishment protocols include the
ECG, photoplethysmogram (PPG), blood glucose, blood pressure, temperature,
hemoglobin and blood flow [135]. For example, Poon et al. [104] and Rostami
et al. [114] showed that the time between patient heartbeats, also known as
interpulse interval (IPI), exhibits two desirable properties: (i) it provides a high
level of randomness and (ii) it can be measured anywhere in the patient’s body
by touching her skin.
A common approach for establishing a cryptographic key between the device
programmer and the IMD is that both devices take a measurement of the
chosen PS independently and synchronously [90]. These PS measurements
are typically not equal and at best only rather similar due to the noise, and
not necessarily uniformly distributed. However, cryptographic keys need to be
random, uniformly distributed and identical on both sides of the communication.
The problem of how to generate cryptographic keys from noisy data was first
studied by Dodis et al. [57]. Prior work in the domain of medical device security
has proposed to use PSs in combination not only with fuzzy cryptographic
primitives, as suggested by Dodis et al., but also with cryptographic commitment
schemes. Below, we give an overview of the existing solutions belonging to each
of these groups.
1) Fuzzy cryptographic primitives: Miao et al. proposed to modify the
original fuzzy vault so that it can be applied in the context of body sensor
networks [96]. K Venkatasubramanian et al. presented a key agreement protocol
based on the use of a fuzzy vault, also known PKA, which uses PPG signals as a
means for sensors to agree on a cryptographic key [131]. K Venkatasubramanian
et al. also proposed PSKA, a key agreement protocol that uses a fuzzy vault
to allow sensors to securely communicate with each other without requiring
any initialization phase or pre-deployment of keys [132]. Yet, Bagade et al.
showed that it is possible to break PSKA with an average probability of 30%
after a 30-second handshake [40]. Furthermore, PSKA does not provide high
security guarantees due to the limitations on the feature size, and requires a
complex algorithm to generate the chaff (i.e. random) points. Intuitively, one
could increase the number of chaff points to enhance the security of PSKA.
Nevertheless, this would result in collisions between the chaff points and the
legitimate points generated by the other sensor. Hu et al. proposed a fuzzy-
vault-based key agreement protocol – called OPFKA – which overcomes the
limitations of PSKA [77]. However, Rostami et al. showed that the OPFKA is
vulnerable to an attack that exploits the use of a hash function to expand the
feature size [113]. Cherukuri et al. proposed a key distribution protocol, also
known as Biosec, wherein PSs extracted from the patient’s body are used to
securely transport a session key between two sensors [49]. Biosec relies on a
fuzzy commitment scheme and enables sensor re-keying.
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2) Commitment scheme: Rostami et al. presented heart-to-heart (H2H),
a commitment-scheme-based pairing protocol through which the device
programmer authenticates to the IMD without needing to share any prior
secrets [114]. H2H ensures access to the IMD by any device programmer that
can touch the patient’s skin to measure her IPI. For this, both the device
programmer and the IMD need to take a measurement of the patient’s IPI
independently and synchronously. These measurements are then used as a
“fuzzy password” that is known only to them.
In the next sections, we will discuss several limitations and security problems
in the H2H and Biosec protocols.
3 Unrealistic Assumptions and Adversarial Models
In this section, we challenge several widely adopted assumptions when deploying
security solutions in IMDs, and show how they can be bypassed in practice.
• The device programmer will only be used by medical profession-
als.
Currently, most device programmers are vendor-specific and lack security
measures to authenticate the doctor, meaning that anyone that possesses
a device programmer can interact with all IMD’s models of a specific
manufacturer. This introduces important security risks for patients with
an IMD since adversaries can easily purchase a device programmer on
the Internet1 or steal it from a hospital. Indeed, according to the 2014
Healthcare Breach Report from Bitglass [21], many hospitals struggle to
keep their devices and equipment away from adversaries. Surprisingly,
this report shows that there are more data breaches due to loss or theft
of devices than to security attacks by hackers.
• It is difficult for adversaries to obtain a master key.
In the literature, there are several security solutions that use a master
key to bootstrap a secure communication between the device programmer
and the IMD (e.g. [70]).
As previously mentioned, adversaries can purchase or steal a device
programmer to mount attacks against patients with an IMD. If this
approach is used, there is no need for extracting the master key. However,
this approach has some limitations since device programmers are often
1By the time we wrote this paper, there were several device programmers from different
manufacturers on sale in eBay.
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big and heavy and hence do not fit in a backpack. Instead, adversaries
can attempt to extract the master key from a device programmer located
in a hospital through side-channel or physical attacks (e.g. [82], [37]).
Once the key is compromised, they can use their own commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware devices to conduct attacks. In contrast to
device programmers, these devices are more inexpensive and portable.
While these attacks are rather straightforward if no security measures are
deployed, there are ways to increase the difficulty of performing them. For
example, by storing the master key in secure hardware on the device’s
programmer.
In addition to securely storing the master key in the device programmer,
other security mechanisms should be enforced to avoid breaches in the
supply chain that expose the key to adversaries. For example, the master
key should be kept in a server that is physically protected (e.g. put
in a secure place where it cannot be stolen or tampered with). In
addition, an adequate access control system should be implemented so that
only authorized employees have access to the server through appropriate
identification/authentication mechanisms. But even if all these security
measures are deployed, the master key could still be leaked through insider
adversaries.
The previous examples show that the attack surface is quite large. If
adversaries ever manage to obtain the master key using any of these
methods, they could compromise the security of millions of devices. This
poses a serious threat to solutions that are based only on factory-installed
secrets stored in device programmers.
• Adversaries cannot make physical contact or be sufficiently
close to the patient i.e. physical contact or proximity between the
device programmer and the IMD enables private and/or authentic
communications.
Several solutions have been proposed that use electromagnetic, vibration
or acoustic OOB channels as a means to authenticate or establish a key
between the device programmer and the IMD [109,114]. The security of all
these solutions relies on the assumption that adversaries cannot eavesdrop
or tamper with the data sent over these channels. However, as shown
in Section 2, all these solutions are vulnerable to remote eavesdropping
attacks (e.g. [68, 86]). These attacks make it possible for adversaries to
intercept the data transmitted over these OOB channels without needing
to be nearby. Nevertheless, adversaries still need to make physical contact
or be in close proximity with the patient in order to perform attacks.
This is because device programmers typically activate (or interact with)
IMDs over a short-range channel that requires the device programmer
154 A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SECURITY SOLUTIONS BASED ON PHYSIOLOGICAL
SIGNALS
to be located a few centimeters away from the IMD. However, there are
scenarios, such as a crowded subway, where adversaries can be in close
proximity with patients to execute these attacks.
• PS cannot be obtained remotely, i.e. PSs can only be picked up
reliably when the device programmer makes physical contact with the
patient.
Prior work has demonstrated that some PSs, such as those extracted
from patient’s heart, can be gathered without the need for being in close
proximity with the patient. This can be achieved using several methods.
For example, Calleja et al. showed how to collect information of cardiac
signals remotely using inexpensive hardware equipment [47]. Seepers et al.
showed that well-known remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) techniques
allow to measure the heart rate with similar accuracy as when doing so
by touching the patient’s skin [122]. Poh et al. presented a technique
through which the patient’s heart rate can be measured using a standard
webcam [103]. Katabi et al. showed that even WiFi signals can be used
to infer the breathing and heart rate of individuals [24]. This renders
all security solutions based on these PSs insecure, and shows that PSs
extracted from the patient’s heart are particularly vulnerable to attacks.
4 Security Attacks and Design Flaws in PS-based
Security Solutions
In this section, we show that both the Biosec and the H2H have serious protocol
weaknesses and design flaws which render them insecure.
4.1 Attacks on H2H
By using public-key cryptography in combination with a commitment scheme,
the H2H protocol enables the IMD and the device programmer to securely
exchange data. H2H implements a novel access-control policy called “touch-to-
access” which ensures access to the IMD by any device programmer that can
make physical contact with the patient to measure her heart rate. Figure. 1
provides an overview of the H2H pairing protocol. H2H can be divided into
two different phases: (i) a secure-channel setup phase and (ii) an authentication
phase.
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IMD Device programmer
SecChannel R−→ s  (0, 1)k
read PV α ( ν) read PV β ( ν)
wa
R←− (0, 1)k wb R←− (0, 1)k
Ca = Commit((α, s); wa) Cb = Commit((β, s); wb)
Ca
Cb
wa
if Ca 6= Commit((α, s); wa) or
dist(α, β) > d; then abort
wb
if Cb 6= Commit((β, s); wb) or
dist(α, β) > d; then auth ← reject
auth
if auth = reject; then
wait for time τ
Figure 1: H2H pairing protocol proposed by Rostami et al.
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IMD Adversary Device Programmer
SecChannel R−→ s SecChannel R−→ s’
read PS α ( ν)
wa
R←− (0, 1)k
Ca = Commit((α, s); wa)
Ca
Adversary chooses random PS β ( ν)
wb
R←− (0, 1)k
Cb = Commit((β, s); wb)
Cb
wa
Adversary learns α
w′a
R←− (0, 1)k
C ′a = Commit((α, s’); w′a)
C ′a
read PS υ ( ν)
w′b
R←− (0, 1)k
C ′b = Commit((υ, s’); w′b)
C ′b
w′a
if C ′a 6= Commit((α, s’); w′a) or
dist(α, υ) > d; then auth ← reject
w′b
auth
Figure 2: MiTM attack. The adversary wants to trick the device programmer
into believing that it is communicating with the legitimate IMD while it actually
does it with him.
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In the secure-channel setup phase, a secure but unauthenticated channel is first
created between the IMD and the device programmer using the transport layer
security (TLS) protocol. This channel provides confidentiality, integrity and
freshness. The IMD takes the role of a TLS client whereas the device programmer
acts as a TLS server. The device programmer presents its certificate to the
IMD but the latter does not verify it. This is to avoid the burden of needing
a public-key infrastructure (PKI). The secure-channel setup phase outputs a
unique, random number s which does not need to be kept secret, e.g. the hash
of the TLS master key and the public key.
In the authentication phase, the IMD authenticates the output value of the
previous phase s by using the touch-to-access policy described above. This is
achieved using a commitment scheme that allows both devices to commit to
their respective IPI measurements in a secure manner.
The first step for the IMD and the device programmer is to take an IPI
measurement denoted by α and β, and generate a random number wa and
wb, respectively. Each of the devices binds its commitment (Ca and Cb) to s
in order to avoid that adversaries reuse α or β on a different channel. Once
Ca and Cb have been exchanged, the IMD sends wa to open the commitment
Ca, allowing the device programmer to obtain α. Subsequently, the device
programmer verifies whether α, wa and s were used to produce Ca, and that
the distance between α and β is less than a predetermined threshold according
to some metric. If these conditions are met, the device programmer sends
wb to open the commitment Cb, allowing the IMD to obtain β. Similarly, as
before, the IMD verifies whether these parameters were used to produce Cb,
and that the distance between α and β is within a predefined threshold. If
these conditions are satisfied, the IMD considers the public key included in the
certificate it received during the secure-channel setup phase as authentic.
We want to emphasize that the H2H lacks important details about both the
TLS protocol that is run in the secure-channel setup phase and the commitment
scheme that is used in the authentication phase. Without these details, it is
difficult to assess the security offered by this protocol. The security of H2H
is based on the assumption that the IPI measurements (α and β) are secret
one-time values that are only known to the IMD and the device programmer,
which can be revealed at the end of each protocol instance. However, we show
that it is possible to conduct two attacks against H2H, namely a reflection and a
MiTM attack, without needing to touch the patient’s skin to learn the patient’s
IPI.
Reflection attack: We found a simple yet effective attack where adversaries
can gain access to the IMD without needing to know the patient’s IPI. Our attack
leverages the fact that the H2H protocol is symmetric in both directions (i.e.
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from the IMD to the device programmer and vice versa), and works as follows.
The adversary first executes the secure-channel setup phase to establish a TLS
session with the IMD. Recall that the IMD does not validate the certificate it
receives from the device programmer. In the authentication phase, the goal
of the adversary is to authenticate s (the TLS output) without having access
to any IPI measurement. However, we observed that adversaries can simply
replay the messages the IMD sends. In other words, the adversary can choose
Cb and wb to be equal to Ca and wa. This tricks the IMD into believing that
it executes the TLS protocol with a device programmer that can measure the
patient’s IPI. To fix this flaw, the IMD can simply reject Cb if it is identical to
Ca. Another possible solution would be to modify the protocol such that it is
no longer symmetric.
MiTM attack: The H2H protocol is susceptible to a MiTM attack where
adversaries convince the device programmer that it is communicating with the
legitimate IMD while it actually does it with a fake IMD (i.e. the adversary).
The attack is shown in Figure. 2 and works as follows. The adversary
first executes the secure-channel setup phase with the IMD and the device
programmer, respectively, to establish two simultaneous independent TLS
sessions s and s′. In the authentication phase, the IMD creates its own
commitment Ca and sends it to the device programmer (in that case the
adversary). Upon receiving Ca, the adversary creates its own commitment Cb
and sends it to the IMD. Both Ca and Cb are binded to s. Cb can be whatever
random value the adversary chooses. The next step for the IMD is to send wa to
allow the opening of the commitment Ca, which enables the adversary to obtain
α (the IPI measurement taken by the IMD). As soon as the adversary learns α,
he aborts the session with the IMD, creates a new commitment C ′a that contains
α, and sends it to the device programmer. The device programmer then creates
and sends its commitment C ′b. Both C ′a and C ′b are sent over s′. After receiving
C ′b, the adversary sends w′a, which allows the device programmer to open the
commitment C ′a. Following the same procedure, the device programmer sends
w′b such that the IMD (in that case the adversary) can open the commitment C ′b.
Finally, the adversary can simply reply with an auth message without needing
to open the commitment C ′b. Upon receiving auth, the device programmer is
convinced that it is communicating with the IMD over s, but actually it is doing
it with the adversary over s′.
4.2 Security Analysis of Biosec
The goal of the Biosec protocol is to use PSs extracted from the patient’s body
to securely exchange data between two sensors. Fig. 3 provides an overview of
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the protocol proposed by Cherukuri et al. Before outlining how the protocol
works, we give an overview of the variables and cryptographic primitives used
throughout the protocol.
Notation: We denote by Data, eData the data in an unencrypted and
encrypted form, respectively. m corresponds to a 128-bit MAC tag whereas
Ks is a 128-bit key generated by S1 and transported to S2. ms is a 128-bit
random number generated through various PSs whereas ru is a 128-bit static
patient’s ID. Kc is a 128-bit sequence that is computed by XORing ms and
ru. Its function is to mask Ks. Scom is a 128-bit sequence that is the result of
masking Ks with Kc. We denote the same variables as m′s, K ′c, K ′s when they
are generated/computed by S2. Furthermore, Biosec assume that all sensors
use an error correction code (ECC) that can correct up to T errors. For this,
the following equation needs to be satisfied: T = (D - 1)/2; where D is the
minimum distance of the ECC. H denotes a one-way function (e.g. a hash
function).
The Biosec protocol works as follows: S1 generates a random session key Ks
and encrypts some information Data. This results in a ciphertext, eData, i.e.
eData = EKs(Data). Subsequently, a MAC tag m is computed over eData
(m = MACKs(eData)). To transport the key Ks from S1 to S2 without
revealing it to adversaries, S1 first adds some redundancy to Ks (depending on
the type of ECC), conceals its value using Kc and computes H(Ks). eData, m
and Scom are then sent to S2, where Scom = H(Ks) ‖ (Ks⊕Kc). Subsequently,
S2 attempts to undo the masking operation in order to obtain Ks from Scom
through the use of K ′c. Ideally, if the PS measurements were identical, it would
be trivial for S2 to obtain Ks. In practice, though, as m′s is not equal but rather
similar to ms, K ′s is slightly different than Ks. To retrieve Ks from K ′s, S2
applies the ECC previously used by S1, computes H(K ′s), and verifies whether
the result corresponds to H(Ks). If this condition is satisfied, Ks can be used
to verify m and decrypt eData.
The security of Biosec is based on the assumption that adversaries cannot obtain
Ks by intercepting the messages sent over the air. However, we demonstrate
that this assumption do not always hold. In particular, we want to highlight
that the Biosec protocol lacks a rigorous security analysis which lead to several
important design flaws.
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S1 S2
eData = EKs(Data)
m =MACKs(eData)
Generate random Ks
Kc = ms ⊕ ru
Scom = H(Ks) ‖ Ks ⊕Kc
eData ‖ m ‖ Scom
K ′c = m′s ⊕ ru
K ′s = ECC(Ks ⊕Kc ⊕K ′c)
if H(K ′s) 6= H(Ks); then abort
m′ =MACKs(eData)
if m′ 6= m; then abort
Data = DKs(eData)
Figure 3: Key distribution protocol proposed by Cherukuri et al.
• Kc randomness: As previously explained, Kc is the result of XORing
several PSs with ru. Its function is to conceal Ks while it is being
transported, preventing adversaries from obtaining this key while it is
transported from S1 to S2. However, it is unclear what the purpose is
of using the static ID and how S2 knows ru. We argue that ru does not
provide any extra security since the masking operation (i.e. XOR) is linear
and hence its effect can be cancelled out just by capturing two messages
and subtracting their Kc values.
• PSs randomness: As it has been pointed out by the authors, another
possible shortcoming of Biosec could be the lack of sufficient PSs entropy.
• Reuse of the key: We observed that a single key is used for providing
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confidentiality and authenticity. Using one key in multiple cryptographic
primitives is considered to be “bad practice”. An easy fix to this problem
would be to use Ks to derive two independent random keys using a
standard key derivation function (KDF), or even better, use authenticated
encryption.
• Using an ECC: The use of an ECC reduces the EKL since it adds
redundancy to correct errors, thus reducing its entropy. A possible solution
would be to increase the key length to achieve the same level of security
that is expected when no ECC is used. The authors, though, define Ks
as a 128-bit key and do not consider the loss of entropy. When using an
ECC to correct a significant number of errors, the EKL can be reduced
considerably. This could make Biosec vulnerable to brute-force attacks
where adversaries can try all key combinations. This type of attack can
be carried out regardless of the randomness level of the PSs and the type
of masking operation being used. For each key attempt, adversaries can
check whether they successfully guessed the key since the hash of the
key being used is included in the message. In addition, adversaries could
potentially perform these computations off-line and create a table with
all possible keys and their corresponding hash values. Thus, adversaries
only need to capture one message sent from S1 to S2 and find the match
in the table in order to recover the key.
5 How to Use Physiological Signals in Security?
5.1 Criteria for Selecting Physiological Signals
PSs need to satisfy several properties, some of which are similar to those used
in biometric systems.
• Readiness: The process of acquiring the PS should be as fast as possible.
• Exclusivity: Only the device programmer and the IMD should be able
to accurately measure the PS.
• Availability: The PS should depend neither on the patient nor on his
health condition.
• Entropy: The PS should provide high entropy so that it is possible to
generate random keys in short periods of time. More specifically, the PS
should offer high inter-subject variability and high intra-subject variability.
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• Precision: The differences between the PS measured by the device
programmer and IMD should be as small as possible to maximize the
EKL and reduce the acquisition time.
5.2 Fuzzy Extraction from Physiological Signals
The use of PSs for generating, transporting and establishing keys needs to be
carefully formulated in order to avoid undesired information disclosures. For
this purpose, the most appropriate formal construction is the fuzzy extractor,
introduced by Dodis et al. [57]. The properties of fuzzy extractors have been
widely analyzed and are well understood. Informally, fuzzy extractors comprise
the following two primitives:
• Generate. This primitive is a randomized procedure that takes a fuzzy
measurement r as an input and outputs a public string P as well as a
secret string S. S can be used as a cryptographic key or as a seed in a
KDF.
• Reproduce. This primitive consists of two inputs, namely a fuzzy
measurement r′ and the public string P previously generated by Generate.
If the distance between r and r′ is below a given threshold t, Reproduce
outputs the same secret string S as the one produced by Generate.
In this domain, both the device programmer and the IMD need to independently
and simultaneously take a PS measurement, which is denoted by r and r′,
respectively. Subsequently, one party executes Generate, whereas the other
performs Reproduce. The idea behind fuzzy extractors is that, if r and r′ are not
equal but similar, both parties will be able to agree on the same cryptographic
key. Prior work has also analyzed the entropy loss on the fuzzy measurement
due to the disclosure of the public string P , which is also known as helper
data [57]. This depends on the PS entropy and the precision, i.e. the similarity
between the measurements taken by the device programmer and the IMD.
In addition to all properties that PSs need to satisfy, there are other practical
aspects that need to be considered. For example, the use of fuzzy extractors
increases the energy consumption in both the device programmer and the IMD.
Specifically, the energy consumption can be divided into two main components:
the computation and the communication cost. The former refers the cost of
conducting operations such as ECC decoding, whereas the latter refers to the
cost of transmitting/receiving bits to/from a device.
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Below, we discuss each of these practical aspects more in detail.
Helper data. Beyond the helper data derived by the Generate procedure,
quantization helper data can also be produced. Zero-leakage quantization helper
data does not disclose any information about the discrete PS representation,
links the continuous and discrete representations, and reduces the FAR and
FRR [53]. In this scenario, the FAR represents the probability that a random
PS measurement produces the same secret string as the one produced by
Generate. Similarly, the FRR corresponds to the probability that a genuine
PS measurement produces a different secret string than the one produced by
Generate.
A well-known drawback of fuzzy extractors is that the use of helper data
increases the communication burden and hence the energy consumption in both
the device programmer and the IMD. This is because the helper data needs to
be transmitted from the party that executes Generate to the one that executes
Reproduce. When using quantization helper data, additional information needs
to be transmitted, increasing even more the communication burden. However,
using quantization helper data reduces the number of expected errors, and
therefore the complexity of Reproduce.
Complexity and energy consumption. In contrast to device programmers,
which are external powerful devices, IMDs are resource-constrained devices that
pose severe limitations on the computation complexity and energy consumption.
Thus, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis to estimate the complexity
and energy cost required to execute both the Generate and Reproduce procedures.
The Generate procedure is typically less computationally complex than the
Reproduce procedure. Practical implementations of fuzzy extractors, such as
the fuzzy commitment, use a remarkably simple Generate procedure, and
the complexity is mostly concentrated on the Reproduce procedure. Yet, the
Generate procedure requires some randomness. We argue that the device
programmer can easily generate randomness from different entropy sources.
However, it is certainly a non-trivial task to extract randomness in resource-
constrained devices like IMDs. Furthermore, the party executing the Generate
procedure has to transmit helper data – which could also include quantization
helper data – to the other party. Marin et al. [92] showed that communication
cost is dominant compared to the energy cost required to compute low-
complexity cryptographic primitives such as symmetric encryption/decryption.
In this domain, it is unclear whether the communication cost is still dominant
or the ECC-related operations (i.e. computation cost) are more energy hungry
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Security and usability considerations. Another important aspect is how
to set the working point of the fuzzy primitives. Figure 4 shows the error rates
as functions of the EKL for a 255-bit synthetic signal. For this, we assumed
constant error rates per bit for the legitimate and adversarial signals, and used
BCH ECCs [45, 75]. The EKL is the length of the message encoded by the
ECC in a fuzzy commitment scheme. For example, when the EKL is 91 and
the code length is 255, the code used is a BCH with length 255, dimension 91,
and error correcting capability 25. Ideally, the EKL and the FAR are related
by the following equation:
FAR = 2−EKL (1)
However, in practice the most usual case is that FAR  2−EKL. This is because
of an imperfect source coding. In other words, the entropy of the discrete
features provided to the fuzzy extractor is far from maximum. The EKL is
related to the resilience of a fuzzy extractor to be spoofed by an adversary
who does not have access to a genuine PS source. This adversary succeeds
with probability 2−EKL. Similarly, the FAR is the probability of success of an
adversary who samples a genuine PS source.
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Figure 4: Example of False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate as a
function of the EKL for 255 code length BCH codes.
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As illustrated in Figure 4, the more error correction capabilities are used, the
lower the FRR becomes. This also results in a shorter EKL. FRRs are closely
related to availability, since a high FR would make the device pairing less reliable
and hence more time consuming. In general, fuzzy primitives provide a variety
of available working points and security trade-offs for the same signal. As not
all the functions and sessions of a device programmer-IMD might have the same
requirements, different working points can be set. Session-specific security and
availability requirements can be specified to select the most appropriate ECC
and working point.
6 Future Work
In this section, we discuss several potential research directions for future work.
New physiological measurements. New PSs can be investigated that meet
the necessary requirements in terms of Readiness, Exclusivity, Availability,
Entropy, and Distinctiveness.
Efficient and flexible fuzzy primitives. To minimize the energy
consumption in the IMD due to the use of fuzzy extractors, an analysis is
needed to determine which of the two types of energy costs is the dominant.
This will determine the role played by each of the devices and the types of ECC
that will be employed. At the same time, more research is needed that explores
whether and how to design more efficient and flexible fuzzy primitives.
Doctor authentication. As previously mentioned, anyone in possession of
a device programmer can use it to interact with an IMD. However, as device
programmers are non-constrained external devices, there are several ways to
ensure that only legitimate doctors can use device programmers. For example,
one possible solution would be to give doctors an authentication token or smart
card with cryptographic capabilities containing a public-private key pair signed
by the manufacturer.
Hybrid approaches. One possible solution to overcome the limitations of
some the existing security solutions would be to combine them in an hybrid
approach. For example, using a factory-installed key and a proximity or contact-
based secret sharing scheme. In such systems, the factory-installed keys would
not be a single point of failure, since the adversary would also need to get an
accurate PS in order to obtain to the session key. Equivalently, having access
to the PS, or simply eavesdropping the short-range communication would not
suffice either, i.e. the adversary would need to simultaneously be in possession of
the factory-installed key. However, while an hybrid solution would significantly
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increase the security protection, it could also have a negative effect on the IMD’s
reliability. Thus, more research is needed to investigate how to combine several
security solutions without increasing the overall energy cost and significantly
decreasing the IMD’s reliability.
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented a critical evaluation of security solutions protocols
that rely on patient’s physiological signals for generating and establishing a
cryptographic key between the device programmer and the IMD. We showed
that most of these solutions rely on unrealistic assumptions that underestimate
the adversaries capabilities. Furthermore, our work revealed serious security
weaknesses in two well-known cryptographic solutions, namely the H2H and
the Biosec protocol. Finally, we provided a set of recommendations on how to
securely use physiological signals in cryptography. The observations and lessons
learned from this work can facilitate the process of how to design both more
efficient fuzzy cryptographic primitives and secure protocols.
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